

POLITICAL AND MILITARY
EVENTS
IN BRITISH INDIA.

FROM THE YEARS 1756 TO 1849.

BY

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POLITICAL
AND
MILITARY EVENTS IN INDIA
1756—1849.

CHAPTER I.

THE GORKHA WAR, 1814—16.

THE Gorkha war.—1814-16. The territories of Nepal¹ extended for a distance of more than seven hundred miles along the northern frontier of the British possessions. In the year 1765, the valley of Nepal was partitioned among the three Hindoo rajas of Khatmandu, Lalita-patan, and Bhatgaon.²

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 4.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 336, (1763) mentions that Meer Casim, nabob of Bengal set out on an expedition against the kingdom of Nepal. An Armenian commanded the expedition and a party was sent up with boxes containing muskets.

“ In 1767, a military force under Major Kinloch drove the Gorkhas out of the province, and, following them into the hills, took possession of Makwanpur. When a good understanding with the court of Khatmandu was restored, Mr. Hastings gave up that part of Makwanpur which was situated in the hills, but retained the low lands on the Bettia frontier as a compensation for the cost of the military expedition, which the Bengal government had been compelled, in self-defence, to undertake.”¹

Gorkha is the name of the town situate in the district of the same name, whence the Gorkhas, the conquerors of the country, came. In 1792, the Gorkhas sent an army against Lhassa, and compelled the Lamas to pay tribute to the Brahminical ruler of Nepal. The Emperor of China, incensed by the indignity offered to a religion of which he is the secular head, dispatched a large army to Nepal, which defeated the raja's

The object was to arm these persons. The boxes were said to contain presents. One of the party got intoxicated and the plot was discovered. The plan was to seize on Khatmandu. In 1765 the raja of Bettia became a subject of the British government. The raja of Makwanpur was conquered by the Gorkhas shortly before that date.

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 13.

troops, and advanced within a few miles of Khatmandu. The raja agreed to pay a yearly tribute. They had for many years been making encroachments on the territories of our allies, subject to the presidency of Bengal. Their encroachments commenced as far back as 1787, and were persisted in, with intervals, until 1813.

In 1804, the Nepalese had made claims on the districts of Sheoraj and Bhotwal, within our ceded provinces. The Marquis Wellesley did not think it proper, on the eve of his leaving India, to enter upon a war with these people. Sir George Barlow offered, in 1805, to relinquish the Company's claims to Sheoraj, if they would give up Bhotwal.¹ In 1809, Lord Minto remonstrated against the retention of Bhotwal. The mutiny at Madras, and the expeditions to the French and Dutch islands, prevented, at the time, military proceedings against the raja of Nepal. In 1811, they made fresh encroachments on Gorakhpur. The government were reluctant to go to war. The Nepal raja considered this as a sign of the want of power in the Indian government. On the 29th May, 1814, the Nepalese attacked our police on the frontier. Hostilities now became evident.

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 11.

An army was appointed to take the field, consisting of several divisions.

The first division under Major-general D. Ochterlony, consisting of sixty thousand men, was destined to attack the Gorkha positions at the western extremity of their line. The second division, under Major-general Gillespie, consisting of three thousand five hundred men, was to occupy the Dehra Dhoon, and besiege Jytak. The third division, under Major-general J. S. Wood, consisting of four thousand five hundred men, was to march from the Gorakhpur frontier, through Bhotwal and Sheoraj, to Palpa. The fourth division, under Major-general Marley, was nearly eight thousand strong. The total force, twenty-two thousand men. The force was to march through the valley of Mukwanpoor to Khatmandu. Local corps were stationed on the British frontier. On the south-east frontier, Captain Latter was posted with the Rungpoor local battalion, and a battalion of regular native infantry. The whole force, including irregulars, amounted to more than thirty thousand men, and sixty guns. It was said the Gorkhas could muster twelve thousand regular troops.

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 22.

Major-general Gillespie's division proceeded, *via* the Timli Pass on the 19th October, 1814, into the valley of the Dhoon. On the 22nd, Lieutenant-colonel Mawby, with the main body, occupied the town of Dehra.

The Gorkhas fell back to Kalanga. Lieutenant-colonel Mawby marched upon that fort, summoned the garrison, who returned an answer of defiance. General Gillespie joined the advance on the 26th, with the remainder of his force. Heavy guns were brought up, but no proper breach was made, though preparations were made to carry the fort by storm. The assault took place on the 31st October. There were four columns of attack and a reserve. Three of the columns having a detour to make, never heard the signal gun, and had not reached their destinations. The enemy made a sortie, which was repelled. The general thinking our troops might follow them into the fort, ordered the advance of the troops on that side. "The men could not scale the wall, as the ladders could not be fixed, owing to the enemy's fire. The attempt to force the outwork and carry the gate failed. General Gillespie placed himself at the head of three fresh companies, and of one hundred of the 8th dismounted dragoons. The

53rd hung back. The general called on the men to follow him, when he was shot through the heart. The fall of the general completed the discouragement of the men; and a retreat was ordered." One of the other columns arrived in time to cover the retreat. Colonel Mawby,¹ on whom the command devolved, returned to Dehra, and there waited the arrival of a battering-train from Delhi.

The train having arrived, the army² advanced again on the 25th November against Kalanga. A battery of eighteen-pounders made a practicable breach by noon on the 27th. The troops³ moved with their muskets *unloaded!* The assault failed. Within the breach there was a precipitous descent of about fourteen feet, at the foot of which stood a part of the garrison armed with spears, &c., supported by another portion with matchlocks and various missiles. There was not a proper breach.⁴ The storming party was recalled. The loss was :—

¹ Of the 53rd ;—was disliked by his men]

² Wilson, vol. viii. p. 27.

³ Two companies fifty-third and six companies of native infantry. covered by the light infantry of the fifty-third and supported by the rest of the troops.

⁴ The men remained two hours under fire near the breach.

	OFFICERS.	PRIVATES.
Killed . . .	4 . . .	33
Wounded . . .	7 . . .	636
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	41	669
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL . . .		680

It appeared afterwards that the enemy procured the water for the garrison at some distance outside. No attempt was made to prevent the enemy getting the water by stationing parties to cut it off. The signals made by guns in the hills were useless, as they could not be properly heard, as no one knew where the sound came from. Recourse was now had to a bombardment. The fortress was little more than an open enclosure within stone walls, and afforded no shelter to the besieged, and soon became untenable. In the course of three days the stench from the unburied bodies became intolerable; the commandant abandoned the place, with seventy survivors out of the six hundred who had composed the garrison. Balbhadra Sing effected his escape unperceived, and joined three hundred fresh troops which had been sent to his relief. The party was pursued by Major Ludlow, who, by great activity, came upon them suddenly on the night of the 1st December, 1814. After

a smart action the Gorkhas were routed. They disappeared among the recesses of the mountains, and our troops returned to camp. The fort of Kalanga was demolished.¹

The result of the above checks and the heavy loss suffered, raised the spirits of the Gorkhas, and induced us to make additions to the force to carry on operations against Nepal—three regiments of native infantry of two battalions each were ordered to be raised,² and eight grenadier battalions were formed of eight companies each, and their places were supplied by supplementary grenadier companies being raised; so that an additional force of about twelve thousand men were added to the Bengal army; the grenadier battalions being attached to the different divisions of the army in the field.

The division under Colonel Mawby after the capture of Kalanga,³ was directed to march to the westward, into the valley of Karda, so as to effect a co-operation with the division under Colonel Ochterlony. On the 19th December the division was within seven miles of Nahan,

¹ See Nepal Papers, pp. 460, 490, for official reports.

² G. O. G. Gen. C. 16th Dec. 1814.

³ Wilson, p. 31.

the capital of Sirmor. The Gorkha army in that quarter was commanded by Ranjor Sing Thapa the son of Amar Sing, whose head-quarters were at Jytak, a fort on the top of a mountain, five thousand feet above the sea. On the 20th December the force was joined by Major-general Martindell. He occupied Nahan, and moved to the foot of the range, on the highest peak of which stood the fort of Jytak, the approach to which was defended by stockades at various heights. It appeared that the garrison obtained their supply of water from wells situated outside the fort and some distance below it. Majors Richards¹ and Ludlow,² had minutely reconnoitred the position, and ascertained the above fact. The general resolved to attempt to cut off the supply of water, and to destroy the strongly stockaded post to the west of the fort, erected for the defence of the wells. Major Ludlow's party³ was to move against the post on the left and nearest side; the other, under Major Richards⁴

¹ Lieutenant-general Sir W. Richards, K.C.B.

² A distinguished officer who died many years ago.

³ Grenadier company's fifty-third foot, three companies light infantry battalion and nine companies sixth native infantry, and one of pioneers, (nine hundred men).

⁴ First battalion thirteenth native infantry light companies fifty-third foot, seventh, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh

to make a detour, and attack the stockade in the rear. The columns were overpowered by a superior force, and compelled to retreat. Major Richards left camp at midnight: he had sixteen miles to march by paths rarely admitting two men abreast. He reached the foot of the hills by 8 A.M., and having gained the summit, advanced within three hundred yards of the fort of Jytak. The enemy were engaged with the force under Major Ludlow. He marched an hour later, having a much shorter distance to go, and earlier came into contact with the enemy: he had driven back their picquets at 3 A.M. The column advanced to the summit of a hill, and dislodged a small Gorkha post. They advanced against a stockade with only part of the force, and failed. The troops in India had not been accustomed to warfare in a mountainous country. With narrow paths and steep ascents troops move slowly. The Gorkhas themselves always stockaded their position at every halting-ground. We afterwards adopted the plan of stockading, and a more connected form of attack. Dr. W. Darby gallantly exerted himself when native infantry, and a company of pioneers (little above six hundred men). Nepal Papers, 504.

not professionally engaged, with Major Richard's column. The general did not send supporting parties, as he had been advised to do: the two columns could not support each other; while the enemy detached their main body. On the *plains* they were always defeated; but in their difficult *hills* the Gorkhas are, sword in hand, good fighters, and are, also, good shots. The loss was four officers killed, and eight wounded, and four hundred and fifty-three men killed and wounded in both columns, total four hundred and sixty-five. This repulse had a most mischievous effect upon the progress of the campaign; as Major-general Martindell did not think himself competent to resume offensive measures.

General Ochterlony, further to the west was successful.¹ He was opposed to Amar Sing Thapa, the most celebrated of the Gorkha leaders. The scene of action was a rugged country. From the left bank of the southern arm of the Sulej, rises a succession of lofty mountains. On three of the ranges, the Gorkha general had constructed the forts of Nalagerh, Ramgerh, and Malaun, stone structures, the approaches to which were defended by strong timber stockades.

¹ Wilson, p. 37.

The general's division ascended the hills at the end of October, 1814. On the 2nd November, he arrived before the first and lowest of the mountain ridges. Here stood the fort of Nalagerh, with the outwork of Taragerh, higher up the hill, commanding the entrance into the mountain. With much labour the guns¹ were raised to an elevation to breach the walls. By the 4th, batteries were opened, and on the 6th the enemy surrendered Taragerh. Towering far above the pass of Nalagerh, and at an elevation of four thousand six hundred feet above the sea, appeared the mountain on which stood the fort of Ramgerh. Amar Sing, on hearing of Ochterlony's advance, marched from Arki with three thousand regular troops towards Ramgerh. He took up a position and stockaded it. Ochterlony wisely resolved not to make an attack in *front*. He determined to turn the enemy's left, and assail their position from the rear. He moved to the heights of Nahan, seven miles north-east from Ramgerh. He erected a battery, which was found to be too distant. Lieutenant Lawtie, engineers, with a small party, in reconnoitring for a nearer position was surrounded. A rein-

¹ Eighteen-pounders.

forcement sent from camp, had one officer killed, and seventy sepoy killed and wounded, greatly owing to the misconduct of the men. Hearing of the second failure at Kalanga, Ochterlony applied for reinforcements, and suspended offensive operations. In the meantime, roads were made, and the organisation of the irregular levies of the adherents to the British cause went on; when (26th December) the force being joined by the 2nd battalion 7th native infantry, with a train of field artillery, and by a Sikh levy, General Ochterlony resumed active operations.

On the 27th of December, 1814, Colonel Thompson was dispatched to prosecute the plan¹ of spreading along the enemy's rear, and intercepting his communications with Arki² and Bilaspur, by occupying the Dibu hills, a low range on the north east of Ramgerh. A lodgment was effected. The Gorkha general made a desperate and fruitless effort to drive away the detachment. General Ochterlony, leaving a force under Brigadier Arnold to watch the enemy's movements, marched so as to place himself on the north of the last range of hills between Malaun and the

¹ Wilson, p. 41.

² Arki is seen on the road up to Simla.

Sutlej. On the 6th January, 1815, he ascended the bed of the Gambhira river, and,¹ crossing the mountains on which Malaun stood, took post at Battoh, on the north bank of another mountain stream, the Gamrora, nearly opposite to the centre of the range, sending forward two thousand Hinduris, under Captain Ross,² to occupy the heights above Bilaspur. This movement effected his object. Amar Sing, alarmed for his communications, withdrew his main body from Ramgerh, and, leaving a garrison in the fort, concentrated his force on the ridge of Malaun. Colonel Arnold then moved round the opposite extremity of the ridge, to co-operate with General Ochterlony on its northern base; delayed by a rough country, and a heavy fall of snow, he turned the north-west extremity of the line, and received the submission of the government of Bilaspur, and possession of the fort of Ramgerh, divided only by a deep and extensive hollow from Malaun. A force, under Lieut.-Colonel Cooper, dislodged the Gorkhas from Ramgerh, and other posts which they had continued to hold to the south, and then moved to co-operate

¹ Crossed in going to Subathoo.

² Now Colonel R. Ross

with the main body. These movements, and the severity of the season,¹ prevented the completion of the investment of Malaun till the 1st of April, 1815. In the meantime, the armies acting at the eastern extremity of the line of operations had been engaged with the enemy, but had made little progress.

The third division of the army, under Major General J. S. Wood, assembled at Gorakhpur early in November, 1814, but was not ready to take the field till the middle of December.² The destination was the district of Palpa, lying beyond Bhotwal, and accessible by a difficult mountain pass. On the 3rd of January, General Wood marched to reconnoitre the stockade of Jitpur, situated at the foot of the Majkote hills, one mile west of Bhotwal, which it would be necessary to carry. Major Comyn was sent with seven companies to turn the *left* flank of the position; the general himself proceeded with twenty-one companies to attack it in front and on the right. *He* expected, on clearing a wood through which lay the road, to come out upon an open plain at some distance from the stockade. The general and his staff unexpectedly found them-

¹ Snow fell.

² Wilson, p. 44.

selves within fifty paces of the stockade. The enemy opened a heavy fire, and the garrison made a sortie. The troops coming up saved the party. The main body attacked the works in front, while one company of His Majesty's 17th foot, under Captain Croker,¹ carried a hill to the right, which commanded the enemy's stockade. Instead of being *supported*, Captain Croker was recalled, and nothing was done to redeem the honour of the British arms. Major Comyn effected a passage between the stockade and Bhotwal, and approached the eminence on which the latter was situated. There appeared to be every probability of success, when the general commanded a retreat. Several officers were wounded. Lieutenant Morrison, engineers, died of his wounds. Had there been a proper advance guard and flanking parties, the general never would have got within fifty paces of the stockade without knowing that he was near the enemy. This force went into cantonments at Gorakhpur in the beginning of May: as exposure to the insalubrity of the climate in the Teerae² had already affected the troops.

¹ Late Colonel Croker.

² Low ground near the hills.

The chief reliance of Lord Moira¹ for the success of the entire plan of the campaign, rested upon the division which was to be directed against the Gorkha capital, Khatmandu. The troops assembled at Dinapoor, on the right bank of the Ganges, and marched towards Bettia,² on the 23rd of November, 1814. Major Bradshaw, commanding on the frontier of Sarun, joined by Major Roughsedge, with the Ramgerh battalion, and other troops, had proceeded previously to clear the frontier forests of the Gorkha posts. He surprised Parsuram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was encamped with four hundred men. He was surprised and routed, the thapa killed and fifty of his men, and many were drowned in the Bhagmati. Detachments under Captain Hay and Lieutenant Smith took possession of the posts of Baragerhi and Parsa, in advance of Barharwa, and the tract known as the Tirai was occupied, and annexed, by proclamation, to the British territories.³

The main army arrived at Pachraota, on the frontier, on the 12th of December, and the re-

¹ Wilson, p. 47.

² Eight or nine miles from the Saul forest.

³ Nepal Papers, 307.

mainder of the month was spent in preliminary arrangements for ascending the hills, and waiting for the battering train. The general's instructions were to leave the heavy guns in the rear, till he had established a solid footing in advance. This delay allowed the Gorkhas to recover from the alarm caused by the defeat and death of Parsuram Thapa. The Gorkhas were on the alert. To secure the occupation of the Tirai, Major Bradshaw had stationed Captain Hay, with the head-quarters of the Champaran light infantry, at Baragerhi; Captain Blackney, with the left wing of the 2nd battalion 22nd native infantry, at Samanpur, about twenty miles on his right; and Captain Sibley, with about five hundred men, at Parsa, about the same distance on Captain Hay's left. General Marley encamped near Lautan, two miles west of Baragerhi. The outposts at Samanpur and Parsa were unsupported, and no precautions were taken to secure either position by temporary defences, although they were situated in the immediate proximity of the enemy. Both posts were attacked in force on the 1st of January, 1815. Captain Blackney was taken completely by surprise, and, with his second in command (Lieutenant Duncan), was

slain at the first onset. The tents were set on fire, and the troops killed or dispersed, except a few kept together by Lieutenant Strettell, and conducted to Gorashan. At Parsa, Captain Sibley had suspected an approaching attack, and applied for reinforcements; four companies of the 15th native infantry were detached on the evening of the 31st of December, but they arrived only in time to cover the retreat of the fugitives. Captain Sibley and more than half his detachment were killed, and the whole of the stores, &c., taken by the enemy.

General Marley, deeming his position unsafe, made a retrograde movement to the westward to guard the depôt at Bettia, and for the security of the Sarun frontier, leaving a strong force with Major Roughsedge, at Baragerhi. The feeling of alarm extended to Gorakhpur and Tirhut; and the approach of a Gorkha army was universally apprehended. They, however, recovered the whole of the Tirai, not immediately protected by military posts; and made various incursions into the British territories. With regard to Parsa the state of the case was as follows.¹ Parsa was close on

¹ The author passed Parsa in March, 1816, on his return from Muckwanpoor, after the peace, which was signed on the

the bank of a deep stream on the side towards the Saul forest. There was a little mud fort on the bank, which would have contained most of the troops, but an entrenchment, connected with the fort, might easily have been made for the rest of the men. There was a six-pounder which might have been placed in the entrenchment. Instead of which they were attacked in camp, which was so close to it, that the discharges from the gun peeled off the bark of the trees. If they had been cut down, they would have had a clear open space; whereas the trees offered a protection to the enemy. There were no means adopted for ascertaining the approach of an enemy, though expected to make an attack.¹ Lieutenant Smith stated, that on the night before he warned Captain Sibley that he (Lieutenant Smith) had obtained intelligence of the expected attack to be made early next morning, but the report did not induce any precaution being taken. The force sent as a reinforcement halted when it arrived half-way, as no firing was heard. In September, 1780,

5th of that month, and he heard the account from Lieut. Smith, the second in command.

¹ Natives get up into trees to watch for tigers. A forest affords a good opportunity for look-out men.

Sir H. Munro halted his army on its march to the relief of the unfortunate Colonel Baillie at Perambaucum, because the firing he had heard had ceased. It was then that the explosion of Baillie's tumbrils told of the desperate position which demanded a quick advance.¹

Great efforts were made to add to the strength of General Marley's force.² His Majesty's 14th and 17th foot, and other troops, were at once dispatched to the frontier, raising the amount of the division to thirteen thousand men. The general hesitated to move; and after spending the month of January in inactivity, suddenly quitted his camp.³ Colonel Dick assumed the command, until the arrival of Major-general George Wood, towards the end of February.

The Gorkhas entrapped.—Lieutenant Pickersgill,⁴ Assistant Quarter-master General, was out surveying on the 20th of February, 1815, with a small escort, and came unexpectedly upon a party of four hundred Gorkhas. By skilfully pretending to retreat, he drew the party from the cover

¹ Recollections in military history are useful.

² Wilson, p. 50.

³ He left a note for the assistant adjutant-general desiring him to make the reports to Colonel Dick.

⁴ The author's brother officer.

of the forest towards camp. He sent information to camp. Colonel Dick sent one hundred irregular horse, and followed with the picquets. The cavalry and a number of mounted officers from camp charged the Gorkhas, when the commander, a chief of some note, and one hundred of his men were killed; fifty were taken, the rest fled, and many were drowned in crossing a rivulet.¹ "This affair struck so much terror into the Nepalese, that they hastily fell back from their forward positions, and again abandoned the Tirai." The road to Muckwanpoor was now open. But General Wood pleaded the advanced season of the year as an excuse for confining his operations to the plains; and having ascertained that the Gorkhas had evacuated the low lands (Tirai), the army was broken up and cantoned along the frontier, from the Gandak to the Kusi.² It is stated (after the 20th of February, 1815), that "A month remained for military operations before the unhealthy season commenced."

Sir D. Ochterlony³ in the last campaign marched

¹ While the zeal of the officers who mounted and went from camp, was acknowledged, a D. O. informed them that officers should not leave camp without their corps.

² Nepal Papers, 560.

³ Wilson, p. 69. The author was with Ochterlony's left column.

through the forest on the 12th of February, 1816. The treaty was signed at Muckwanpoor on the 5th of March, 1816, when the Assistant Adjutant-general, Captain Watson,¹ reported that half the European officers were on the sick list next day. The troops got back to Bettia on the 18th of March, when there was much sickness. Muckwanpoor is in a direct line twenty-five, but by the road about fifty miles of very difficult country to Khatmandu. This will show that General Dick could not advance with safety; for neither Colonel Ochterlony nor Colonel Nicolls had succeeded at Malown, or at Almora. General Marley's force, as compared with that employed in February, 1816, was inferior to Sir D. Ochterlony's army. The success of the operations in April (Almora) and May (Malown) 1815, gave us the means of further success; and not least, a good knowledge of the Gorkhas and their country.

We in 1816 had no opposition of any consequence; the pass by which Ochterlony advanced was turned. He had two strong brigades; the right and left columns made a *detour* to attack the enemy in flank, while Ochterlony advanced by the direct route. Now, neither in Marley's case,

¹ Lieutenant-colonel Watson died in 1851.

nor in that of Wood was there anything but a *direct* attack proposed. The author went with the left column,¹ and knows that route; all the troops (except the right column which never joined Sir David,) returned by the route by which Sir David advanced. *Three thousand men could have defended the pass against the whole of the troops employed in 1815*; and the force in 1816, was better equipped and organised. The troops had temporary cantonments in the rains of 1815, at Nauthpoor (near the Kusi river) at Ramnuggur, at Bhugwanpoor, and at Goruckpoor.² Many officers went away sick. There were hundreds of sepoy sent away sick from Nauthpoor, the most sickly of all the above cantonments.

The boundary of our frontier on the east of the river Kusi was protected from insult by a force under Major Latter, and the Gorkhas were driven from all their positions: occupation had been taken of the province of Morang, and an alliance had been formed with a hill chief, the raja of Sikim,³ a small state east of Nepal. His country is situated in the hills near Darjeeling,

¹ Adjutant of the 8th grenadier battalion.

² Wilson, p. 52.

³ Deposed in 1851 for his imprisonment, &c. of Dr. Campbell, the political agent at Darjeeling.

which has been a sanitarium for many years. While we defended him from the vengeance of the raja of Nepal, we secured an ally through whose country a route lies towards Khatmandu.

The province of Kumaon. A force¹ consisting of three battalions of native infantry, four six-pounders, two twelve-pounders, and four mortars, besides some irregular troops under Colonel Gardner and Captain Hearsay, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jasper Nicolls, his Majesty's 14th regiment, and Quarter-Master General of his Majesty's forces, was formed for service in the province of Kumaon. Colonel Gardner had been sent in advance in February 1815. Colonel Nicolls joined the troops on the 8th April before Almora. On the 25th a general attack was made on the stockaded defences of the hill of Sitauli, in front of Almora. Having established themselves in the town, the troops on the 26th commenced operations against the fort and opened a fire from the mortars. The enemy submitted; and the fort of Almora, with the provinces of Kumaon and Gerhwal, were ceded to the British. Our loss was one officer

¹ Wilson, p. 54.

killed, and one hundred and eighty men killed and wounded.

General Martindell¹ had made little progress in his operations. He was encamped before the fort of Jytak. Heavy ordnance had been carried up the mountain with prodigious labour and protracted delay.² On the 20th March, a battery levelled one of the stockades to the ground. No attempt was made to advance batteries sufficiently near to destroy the other stockades. The result of a blockade was tried; and the garrison would probably have yielded under the pressure of famine, had not its fall been accelerated by the brilliant results of General Ochterlony's contest with Amar Sing.

The heights of Malaun. Having reduced all the detached Gorkha posts, and confined them to the heights of Malaun, General Ochterlony determined to employ his whole force against the enemy's defences. The Gorkha posts extended along the summit of the Malaun range, having the fort of Malaun on the extreme right,

¹ Wilson, p. 56.

² Getting up eighteen-pounders was a difficult and arduous undertaking, till then but little known in warfare.

that of Surajgerh on the extreme left. Most of the intermediate peaks being occupied and stockaded. The stockades were strongest in the vicinity of Malaun ; and directly below the fort, on the slope of the hill, lay the Gorkha cantonments, similarly protected. On the right of Malaun, upon an eminence of somewhat less altitude, and separated from it by deep ravines, was situated the fort of Ratangerh, which had been occupied. The fort of Surajgerh was observed by a detachment under Captain Stewart, stockaded upon a contiguous elevation. Upon the top of the ridge there were two assailable points, Ryla and Deonthal, the latter more to the right and nearer to Malaun. Major Innes, on the 14th, established himself in position near Ryla. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, and Major Lawrie moved in the direction of Deonthal, on the 15th of May, and carried the post. Colonel Thompson, leaving Major Lawrie at Deonthal, advanced to besiege a stockade within battering distance of Malaun. The attack upon the cantonments near Malaun was repulsed by the Gorkhas. The British position at Deonthal was stockaded on the 15th. Amar Sing made a desperate effort to drive the British down the

hill, anticipating the fall of Malaun from their near approach, and placed the whole of his force under Bhakti Sing Thapa, whilst he supported the attack in person. The enemy advanced on the 16th so as to turn both flanks. The Gorkhas advanced with undaunted courage up to the very muzzles of the guns, and endeavoured to strike down our men over their bayonets.¹ The action had lasted two hours, when reinforcements from the post of Ryla having joined, the spirit of the enemy began to fail, while that of the sepoy rose with the continuance of successful resistance. Colonel Thompson ordered a charge with the bayonet by the sepoy and the irregulars to fall on, sword in hand. Major Lawrie led the charge. The Gorkhas gave way and fled, leaving their brave commander dead on the field. Amar Sing retired into the fort.

On the above occasion all the men serving our two field pieces were either killed or wounded, except three privates, by whom, and by Lieutenant Cartwright, of the artillery, Lieutenant Armstrong, of the pioneers, and Lieutenant Hutchinson, of the engineers, alone they were at last served. Unable longer to endure the hardships of the

¹ Wilson, p. 61.

blockade, and seeing no prospect of relief, and unsuccessful in their endeavours to prevail on Amar Sing to surrender, the main body quitted Malaun without arms, and gave themselves up to the nearest British post. The guns were opened upon the fort on the 10th May; on the morning of the 11th, Amar Sing sent his son to intimate his desire to negotiate; and a convention¹ was concluded, by which he consented to give up all the possessions of the Gorkhas on the west of the Jumna, and to send orders for the evacuation of Gerhwal. Amar Sing, with the garrison of Malaun, Ranjor Sing, with part of that of Jytak, and all members of the Thapa family, were allowed to return to Nepal with their private property and military equipments. The men were left the choice of departing for Nepal, or taking service with the British; and, most of them having preferred the latter alternative, they were formed into battalions for duty in the hills, for which they were peculiarly fit.² The government of Nepal sued for peace. The

¹ Wilson, p. 63.

² Two Nusseree battalions and one Simoor corps were raised—the Bengal sixty-sixth native infantry is also a Gorkha corps.

conditions the Governor-general proposed, were, 1st. The relinquishment of all claims on the hill rajas,¹ west of the Kali river; 2nd. The cession of the whole of the Tirai, or low lands, at the foot of the hills along the Gorkha frontier; 3rd. The restoration to the Sikim raja of all territory wrested from him, with the cession of two stockaded forts; and, 4th. The admission of a resident at Khatmandu. The first and third conditions were submitted to, and the mission of a resident reluctantly acquiesced in; but the cession of the Tirai² was a demand which the court of Nepal pertinaciously resisted." The negotiations began in May, and were protracted through the rainy season. On the 2nd December, 1815, the treaty was duly executed; the Commissioners promising its ratification under the red seal, the signet of the raja of Nepal, should be delivered in fifteen days. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-general in council on the 9th December; but the promised ratification from Khatmandu failed to make its appearance. Amar Sing Thapa was at

¹ The rajas of Kahlur, Hindur, Sirmoor, Bisahar, Deonthal Bagul, Jubal, and Gerhwal. Prinsep, 177.

² Wilson says, p. 64, extends from the river Tista east to the Ganges on the west, about twenty miles broad and about five hundred in length.

the head of the war-party, which prevailed in the councils of Nepal. It was evident that their policy was now to defer the definite conclusion of the treaty, until the season should be too far advanced for hostilities to be resumed with any effect.

Upon the abandonment of the provinces west of the Kali by the Gorkhas, our regular troops employed in that quarter had been marched to their stations, with the exception of small garrisons in the principal forts, and the irregulars had been dismissed,¹ except the Gorkha battalions, to whom principally the defence of the conquered provinces was entrusted. The troops which had been cantoned on the frontier during the rains of 1815, were in readiness to march in the cold season of 1815-16.

There can be no doubt, and the sentiment was unanimously expressed by those who had any knowledge of the date of affairs, that Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw had suffered the Nepal commissioners to make a delay, which might have caused a failure of success in the second campaign; or have compelled our government to

¹ Lieutenant (now Colonel) F. Young commanded two thousand of them.

postpone operations till the month of October, 1816. Nor can it be admitted as any answer to the objection urged, that he did succeed at last, as an excuse for a delay, after the ratification by the Governor-general had long been signed. Sir David Ochterlony¹ was now invested with the chief political, as well as military, authority. By the beginning of February 1816, Sir David had taken the field with a force of nearly seventeen thousand men, including three king's regiments.

They were brigaded as follows:—

1st brigade; Colonel Kelly, his majesty's 24th foot:—His majesty's 24th foot, first battalion 18th native infantry, divisions of the second battalion, and the Champarun light infantry.

2nd brigade; Lieutenant-colonel Nicol, 66th foot:—His majesty's 66th foot, fifth and eighth grenadier battalions, first battalion 8th, and second battalion 18th native infantry.

3rd brigade; Lieutenant-colonel Miller, 87th foot:—His majesty's 87th, second battalions of the 13th, 22nd, and 25th native infantry.

4th brigade; Lieutenant-colonel Burnet, 8th native infantry:—second battalions 4th, 8th, 9th,

¹ Wilson viii. 68. He had been created a baronet after the surrender of Malaun.

and 15th native infantry, and part of first battalion 30th; besides artillery, pioneers, and irregular horse.

Two other divisions were formed, one at Sitapur, in Oude, under Colonel J. Nicolls, intended to enter the district of Dúte, between the Kali and Rapti rivers; the other at Gorakhpur, under Major-general J. S. Wood, intended as a reserve.¹

The 1st brigade was detached to the right, to penetrate by Hariharpur. From this place there is a road leading to Khatmandu. The 2nd brigade to enter the hills at Ramnuggur. The brigadiers of these brigades were allowed an aide-de-camp. These, taking a circuitous route, were to join Sir David before Muckwanpoor. It marched on the 11th February from Ramnuggur, distant eighteen miles from the hills. General Ochterlony, with the third and fourth brigades, marched on the 12th February, 1816, from Simlabasa through the forest (here about eight miles deep), to the foot of the Bichu-koh, or Chiriaghati pass, formed by the bed of a mountain torrent. The Gorkha commissioners arrived at this place; but, instead of producing the ratified treaty, made

¹ Nepal Papers, 983. The 1st and 2nd brigades had a train of Artillery.

proposals. They shortly left camp. It is a *political ruse* to send such persons to observe your camp. The only plan is to keep them outside.

Wilson says, the Gorkhas had strongly fortified the passes by which an army might penetrate into the hills, on the route towards Makwanpur, and the valley of Nepal. Lieutenant Pickersgill,¹ Assistant Quarter-master-general, had been surveying on the frontier, and had, during the interval between the two campaigns, obtained information of a *secret* pass (the Chiria-ghati).² Wilson says, the Chiria-ghati pass "was defended by successive tiers of strong stockades, and could not have been forced by an attack in front without disproportionate loss. After some delay, another access to the mountains was discovered, and which, although difficult and dangerous, was undefended." An engineer officer went through this pass, which was the Chiria-ghati pass, and not the usual and actually stockaded one. Sir David with the advance went up at night, on the 14th February. When they had proceeded half

¹ He had charge of the intelligence department.

² Chiria is a bird. It was an elevated ascent which turned the regular pass; and not intended for the passage of troops, etc.

way, Sir David doubted if the pathway would lead to the road they were at last to take. He was assured it would; and in the morning he found that they had turned the large stockade which commanded the usual road. It was "a dark and deep ravine, between lofty and precipitous banks, clothed with trees, whose intermingling branches overhead excluded the light of day." They had no guns with them, and moved silently along. An advanced party reported that there was a stockade, but the enemy expected the troops by the other road. They, therefore, fell back. The 4th brigade was left on the ground, their tents standing. The advance (3rd brigade), with his majesty's 87th regiment, was sufficient. Leaving these troops behind, and their tents, and his own tents standing, would lead the enemy to conclude that the troops had *not* marched.

The fourth day, the general¹ moved to Hetaunda, on the bank of the Rapti. The place is built of stone, and where a defence could be made. He was there joined by the 4th brigade, which went by the common pass. The enemy retired from the stockades, when they found the stockades had been turned. They fell back on

¹ Wilson, p. 71.

Muckwanpoor. Sir David advanced on the 27th February to the valley of Muckwanpoor, and took up a position in line, about one mile and a quarter from the fortified heights. The town and fort lay to the right of the camp. To the right of the fort was a strong stockade. Opposite to the left of the camp was the village of Sekhar-Katri, held by a strong detachment of the enemy; but they evacuated it the next morning. It was taken possession of by three companies of the 25th native infantry, and forty men of the 87th. At noon, the Gorkhas returned in greater force, and endeavoured to recover the position. They drove in the picquets, and attacked the village. The flank companies of the 87th, and the rest of the 25th, were despatched to reinforce the post as soon as the firing commenced. Fresh numbers of the enemy poured along the summit of the heights from Muckwanpoor to the extent of, at least, two thousand men. Two more companies of the 87th, and the second battalion 12th native infantry, were sent, and, after repeated attacks, the Gorkhas were finally repulsed. Although forced to retreat, they kept up a galling fire, until they were dislodged by the bayonets of the 8th native infantry. The action lasted from noon, till

five o'clock, P.M. The Nepalese loss was computed at five hundred ; of the British, forty-five were killed, and one hundred and seventy-five wounded. Lieutenant Terrell, of the 20th native infantry, was killed.¹

Lieutenant Terrell commanded the party originally sent up with the three companies 25th native infantry, and forty men of his majesty's 87th foot. Considering that the heights were about two thousand feet above the level of the sea, the distance from camp, and the situation of the enemy's village, capable of being reinforced from the fort and stockade, the force was too small. There ought to have been a battalion, and two or three companies of Europeans, and two guns detached. It was to be expected that, if the Gorkhas were disposed to fight, they would attack a small force. The next day, the 2nd brigade joined. We had made a detour to a pass to the left and north of Ramnuggur, and marched up the valley of the Rapti. Before entering the valley, we found a stockade unfinished, and deserted. Leaving the fifth grena-

¹ Adjutant of the 20th Native Infantry, and a volunteer doing duty with the 25th native infantry. A shot from the heights killed one of Sir David's bearers close by his side.

dier battalion, and the first battalion 8th native infantry, under Major Lumley,¹ we passed our guns down a pass leading into the valley, and proceeded *via* Hetaunda, where the 4th native infantry were posted; and the day after, joined Sir David's force.

The 15th native infantry were stockaded on the heights after the battle. It was determined to attack the stockade to the right of the camp. His Majesty's 66th foot and the 8th grenadier battalion were ordered up. Two six-pounders were carried up on elephants, one carrying the gun and another elephant the carriage. After moving along the ridge to the right for three miles, we stockaded for the night, and were about a mile distant from the enemy's work. While we were making this movement along the ridge, the whole of the troops from camp moved in column parallel to our line of march, so as to be able to send up troops to our aid if attacked. It was a very military and imposing sight viewed by us from the heights. The engineer, Captain Tickell,² had brought up two eighteen-pounders

¹ He and Lieutenant D. Williamson, Quarter-Master of Brigade, had the charge of the intelligence department.

² Lieutenant General Tickell, C.B., Bengal Engineers.

to breach the stockade and fort of Muckwanpoor, when, on the evening of the 4th March, 1816, we were informed that the Goroo (Gaj Raj Misr) would pass our post early next morning; and he came next morning with the ratified treaty, which was not accepted without the additional stipulation, "that the cession of territory exacted from Nepal should comprehend the country conquered in the actual campaign, and the valley of the Rapti. This pacific termination was caused by the operations of the 1st brigade. Colonel Kelly had reached Hariharpur, by a route which had not been stockaded. In fact, after various operations, and bringing our artillery to bear, the enemy were defeated after a considerable struggle, and next day Ranjor Sing Thapa, who had defended Jytak, abandoned the fort.¹ Finding that three corps of the 2nd brigade had joined, and hearing of the defeat at Hariharpur just at this time, which would have given an addition of five more regiments, and that Colonel Kelly could turn their flank, they decided upon giving in.

"It was stated² by the Gorkha chiefs to the

¹ Nepal Papers, 940.

² Wilson, p. 65. Nepal Papers, 776, and 810.

Honourable Mr. Gardner, the British commissioner in Kumaon, that most of the military leaders and their followers derived their support from the lands of the Tirai; that the raja's house expenses were defrayed from the same source; and that, of the twenty lakhs of rupees a-year, the revenue of Nepal, Tirai alone yielded ten lakhs." The Tirai has been considered the granary of the country in the hills. A portion of grain is grown in the hilly country, but many articles of consumption must come from the plains. The command of the entrance to the passes from the plains, would "stop the supplies." A force was stationed at Segowlee for many years; and during the war with the Sikhs.

In the year 1848-49, during the war in the Punjab, the raja of Nepal came down with a large portion of his army, said to be "on a hunting excursion:" the resident reported favourably of the movement, but an European corps was sent from Fort William to Dinapoor. The Gorkhas were not liked by the people of the country whom they had conquered. This feeling operated there can be no doubt, in favour of the British government. The Gorkhas calculated upon the co-operation of powerful allies, and endea-

voured to interest Runjeet Sing, (Punjab,) Sindia,¹ the Raja of Bhurtpoor, Meer Khan, the Burmese, and even the Pindarees! But the application to the Emperor of China was the most curious! The raja represented the war to be caused owing to *their* refusal to give a passage through Nepal to a British force intended to take possession of Lhassa, which is under the protection of China. The Chinese authorities asked the Nepal envoys, as to the amount of their army and revenue; they replied, two hundred thousand men, and five and a-half lakhs of rupees (about £55,000.) "Truly," said the Chinese officer, with a sneer, "you are a mighty people!"—that if the English wished to invade China, "they would have found a nearer route than that through Nepal."² However, Lord Amherst's embassy in the year 1816, was chiefly undertaken for the purpose of evincing our friendly disposition towards China, and to explain the object of our attack upon Nepal. Our trade with China might have been affected, if the Chinese had supposed we had the object in view imputed to us by the Gorkhas. It is

¹ Wilson, p. 78. Sindia's letter was read in full durbar by the resident, by order of Lord Hastings.

² Wilson, p. 80. note 1.

said that the Gorkhas were disliked by the people.

Hattras, 1817.—Dyaram the zemindar of Hattras had set at defiance the authority of the British government. He had among other acts refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Company's officers. He possessed a strong fort, with a ditch one hundred and twenty feet wide and eighty-five deep. The government was resolved to demolish the forts of the different Talukdars many of whom gave protection to robbers and disobeyed the regulations of government as to police regulations. Dyaram, as the most powerful, was first to be made an example of. He had a force of eight thousand men,¹ of whom three thousand five hundred were horse. He was required to testify his profession of allegiance, by disbanding his troops and dismantling his fortress: the following force took the field, under the command of General Marshall, to compel obedience.

Cavalry:—8th and 24th light dragoons, 3rd and 7th native cavalry, 1st and 2nd Rohilla horse, and rocket troop.

¹ Wilson, viii. 129, and Marquis Hasting's Summary of his Administration, pp. 24—27.

Infantry :—His Majesty's 14th and 87 regiments, and 2nd battalion 1st, 1st battalion 11th, 2nd battalions 12th, 15th and 25th, 1st battalion 29th, and 2nd grenadiers' battalion; besides artillery and pioneers.

Train :—Seventy-one mortars and howitzers, thirty-four battering guns (twenty-four pounders and eighteen pounders), besides twelve-pounders for enfilading. Major-General Horsford, Commandant of artillery, and Major Anbury, Chief Engineer.

The troops marched early in February 1817, and the fort was invested by the 12th of that month. He made overtures of submission, but would not consent to the demolition of his fort. Batteries were opened against the town and fort, and a vigorous bombardment was kept up upon the latter. A practicable breach was effected in the walls of the town by the 23rd; but the garrison evacuated the place next morning. The bombardment of the fort continued, and most of the buildings were in ruins. On the 2nd of March, a shell fell into the great powder magazine, which caused a tremendous explosion, which was heard at a distance of fifty miles from the fort. It was felt in the batteries and entrenchments.

The great magazine contained eight thousand maunds (two hundred and ninety-two tons) of gunpowder. Dyaram, convinced of the futility of resistance, made his escape at midnight, with a small body of horse, protected by chain armour; by cutting their way through our cavalry picquet of the dragoons. The explosion completed the work of destruction within the fort, and we took possession of it. The bastions were blown up, and the fort dismantled.

The rocket practice. The rockets were those of Sir William Congreve's manufacture.¹ They did not produce any effect. To insure the straight flight of the rockets, the ground must be level. The great difficulty consists in the direction of the wind. At Hatrass, the wind blew from one side of the fort, and carried the rockets over the place. The range being known, a position must be taken up at a certain distance from the fort. A strong wind will not be favourable to the flight. Rockets are of Indian origin, and can do great execution against large bodies of cavalry.

¹ Major Parlbly, Bengal Artillery, made just as good rockets. He had the composition put in the tubes *fresh in India*, which prevents failures in going off!

CHAPTER II.

PINDAREE AND MAHRATTAH WAR, 1817—18.

“THE political relations established with the Court of Poona,” had for some time borne an uneasy complexion, “The claims of the peishwa upon Baroda and Hyderabad, still remained unadjusted, and he ascribed the delay to the purposed procrastination of the British authorities. Their intervention also protected the estates of his feudatories, from his secret or open encroachments; and his *title to be regarded as the head of the Mahrattah confederacy*,¹ which the other members were willing to acknowledge, was avowedly withheld from him by the British government. Notwithstanding the unequivocal tone in which their determination to disallow the resumption of this supremacy was declared, Baji Rao had never desisted from unavowed intrigues for its attainment; and, in *violation* of the terms of the treaty

¹ Wilson, viii. 147. The author's *italics*.

of Bassein,¹ had constantly maintained agents at the courts of Gwalior,² Indore,³ and Nagpur,⁴ and carried on, with little affectation of concealment, negotiations with the Bhonsla, Sindia, and Holkar." "By Sindia, active,⁵ though *secret* negotiations were carried on with the ministers of the Holkar state, with the Bhonsla, and with the peishwa, for the establishment of the supreme authority of the latter, and the *consolidation* of the remaining fragments of the *Mahrattah empire*,—vakeels were received privately from Nepal,⁶ and from Runjeet Sing;⁷ and constant communications were maintained with the Pindaree leaders, who promised implicit obedience to Sindia's orders, and declared themselves ready, with his sanction, to carry fire and sword into the Company's possessions." "The communications which had been carried on⁸ by the peishwa, with the several Mahrattah courts, had not been unattended by consequences

¹ December, 1802. In 1803, General Wellesley replaced him on the musnud at Poona, or he would have been a pageant in the hands of the chiefs.

² Sindia.

³ Holkar.

⁴ Berar Raja.

⁵ Wilson, p. 169.

⁶ Sindia urged the raja of Nepal to hold out against us.

⁷ The Sikh ruler.

⁸ Wilson, p. 159.

unpropitious to the continuance of tranquillity, and the maintenance of British influence. The chiefs were generally discontented with their position."

The raja of Berar, Raghuji Bhonsla had died.¹ His son, Parswaji, was infirm of body and weak of intellect. At last Modaji Bhonsla, commonly called Appa Sahib, the nephew of the late raja, with the concurrence of the British resident, assumed the office of regent. He was inclined to an intimate connexion with the British government. The government had long desired to induce the Raja of Berar to receive a subsidiary force. It was at once accepted, and was to consist of one regiment of native cavalry, six battalions of infantry, one company of European artillery, with the usual proportion of guns.

Central India was disorganised.² "In Malwa, the troops of Sindia and Holkar acted independently of their nominal masters, and, were provided with assignments on the revenues of the provinces." "The princes of Rajputana were in a still more helpless condition, and aggravated the evils of political humiliation, by personal incompetency. The raja of Udaypur, indolent and

¹ Wilson, p. 167.

² Wilson, p. 181.

improvident, was bearded in his capital by military adventurers,¹ and robbed of his domains by his own feudatory chiefs and clansmen. The raja of Jodpur, affecting idiocy, abandoned the reins of government to the hands of a dissolute prince, whose career was soon after cut short by the hand of an assassin. The raja of Jypur, a slave to an infatuated attachment to a Mohammedan dancing girl, preserved only a portion of his hereditary possessions, by the sufferance of Ameer Khan." "Every vestige of regular and orderly government had disappeared, and complete dissolution of the bonds of society must have ensued, had not the government of British India obtained, by persevering representation and remonstrance from the authorities in England, a reluctant and qualified permission to effect the extirpation of that part of the predatory system, which consisted in the peculiar organization of the plunderers, termed Pindarees,² as preliminary

¹ His palace on the bank of the Lake was besieged, and as Colonel Tod said, the servants bringing up water were plundered. Our government allowed him in 1818, the sum of 4000 rupees (£400) a month, till his country yielded some revenue.

² Called sometimes "Free Companies," commanded by Ameer Khan and others, soldiers of fortune, Mohammedan and Hindu.

to the overthrow of the whole scheme of military depredation." In 1818, after the war, the Marquis Hastings carried out the original plan of the Marquis Wellesley, designed by that great man before his departure from India in 1805,¹ to take Rajpootana under British protection, and thus free it from the hands of lawless plunderers; but which the short-sighted policy of the Marquis Cornwallis repudiated.

The Pindarees had given the British provinces annoyance as early as in 1812. When first known to the British authorities,² the Sindia Shahi Pindarees, who were by far the most numerous of the two, were under the leading of a number of sirdars, of whom Cheetoo, Karim Khan, and Dost Mohammed were the principal. None of the Holkar Shahi chiefs were leaders of much note. Blacker³ gives—

	HORSE.	FOOT.	GUNS.
The Sindia Shahi . .	18,000	1300	15
The Holkar Shahi . .	3,000	200	3
Total . .	<u>21,000</u>	<u>1500</u>	<u>18</u>

“They moved through the country⁴ at their

¹ Wilson, p. 181.

² Wilson, p. 105 See Papers Pindaric War, pp. 24, 25.

³ Memoir of the War, (1821) p. 18.

⁴ Wilson, p. 170.

pleasure, and levied contributions at will upon their sovereign's subjects and dependents; or when these failed, carried their bands into the territory of the princes of Rajpootana, and, under pretext of assisting one or other of the contending parties, plundered both friends and foes.¹ To add to these sources of disorder, the mountaineers on the south and west of Malwa, and the Bhils and Mhers, and the petty Hindu chiefs on the south and east of the same country, were committing unchecked ravages in retaliation for invaded rights or disregarded claims." The Pindarees threatened Mirzapoor, plundered Ganjam, Masulipatam, Guntoor, and the northern Circars. It was expected that any attack on these hordes, as being under the protection of Sindia and Holkar, might cause a war with those chiefs. It was, moreover, known that these chiefs and the Berar raja advocated the supremacy of the peishwa, who again, in 1816, was collecting armed followers at no great distance from Poona.² The Governor-general, therefore, resolved to be prepared for all events.

¹ The Mahrattah army at the battle of Panniput, (1761) had many thousands of them.

² Wilson, p. 215.

The armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, to be assembled, amounted to¹ eighty-seven thousand five hundred and ninety-one; and, including irregular horse and contingents, to a grand total of one hundred and sixteen thousand four hundred and sixty-four men, and two hundred and ninety-five guns. The forces of the native powers which might be brought into the field, were estimated at one hundred and thirty thousand and sixteen horse, eighty-seven thousand three hundred and sixteen infantry, and five hundred and eighty-nine guns, including the Pindarees. The British army which took the field in 1817, was the largest ever assembled in India.

The grand army,² under Marquis Hastings, commander-in-chief in India:—

1st, or centre division, under Major-general Brown; 1st brigade of cavalry, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd brigades of infantry.

2nd, or right division, Major-general R. S. Donkin; 2nd brigade of cavalry, and 4th brigade of infantry.

3rd, or left division, Major D. Marshall; 3rd

¹ Blacker's Memoir, pp. 19—29.

² Blacker's Memoir, pp. 32—38.

brigade of cavalry, 5th and 6th brigades of infantry.

The reserve division, Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, Bart., G.C.B.; 4th brigade of cavalry, 7th and 8th brigades of infantry.

Adjutant-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol.

Quarter-master-general, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Paton.

The army of the Deccan, His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir T. Hislop, Bart., commander-in-chief:—

1st, or advanced division.—Light artillery brigade; the troops of horse artillery, cavalry gallopers incorporated with it; the rocket troop. Cavalry brigade; detachment 22nd light dragoons, 4th and 8th light cavalry. Light brigade; 1st and 2nd infantry brigades.

The 2nd, or Hyderabad division, Brigadier-general J. Doveton.—Cavalry brigade; three brigades horse artillery, and 6th cavalry. 1st and 2nd brigades of infantry. Berar brigade. Hyderabad brigade.

The 3rd division, Brigadier-general Sir J. Malcolm, K.C.B, and K.L.S.—One brigade of horse artillery; 3rd light cavalry; five companies 1st or 3rd native infantry. The Russell

brigade. (1st and 2nd regiments); Ellichpoor contingent; two batteries and four guns; four thousand Mysore horse.

The 4th, or Poona division, Brigadier-general Smith, C.B.—Cavalry brigade; three brigades of horse artillery, 2nd Madras light cavalry; light battalion, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd infantry brigades.¹

5th, or Nagpur division, Brigadier-general J. W. Adams, C.B. (Bengal).—1st and 2nd infantry brigades. Reserve brigade (three troops native horse artillery, 5th and 6th Bengal light cavalry, 1st Rohilla cavalry, light infantry battalion.)

The reserve division, Brigadier-general Munro. Brigadier-general Pritzler, second in command.—Madras artillery; cavalry brigade; infantry brigade.

The Goozerat division, Major-general Sir W. G. Keir, K.M.T.—Cavalry brigade; 1st and 2nd brigades.

Adjutant-general, Colonel Conway.

Quarter-master-general, Lieut.-colonel Blacker.

The centre division² was assembled chiefly at Cawnpoor; the right division at Agra; the left

¹ Two Madras infantry corps;—the rest Bombay corps.

² Wilson, vol viii. p. 329.

division at Kalinjar, in Bundelcund. Two small bodies assembled at Mirzapoor, and another on the frontier of south Behar, under Brigadier-general Hardyman (8th native cavalry, and his Majesty's 17th foot, Rewa contingent of horse, and six guns), and Brigadier-general Toone (his Majesty's 24th foot, 2nd battalion 4th native infantry, Raja Gumsham's horse, and four guns), to defend the British confines to the south-west, and prevent any inroad through Rewa and Chota Nagpur. The reserve division assembled near Rewaree.

The centre division, with Lord Hastings, crossed the Jumna on the 26th October, 1817, and took up a position on the Sindh river on the 6th of November, ready to act against the Pindarees or the Mahrattahs. "Several envoys¹ from Nepal with letters, and two of Sindia's seals, were arrested on their return at Bithur, in the course of September (1817); and letters and messengers from the Pindaree chiefs were constantly arriving at Gwalior, and men were enlisted with little attempt at secrecy for their service."² Sindia was called upon to explain.

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 246.

² Sindia minister said the letters were forgeries. "Sindia was silent!"

“The ultimatum of the British government, and the draft of a treaty to be signed by him, were communicated to Sindia, towards the end of October.” The treaty was actually signed on the 5th of November.¹ Before the treaty was signed, and when Sindia’s views were unknown (for it was supposed he might march to join Holkar), the marquis had determined, if Sindia should move from Gwalior, to march on that fortress, leave a brigade entrenched before it, and then follow his army. By the treaty, Sindia² “bound himself to employ his forces with those of the British in operations against the Pindarees.” He agreed “to maintain a contingent of five thousand horse, to serve with the British troops, and under British command, and to have an English officer attached to each division.” The treaty annulled the 8th article of the treaty of 1805, thus leaving the British government at liberty to form engagements with the states of Udaypur, Jodpur, Kotah, and other substantive states on the left bank of the Chambal. In fact,

¹ The author was with the 3rd brigade of the centre division at the time. The attack at Poona occurred on the same day.

² Wilson, p. 248.

to carry out the views of the Marquis Wellesley, thus repudiating the doctrine of the Marquis Cornwallis,¹ who, and the home authorities of the day, objected to any alliance with native states.

Affairs with the peishwa at Poona.—1817. The peishwa was called upon to revise the treaty of Bassein (1802). Instead of paying the subsidiary force, he was to supply the funds by a cession of territory,² and Mahrattah cessions; “and he was to pledge himself never more to interfere in the affairs of Hindostan.” He had broken the treaty of Bassein by plotting with the Mahrattah chiefs, which (and for his general conduct) “subjected him justly to heavy penalties.” News of the attack at Poona, and of the treaty with Sindia, reached Nagpur on the 14th of November, 1817. The Berar raja still appeared to be friendly; his acts soon proved his intentions towards the British. The treaty of Poona had scarcely been signed by Baji Rao, when he repented of the deed, and resumed his

¹ In May, 1823, the officers in London gave Lord Hastings a dinner; Lord W. C. Bentinck in the chair. Lord Hastings then declared that he had “followed in the footsteps of the Marquis of Wellesley.”

² Wilson, p. 222, Treaty 13th June, 1817.

intrigues;¹ and by the end of October, he commenced an extraordinary levy of troops, and large bodies of horse and foot were assembled near Poona. The Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, the resident, made general remonstrances as to the peishwa's conduct. He allowed the main body of the subsidiary force under General Smith to march; and the force left at Poona consisted of three battalions of Bombay infantry, under Colonel Burr, a battalion of the Poona brigade, the peishwa's own troops, officered by Europeans, under Captain Ford, and two companies of Bengal sepoy, of the resident's guard. Owing to the bad position of the old cantonments, Colonel Burr had encamped at Kirki on the 1st November. The day before, the force was joined by the Bombay European regiment, and by detachments of the 65th regiment, and of Bombay artillery.

The peishwa's army was computed to amount to ten thousand horse, and as many foot. The British force, consisting of infantry alone, was less than three thousand men. The troops drew up in line, having guns on each flank. Captain Ford's battalion joined, and the line advanced, when a heavy cannonade opened upon them.

¹ Wilson, p. 234.

Having withstood repeated charges by the enemy, our troops again advanced. The Mahrattahs retreated, and abandoned the victory to the English. The attack was made on the 5th of November. Shortly after the action, a light battalion, with one thousand of the auxiliary horse, arrived. The British lost nineteen killed, and sixty-seven wounded; the enemy's loss was more severe. Gokla, the peishwa's general, advised that the battle should begin; the peishwa wished to recal the order, when it was too late. The Honourable Mr. Elphinstone was mounted, and on the field of battle; and to him much was due for the arrangements before, during, and after the battle.

The loss of the enemy was estimated at five hundred killed and wounded. General Smith arrived. The peishwa fled from Poona on the 17th of November, 1817.

Affairs at Nagpur.—1817. Though' "the stipulations of the treaty the Raja of Nagpur had so recently signed restricted him from holding communications with other princes, except with the privity and sanction of the resident, he was speedily involved in a web of secret negotiations

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 262.

with Sindia, the peishwa, and even with the Pindarees." "At last, as if to proclaim his allegiance to the reputed head of the Mahrattah confederacy, in defiance of his relations with the British, the raja accepted from the peishwa the title of Senapati, or commander-in-chief, and a dress of honour, with which he was publicly invested on the 24th November, after the attack upon the British residency at Poona on the 5th was known to have taken place." "The raja invited the resident to be present, or to depute some officer of his staff; and requested that a salute might be fired by the troops of the subsidiary force, declaring that he saw no reason why the ceremony should disturb the good understanding that subsisted between him and his allies, and affirming, that he had no thought of giving them offence." The resident made an earnest remonstrance. All personal intercourse between him and the court ceased. There was a curious infatuation which infected the mind of the raja, who owed his advanced position and dignity to the British government. On the 14th November, he heard of the attack on Poona, as well as of the recent treaty with Sindia; or, ten days before, he had thus proclaimed his infraction of his own treaty! It is

said, that he felt himself, "upon Mahrattah principles, bound to support the peishwa, be the consequences what they might be" The act of the 24th November was an indirect declaration of war. The attack which ensued was to be expected.

"The greater part of the Berar subsidiary force had already taken the field,¹ and there remained within reach a detachment which had been posted at Ramtek, about three miles distant, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H. S. Scott, consisting of two battalions of Madras sipahis, the 1st of the 20th, and 1st of the 24th regiments of native infantry; a detachment of European foot and of native horse artillery, and three troops of the 6th Bengal cavalry. These, upon the resident's requisition marched on the 25th to the residency grounds, and were there joined by the escort, consisting of about four hundred men, with two guns, two companies of Bengal infantry, and a few troopers of the Madras horse. On the morning of the 26th they were placed in position on the Sitabaldi hills. The houses and grounds occupied by the resident and his suite were situated beyond the city of Nagpur, on the west; they were separated from the suburbs of

¹ Wilson, p. 265.

Nagpur by the Sitabaldi hills, a low range of limited extent, running north and south, and consisting of two elevations at either extremity, about four hundred yards apart, connected by a lower ridge, across which lay the public road." The southernmost was the larger. "The smaller hill, at the northern extremity, was conical and narrow at the summit, being about one hundred feet long, by not more than seventeen broad."

The lesser hill was occupied by the 1st battalion 24th, with two six-pounders. The 1st battalion 20th, with one company of the 24th, were posted on the larger eminence, facing east and south. One hundred men of the escort defended its western side, and the rest were stationed to guard the residency dwellings, which had been fitted for defence. The three troops of cavalry with the small party of the Madras body guard, were formed on the plain in front of the residency. The whole force was about one thousand three hundred strong. The numbers of the Mahrattahs were computed at twelve thousand horse, and eight thousand foot, the latter including the three thousand Arabs.

"During the forenoon of the 26th,¹ notwith-

¹ Wilson, p. 267.

standing the receipt of pacific messages from the raja, large masses of cavalry were seen spreading themselves along the plain to the west of the residency, while on the side of the city, infantry and guns were taking up positions menacing the hills." Towards sunset two of the raja's ministers came to Mr. Jenkins, who told them that all hostile preparations should be countermanded as a preliminary to any negotiations; but before the object of their mission could be ascertained, the Arab mercenaries in the service of Nagpur opened a smart fire of musketry upon the eastern face of the southern hill; which was followed by an attack upon the northern extremity of the ridge. The principle efforts of the enemy were directed against the smaller hill on the right. The fire was maintained throughout the night upon both extremities of the line. During the night the whole of the Mahrattah army moved out into the plain. At dawn on the 27th they occupied the plain in dark, dense masses of horse, interspersed with considerable bodies of infantry, and a numerous artillery. They made no serious demonstration against the residency. The enemy brought up nine guns at seven A.M. to bear upon the northern eminence, to which

the detachment could make feeble reply with their two guns. Between nine and ten A.M., one of our guns was disabled, when the Arabs rushed up the hill and drove the defenders from the summit. Guns were brought up and directed against the right of the British line, which suffered severely from a flank cannonade, and men and officers fell fast before the enemy's fire. The enemy in the plain were also in movement; the masses were closing round the rear of the position, and their guns had begun to take effect upon the cavalry stationed in the residency grounds.

British cavalry charge.—“ Being galled by the enemy's fire, Captain Fitzgerald, in disregard of the orders which had commanded him to stand firm,¹ resolved to make a dash against the horse and guns most in advance, and with his three troops of Bengal cavalry, and twenty-five men of the Madras body-guard, he rushed upon the foremost mass of the enemy's horse. The charge was irresistible, the unwieldy column was repeatedly penetrated and broken, and entirely dispersed.

¹ Wilson, p. 269. Mr. Wilson says, This is not noted by Prinsep, nor by Colonel Lloyd, but is particularly specified by Colonel Fitzclarence, 121, and Colonel Blacker, 113.

Their guns were seized and directed against the fugitives, and before the enemy had recovered from their surprise, Captain Fitzgerald with his trophies was again at his post. Colonel Scott, in the orders of the day, acknowledged the critical opportuneness of the charge, and in a letter from the resident it is stated, 'The charge at the critical moment at which it happened, may be said to have decided the fate of the battle.'" This sally turned the tide of affairs. It had been witnessed from the hill, and gave fresh courage to the sipahis. Charging the Arabs, they compelled them to fall back to the left; at this instant, a tumbril on the northern hill exploded, and taking advantage of the confusion which it occasioned, the sipahis pressed forward and recovered the position, dislodging the Arabs from the summit, and driving them not only down the slope, but from the suburbs at his foot. They attempted to rally, but were taken in flank by a troop of cavalry, which had charged round the northern extremity of the line, and completed the expulsion of the assailants from its eastern front. By noon they were, likewise, driven from their advance upon the southern hill, with the loss of two guns; and no longer venturing to approach

the British line, confined their efforts to a distant and comparatively harmless cannonade. Even this ceased by three o'clock, and the struggle ended in the unexpected triumph of the British detachment. The British loss¹ was one hundred and seventeen killed and two hundred and forty-three wounded. Lieutenant Clarke of the 20th and Captain Sadler and Grant of the 24th native infantry were killed; also Mr. George Sotheby,² first assistant to the resident, who acted with distinguished gallantry, and a medical officer was killed. The resident and his civil staff exhibited steady courage, worthy companions of their military brethren in the hour of danger.

The highest commendations were deservedly bestowed upon the troops in India and in England. On her present Majesty's accession the order of the Bath was conferred on Sir Richard Jenkins and Sir W. Lloyd.³ On a petition from the native adjutant of the 24th Madras native infantry that corps, for its gallantry, was restored to its old number (1st regiment) in the Madras army, which the first battalion 1st regiment had

¹ Wilson, p. 271.

² Bombay civil service.

³ Bengal officer. He commanded the resident's escort.

forfeited, by being concerned in the mutiny at Vellore in 1806.

After the action, the raja sent a message to Mr. Jenkins, declaring that his troops had acted without his sanction or knowledge. The raja was told that the final decision rested with the Governor-general, and that no communication could be permitted while the troops of Nagpur were in the field. In the evening of the 27th, the army of the raja retired beyond the city. The resident consented to a suspension of hostilities. Lieutenant-colonel Gahan, with the three other troops of the 6th Bengal cavalry, and six companies Bengal first battalion 22nd native infantry arrived on the 29th, being followed by the rest of the battalion. On the 5th of December, Major Pitman joined with part of the nizam's infantry and reformed horse, and on the 12th and 13th, the whole of the second division of the Deccan army, commanded by Brigadier-general Doveton, encamped at Sitabuldi. The strength of the force now enabled the resident to dictate to the raja the only terms by which the past might be atoned for.

When General Doveton's¹ division had reco-

¹ Wilson, p. 275.

vered from the fatigue of their expeditious march, he prepared to attack the Nagpur army. The raja was to acknowledge his having forfeited his crown; to disband his army and deliver up his ordnance and military stores; to cede Nagpur for the temporary occupation of the British; to repair in person to the residency, and remain there till matters should be finally arranged. Upon compliance with these terms he was to be restored, ceding as much territory as would pay for the contingent he was bound to furnish. His assent to be sent in by four A. M. on the 16th of December. The British troops were drawn up in order of battle on the 15th, and slept on their arms all night. Appa Sahib, late in the day, announced his acquiescence, but, on the morning of the 16th, it was affirmed that the Arabs in his army would not suffer him to quit camp. Before the troops advanced the resident sent word to the raja that he was still willing to receive him.¹ Appa Sahib, attended by three of his ministers, rode into the lines. He expressed himself ready to accede to any conditions. He sent back one of the ministers to carry the terms into effect by noon. At the

¹ Wilson, 276.

appointed hour the British force moved forward, took an advanced battery of fourteen guns without resistance; but, when the line approached the raja's main body, it was saluted with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon. The troops advanced and the enemy's guns were taken, and by half-past one o'clock the enemy had disappeared, leaving their camp standing and forty-one guns on the field, and twenty more in a neighbouring depot.

1818.—The discontent of Appa Sahib had been manifested soon after his restoration,¹ and he professed a wish to resign the whole of his revenues into the hands of the resident, contenting himself with a pension. In an intercepted letter to Baji Rao, he pressed the peishwa to come speedily to his succour. The agents of the Mahrattah princes were still in Nagpur. It became necessary to put the raja under restraint. He was required to repair to the residency. At last a party of sipahis, under Lieutenant Gordon, assistant to the resident, was sent to compel his attendance. Appa Sahib was made a prisoner without the use of violence. There were abundant proofs of Appa Sahib's

¹ Wilson, p. 352.

hostile designs against the British. It was also ascertained that the death of the late imbecile Raja Parswaji was the act of Appa Sahib's partisans, and committed with his privity and approbation. When Poison failed he was strangled in his bed. He confessed himself the author of the attack on the resident in opposition to the advice of his ministers. The Governor-general, therefore, determined that Appa Sahib should be deposed,¹ and that the next of kin, also named Baji Rao, the son of Raghuji Bhonsla's daughter, a boy of eight or nine years of age, should be raised to the Raja. The regency to be vested in the mother of the young prince, but the administration of affairs to be exercised by the British resident until the raja should be old enough to assume the government of the country.

War with Holkar. 1817.—The leading individuals of Holkar's government² had entered into the projects of the peishwa. Envoys from the peishwa were received with honour in the years 1815 and 1816; and a general confederacy against the English was thought practicable.³

¹ The Governor-general had placed him on the throne.

² Holkar had been insane for several years—since 1811.

³ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 282.

Tulasi Bai, a woman of low extraction, whose beauty had captivated and enslaved the mind of Malhar Rao, became, after his death, regent to the young Holkar. Her favourite was Ganpat Rao. He, as well as Tantia Jog, were her ministers. Tulasi Bai and Ganpat Rao were not confident of success in joining the cause of the peishwa, and assured the resident at Delhi of the regent's friendly disposition. Even after the arrival of Sir T. Hislop¹ at Ujain agents had been sent to his camp, and, in his letter of the 17th of December, 1817, he wrote, "a more definite negotiation has been opened; vakils have been sent to camp, and the substance of a treaty has been proposed." But Roshan Beg, at the head of the disciplined brigades, and Ram Din, who commanded the Mahrattah horse, knew that a pacification with the British would cause the disbanding of their licentious soldiery, and would annihilate their power, and, encouraged by considerable sums of money from the peishwa, and by promises of more, had perseveringly urged recourse to hostilities, and had compelled the Bai to sanction the movement of Holkar's

¹ He held full political powers in 1817-18 in connexion with his operations.

troops towards the south, which brought them near the British divisions. Motives of personal dislike influenced other members of the administration to join in the plot, and, on the 19th of December, 1817, Ganpat Rao and Tulasi Bai were seized and separated from the person of the young prince. The former was imprisoned, and she was next morning carried to the banks of the Sipra, her head severed from her body, and the body thrown into the river. She was not thirty years of age at the time of her death.

The battle of Mahidpur, 21st December, 1817. The troops, under His Excellency Lieutenant-general Sir T. Hislop, commander-in-chief Madras army, in the battle of Mahidpur, consisted of horse artillery, the rocket troops, part of his majesty's 22nd light dragoons, 3rd light cavalry, two squadrons of the 4th, and of the 8th, light cavalry; his majesty's royal Scots, Madras European regiment, the rifles, 3rd native infantry, second battalion 6th, first and second battalions 14th,¹ first battalion 16th; The Russell brigade,¹ artillery, and four thousand Mysore horse. Sir T. Hislop came in sight of the enemy about nine o'clock, A. M. A large body of their horse²

¹ Detachments absent.

² Wilson, vol. viii. p. 205, and Blacker, 147.

crossed the river, and attempted to retard the advance of our troops. Wilson says, "they were drawn up in two lines, with a range of batteries, mounting seventy guns, in their front." Blacker says, "the infantry and heavy batteries formed the first, and the cavalry, in masses, the second." The enemy's right resting on a rugged and difficult ravine, the left on a bend of the river, opposite to the town of Mahidpur. It is stated by a well-known officer who was present, that the river ran in the form of a horse-shoe, the bend or fore part covering their left, while the town of Mahidpur was to the left; and near to the enemy's right, the ground was open. Thus the enemy's front, left flank, and rear were covered by the river. Our army in marching up to the ford, where they crossed, had a continuation of the river on the left flank of their column. There was a ford in the continuation of the river.¹ Blacker says, "though the information respecting the two fords in their front was still unsatisfactory, it was evident, that to cross by any ford, either above or below, would be the manœuvre of, at least, an entire day, and met by a counter-manœuvre, or flight, on the part of the enemy." By crossing by the

¹ A staff-officer of the intelligence department had the day before obtained exact information as to the fords.

ford on the left of the line (as was done by the Mysore horse), we should have turned the enemy's right, and might have enfiladed their guns. If the enemy changed position by throwing back their right *en potence*, still their right might have been turned. There were two fords in *front* of the enemy. His whole artillery pointed to the river's bank, while some guns on his left flank were thrown forward, so as to give an enfilading fire. The enemy's infantry were behind their guns, and their horse in rear of the infantry. Our regular cavalry were first moved across the river, and finding the enemy's guns played on them, the cavalry passed along the whole front of the enemy's guns. Some of the enemy's horse were in front of their guns, and until some of our guns opened on them, and the dust cleared away, Holkar's guns were not seen.

Blacker says, it was "resolved that the cavalry, with some horse artillery and light infantry, should be advanced to clear the intermediate plain, and to cover a closer reconnoissance of the features of the enemy's position, and the means of approaching it." The troops crossed by the left of the two fords, in *front* of the enemy.

The bed of the river gave some cover; when they left the protection of the bank, they became exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns. Blacker says the light brigade first crossed, "while a small battery was established on the near side to cover its movement." All the horse artillery guns were dismounted in twenty minutes.¹ "Sir J. Malcolm pushed forward against the enemy's left,² whilst the cavalry, supported by the 2nd brigade, attacked the right. Both attacks were successful. The troops advanced in face of a well-sustained fire, and carried the guns, on which the enemy's infantry on either flank broke and fled." The centre was also dispersed. The fugitives were briskly pursued. Our cavalry came upon their camp, and found themselves exposed to the fire of a battery lower down the river, and in rear of the enemy's army. The enemy's object was to escape, and they did so by a ford higher up the river, and in rear of their right. Our loss was seven hundred and eighty-eight killed and wounded.

¹ The horse artillery and cavalry galloper guns were united. An officer present wrote to a Bengal officer as to the fact of the guns being dismounted.

² Wilson, p. 285.

NUMBER OF KILLED AND WOUNDED. 75

	EUROPEAN.	NATIVE.
Officers killed	3	4
„ wounded	35	23
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	38	27
Total killed	174	
„ wounded	604	
	<hr/>	
Grand total	778	

The enemy, it was reported, had three thousand killed and wounded. Young Holkar was present in the action, and shed tears when he saw his troops retreat. Ganpat Rao and Tantia Jog had, during the action, escaped. They joined the young prince at Allote, and the latter received the office of minister from Kesaria Bai, the mother of the young prince, who was acknowledged as regent. Under the treaty made with Holkar, that prince retained a territory yielding fifteen lakhs of rupees. "Holkar was released from all dependency on the peishwa, and was guaranteed in his dominions by the British, on whose part a resident was appointed at the raja's court, and by whom a field force was to be maintained, and stationed at pleasure in the raja's territories."² As Holkar

¹ Blacker, p. 452.

² "Collection of Treatises," p. 86.

has no army to keep up, his reduced territory, under good management, yield him a larger revenue than the state had in 1817.

Defence of Korigaon. 1st of January, 1818.—
“ The approach of the peishwa towards Poona induced Colonel Burr, who had been left for the defence of the city, with three native battalions and a body of irregular horse, to call for a reinforcement from Seroor, in consequence of which Captain Staunton was despatched with the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Bombay Native Infantry 600 strong,¹ two guns, and twenty-six European artillerymen, under Lieutenant Chisholm, of the Madras Artillery, and a detachment of about 350 reformed horse, under Lieutenant Swanston. The detachment left Seroor on the 31st of December (1817), at six o'clock in the evening, and, by ten on the following morning, had ascended some high ground about half-way to Poona, overlooking the village of Korigaon, and the adjacent plain watered by the Bhima river. Beyond the river appeared the

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 303. Blacker gives five hundred sepoy, Duff, (vol. iii. p. 432) a little more than five hundred rank and file. The enemy had three bodies of six hundred each of Arabs, Gosaeens, and two guns, in their attack on the village.

whole of the peishwa's forces, estimated at 20,000 horse, and nearly 8,000 foot." "Encamped on the *right* bank of the Beemah,¹ above the village of Korigaon; under the walls of which the high road to Poona crossed the river by a ford. Luckily for this detachment, the road to the village, which was on the *left* bank, was unoccupied by the enemy. Captain Staunton pushed for the walls of Korigaon, and succeeded in gaining that position before it fell entirely into the hands of the enemy." The enemy likewise detached infantry to secure the village, which was surrounded by a wall, and protected on the south by the bed of the river, and afforded shelter against the Mahrattah cavalry. Both parties succeeded in occupying part. The village was immediately surrounded by bodies of horse and foot, chiefly Arabs, with two heavy guns. The British occupied the northern and western, the Arabs the southern and eastern portions. The Arabs obtained possession of a small fort. The British obtained a small *choultry*,² but not so commanding as the fort. Good positions were obtained for the two guns to command the road

¹ Blacker, 179.

² Or caravanserai, houses in a walled square for travellers.

by which the enemy could advance, but were exposed to the fire from the neighbouring walls. The village was crowded with both horse and foot, cattle, baggage, and followers.

Captain Staunton¹ failing to drive the enemy from their strong positions, was reduced to the measure of defending his own. Horse could not act in such a position. There were only eight European officers, including two assistant-surgeons, "who were more usefully employed in encouraging the fighting men than in attending the wounded. The infantry of the enemy, who advanced to the attack of the village, are represented as three bodies of 1,000 men each.² The conflict consisted, on one side, of impetuous attacks, repulsed by desperate sallies from the other; for, when closely pressed, the detachment, in order to gain room, was obliged to charge with the bayonet. This measure, therefore, was frequently repeated, and with success; but, as a charge must always be led by an European officer, the majority of these became disabled by death, or wounds, in successive attacks."

¹ Blacker, p. 180.

² There were estimated three thousand Arabs with the peishwa.

The British guns did much execution. In one of the enemy's assaults a gun was taken, and Lieutenant Chisholm was killed. The gun was retaken, and the enemy driven back with much loss. "In the course of the day Lieutenants Swanston and Connellan, and Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, who were severely wounded, were placed for safety in the *choultry*: this was seized by the enemy. Conceiving that this advantage ensured to them the victory, they gave way to the desire of plunder, and put Mr. Wingate to death, in a spirit of cruelty. The same fate awaited the two remaining officers, when Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Jones, and Mr. Wylie, the only officers left unhurt, vigorously charged the enemy in turn, recovered the *choultry*, with all the lost ground, and rescued the lives of their companions.

The loss was so great, and the exhaustion, from exertion, want of water and refreshment, so severe, that some of the men, European and native, considered resistance hopeless, and expressed a desire to apply for terms. Their commanding officer, however, formed a better judgment; he encouraged them to persevere, and represented the forlorn prospect of a surrender to barbarous and

cruel enemies.¹ This exhortation had the desired effect, and the enemy began to doubt the success of further attacks. They maintained their position in the village till nine p. m., when they finally evacuated it to seek repose and refreshment. Under cover of the night the detachment got a supply of water, and made preparations for renewing the contest next morning, being now in possession of the whole village. But daylight on the 2nd of January discovered the enemy preparing to move off on the Poona road. This had now become necessary, as on that day Brigadier-general Smith arrived at Chakun. Captain Staunton wanted ammunition and provisions, was precluded remaining where he was, and the road to Poona was occupied by the peishwa's army, by whom spies were sent, as if from Major Cunningham, with an invitation to meet him at Soonee, where the peishwa's army halted the day and night. He, therefore, marched back to Seroor, where he arrived next morning.

The loss.—Two officers were killed and three wounded, of whom Lieutenant Pattinson² sub-

¹ As in the case of Colonel Baillie's detachment in Sept. 1780.

² He retook the guns taken by the Arabs, although at the time mortally wounded.

sequently died. Of the European artillerymen, twelve were killed and eight wounded; of the native battalion, fifty men were killed, and one hundred and three wounded; and of the auxiliary horse, ninety-six were killed, wounded, and missing.

“ Captain J. Staunton received the thanks of the Governor-general for his gallant conduct,¹ and a public monument was erected on the spot in honour of those who fell.” Dr. J. Wylie, C. B., late physician general of the Madras army, who distinguished himself at Korigaon, became a military companion of the Bath in 1815, (thirty-three years after the event), and died on the 16th of June, 1852.

The peishwa when (after the battle of Kirki,) he retreated from Poona to Purundhur,² was followed by General Smith. On his approach the peishwa moved to Satara, whence he carried off the person of the descendant of Sivaji and his family. The reserve under Brigadier-general Pritzler, and the fourth division under Brigadier-general Smith,³ were united near Satara on the

¹ Made aide-de-camp to the Governor-general, and a C.B. He died in 1825.

² Wilson, vol. viii. p. 302. ³ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 308.

8th of February, 1818. The fort was summoned, and surrendered on the next day, when the flag of the raja was hoisted on the fort, and a proclamation was issued, announcing to the Mahrattah nation the deposal of Baji Rao, and that the Company intended to take possession of his territories : establishing the Raja of Satara in a principality for the maintenance of his rank and dignity, and of that of his court.¹

The peishwa² was defeated on the 20th of February, 1818, at Ashti. His forces were attacked and dispersed by Brigadier Adams, at Seoni,³ on the 10th of April. On the 24th of April, Raigerh, with the wife and treasure of the peishwa⁴ surrendered to the force under Colonel Prother. At last⁵ the peishwa addressed himself to Sir John Malcolm, as an old friend, and besought his intercession with the Governor-general for favourable terms. He was promised a liberal pension, not less than eight lakhs of rupees (£80,000) per annum, and surrendered on the 3rd of June, 1818,

¹ He was deposed in 1838, in consequence of intrigues alleged against him.

² Wilson, vol. viii. p. 310.

³ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 314.

⁴ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 324.

⁵ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 359.

to Sir John Malcolm. The Governor-general objected to the amount of the pension, as well as that there should have been any show of negotiation, considering the helpless state to which he was reduced. As to the amount the reply was, that Amrut Rao¹ who had been placed on the musnud of Poona by Holkar in 1802, had received a similar amount of pension; and that while Baji Rao was free and at the head of troops, there would exist an unsettled state of the country, attended with the maintenance of troops in the field, and consequent expense. Bithur, near Cawnpoor, was fixed upon for his residence. An European officer, as commissioner, had charge of the affairs of the ex-peishwa. "The diminished and scattered fragments² of the Mahrattah confederacy were reduced to a state of weakness which could acquire no vigour from re-union; and as the main link which had held it together was struck out of the chain, it was disunited for ever." As Wilson observes, "A Mahrattah prince ruled Hindustan as the nominal representative and real master of the Moghul." In 1803 this was

¹ His brother and father's eldest (adopted) son. He had resided at Benares till his death.

² Wilson, p. 366. The peishwa died in 1850.

the position of Sindia, till the battle of Delhi enabled the English to replace Shah Allum on his throne. In 1802, both Holkar and Sindia tried to obtain the guidance of Bajee Rao. He fled, and was replaced on his throne by General Wellesley, in May, 1803. We restored him to his throne.

The escape of Appa Sahib.¹ Appa Sahib had been detained at Nagpur, after he had been deposed. The Governor-general thought it expedient to send him to Hindostan, where he was to be placed, for security, in the fort of Allahabad. The resident despatched him under the escort of a wing of the 22nd Bengal native infantry, and three troops of the 8th native cavalry, commanded by Captain Browne, 22nd native infantry, on the 3rd May, 1818. On the 13th, the raja had disappeared. During the night of the 12th, he had been secretly furnished with the dress and accoutrements of a sipahi, and when the sentinels were changed, had marched off with the relieving party. A pillow took his place on his couch, and when the native officer, whose duty it was to inspect the tent, looked into it, he saw what he supposed to be the raja quietly reposing, and two

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 357.

servants kneeling by the bedside, engaged in the office of rubbing his limbs (usual in India). Some of the sipahis had been induced to contrive the raja's escape, and became the partners of his flight. A non-commissioned officer was posted as sentry at the door of the tent of the ex-raja, and ordered to be relieved *every hour*. One of these sentries was tried, and sentenced to be shot; the sentence was commuted to three years' labour in irons on the road: as the native officers tried were only dismissed from the service.¹ The orders were disobeyed by relieving the sentries every *three hours*, instead of every hour, and not going into the tent to see that the ex-raja was there; and the order, that a native commissioned officer should see the face of the ex-raja at each relief, was disobeyed. But the mistake was, in not having an *European* officer on duty, instead of a *native* officer! A reward of £10,000 was offered for the re-capture of the ex-raja, and a jagir of £1,000 a year for life. The pecuniary reward was afterwards doubled.² This "failed to seduce from

¹ Hough's Practice of General Courts Martial, 1825, pp. 486, 487, (1818 and 1819). Captain Brown was fully and honourably acquitted.

² Wilson, p. 358

their allegiance the half-savage mountaineers." He wandered about to various places, and was supposed to have gone into the Punjab; but nothing certain is known even as to his existence at the present day. He went to the Punjab; but Runjeet would not, as an enemy of the English, allow him to remain.

Thus, of the four native powers, the peishwa, Sindia, the Berar Raja, and Holkar, Sindia was the only one who kept the position he held before the war. There were many marches and counter-marches made against the Pindarees. The result was, that they were rooted out from their strongholds; many were destroyed, and from the remainder selections were made, to locate bodies of them in Goruckpoor, and in other places in the Company's provinces, and at Bhopal. The Marquis Hastings wrote of the war,¹ "The important degree in which, as represented by Sir David Ochterlony, the people of the Rajpoot states, amounting to some millions, were benefited by the proceedings of the British government, will excite lively gratification. That population, however, formed but a part of the immense mass rescued from misery." Regarding the peishwa,²

¹ Summary of his Administration, p. 46.

² Page 58.

“no act of personal kindness, no obligations of plighted faith, no conviction of almost inevitable ruin, could weigh with Mahrattah chiefs against the professed bond of obedience to the head of their tribe.” Of the Najpoor Raja, Blacker writes,¹ “His devotion to a cause, which he probably considered paramount to every other consideration, and to which he held himself bound, both by worldly and religious ties.”

Loss during the war. Blacker² gives the number of European officers killed and wounded at one hundred and thirty-four; and the number of all other ranks appear to have amounted to three thousand and forty-two. The operations lasted from the 5th November, 1817, to 13th May, 1819. The battle at Poona was fought on the 5th November, 1817. Asseergurh surrendered on the 9th May 1818 (considered to terminate the war with the Mahrattahs); and Copaldroog captured on 13th May, 1819.

Sindia had promised to direct the killedar (Juswunt Rao Laar) to deliver up the fort of Asseergurh. Sir J. Malcolm³ asked the killedar

¹ Page 431.

² Preface p xvii. Madras, one hundred and four; Bengal, eighteen; Bombay, twelve officers.

³ Blacker, p. 427, the author's *italics*.

if he had not an order from his prince to deliver up the place to the British army? He said, "*It may be the custom among Europeans to obey such mandates ; but, with Mahrattahs, forts like that,*" pointing to Asseergurh, "*are not given up upon orders.*" Instructions were found in the place, "enjoining him to pay no attention whatever to any counter-orders he might receive, but to hold out as long as possible."

In 1819, treaties¹ were entered into with the Rajas of Udaypur, Jaypur, Jodpur, Jesselmer, and Bhikaner, also with the petty chiefs of Banswara, Dungepur, Pertabgerh, Sirohi, Krishnagerh, Kerauli, Bundi, and Kota. "With each of these, formal engagements were contracted, upon the general basis of subordinate co-operation, and acknowledged supremacy."

¹ Wilson, vol. viii. p. 413.

CHAPTER III.

THE BURMESE WAR. 1824—26. .

ALOMPRA (founder of the present dynasty) obtained possession of Ava in 1753. In the war between the Burmese and the Peguers the English supported the former, and the French the latter.¹ Alomptra died about May, 1760. In 1757 he granted the island of Negrais, near the west branch of the Irawaddy, to the English; they were driven away from it in 1759 by the Burmans. In 1767, or year 1131 of the Burman *Æra*,² the Chinese sent 50,000 men from the western frontier of Yunan. They were hemmed in and all destroyed except 2,500 sent in fetters to the capital. In 1783 the Burmese conquered Aracan. In 1795 the Burmese learnt that three robbers from Aracan had taken refuge in the district of Chittagong. They ordered 5,000 men to enter the company's terri-

¹ Symes's Embassy.

² This gives as their origin A. D. 636.

tories, and supported the above force with an army of 20,000 men. General Erskine was sent with a corps of Europeans and sepoy. The Burmese, finding that the English had not concealed or protected the "distinguished robbers," retired to their own territories. This affair caused the mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Symes, in 1795, to Ava. In 1797 the same occurrence took place, when Captain Hill¹ was sent to Aracan, who returned from it in 1800. The king of Ava sent an ambassador, who was dismissed by Marquis Wellesley with assurances regarding the restoration of the emigrants, if found in the Company's territories; and harmony was restored between the two governments. In 1803 and 1809 Captain Canning² was sent, and, in the latter year, was allowed to proceed to Amara-pura, and had an audience of the king. The minister hinted at the pretensions of Ava to Chittagong and Dacca. Nothing more satisfactory could be obtained. The object of the mission was to explain the nature of the blockade imposed upon the trade with the Isle of France. There were further causes for complaint against

¹ Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii. p. 275.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 18. note 2.

the Burmese in the years 1817 and 1819. In 1823 a demand was made of the island of Shahpuri.¹ The Burmese were collecting troops, both in Assam and Aracan.

The Commander-in-Chief recommended the formation of three brigades of 3,000 men each, to be stationed on the eastern frontier, at Chittagong, Jumalpoore, and Goalpara; and a flotilla on the Burrampootra, towards Assam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. Kachar and Manipoor were under our protection, and were threatened. The Burmese were informed² that, if they advanced into Kachar, we would oppose them. This they disregarded: they advanced a force

¹ Wilson's *Burmese War*, (4to. 1827,) p. 10. They claimed the Naf (river) which constituted the boundary between Chittagong and Aracan. Close to the Chittagong side (and separated by a narrow channel) was situated the island of Shahpuri. Wilson vol. ix. p. 32. Lord Hastings in his *Summary of his Administration*, (p. 41.) states that on his way back to Calcutta, in July, 1818, "I received a rescript, brought by an envoy from the Burman monarch." The purport was "a requisition for our immediate surrender of all the provinces east of the Bhaugharetty, even including Moorshedabad; with a menace that, should the demand not be obeyed, he would lay waste our territories with fire and sword."

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 31. *History of India*.

towards the close of 1823, threatening our Sylhet frontier ; it was attacked, and actual hostilities began. War being now declared by the British Government, measures were taken for its prosecution. The troops on the frontier were limited in their operations to the protection of the British provinces, and the expulsion of the Burmese from the adjacent territories. Their maritime provinces were to be attacked. Colonel Innes had a brigade at Sylhet. Colonel Shapland had 3,000 men at Chittagong. Brigadier M'Morine, with about 2,500 men, was at Goalpara.

Troops were sent from the Bengal and Madras Presidencies. From Bengal Her Majesty's 13th and 38th Foot, two companies of Artillery, and the 40th Native Infantry (marine corps), (2175 men). From Madras Her Majesty's 41st and 89th Foot and Madras European regiment, and, including seven native regiments, 9th, 12th, 28th and 30th Madras Native Infantry, artillery, and pioneers, 9,300 men, or grand total, 11,475 men.¹ The object was to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irawadi river. The Bengal troops sailed in April, 1824. "The difficulty in collecting a sufficient force for a

¹ Wilson's Official Documents, pp. 19—24.

maritime expedition from Bengal, owing to the repugnance which the sepoys entertain to embarking on board vessels,¹ had early led to an application to the Madras Government. Besides transports, there was a flotilla of twenty-gun brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying an eighteen-pounder each. There were His Majesty's sloops 'Larne' and 'Sophie,' and several company's cruisers, and the 'Diana' steamboat." Major-general Sir A. Campbell, Commander-in-chief of the Forces.² Brigadier-general Macbean commanded the Madras troops. The Bengal troops reached the rendezvous about the end of April (Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans). They were joined by His Majesty's frigate "Liffey," Commodore Grant, and Slaney, sloop-of-war. The last Madras division left on the 23rd of May,³ and joined at Rangoon in June and July. More troops were sent from Madras in August and September; and, by the end of 1824, His Majesty's 47th Regiment, and the

¹ They went to Egypt in 1801; to the Isle of France in 1810; to Java in 1811; and Ceylon in 1818. There were about 8,000 sepoys on the frontier.

² Some general officers at Madras had declined the honour and responsibility.

³ Some dispersed by a gale of wind.

Governor-general's body-guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign nearly 13,000 men.¹ Captain Canning² went as political agent and joint commissioner with Sir Archibald Campbell.

On the 9th May, 1824, the expedition³ arrived off, and on the 10th stood in for, the river. The town was surrendered, after some firing from the Liffey. It was found deserted by the enemy. Before reaching Rangoon, detachments were sent to seize the islands of Cheduba and Negrais.⁴ A detachment was sent against the Tenasserim coast, in the end of August.⁵ Tavoy and Mergui speedily fell into our hands. The enemy, on the 1st of July, made an attack⁶ on the British lines, and were defeated. There were various operations near Rangoon.

Owing to the difficulties experienced of penetrating into the interior from Rangoon, it was pro-

¹ The eight thousand men at Sylhet, Chittagong, and Goalpara were on the frontier.

² He died in Calcutta, 2nd Sept. 1824, one of the first victims.

³ Official Documents, pp. 25, 61.

⁴ Official Documents, p. 49.

⁵ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 73.

⁶ Snodgrass, p. 47.

posed¹ to try and penetrate from Kachar, through Manipoor, into the valley of the Ningti river, falling into the Irawadi; and a force of about seven thousand troops, under Colonel Shuldham, was formed. This failed. The other route was from Chittagong, through Aracan, and across the mountains into Ava, where it was to effect a junction with the army of Rangoon. A force of eleven thousand men,² consisting of His Majesty's 44th and 54th regiments, the 26th, 42nd, 49th, and 62nd Bengal native infantry, and 2nd light infantry battalion; the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry, the Mug levy, a body of local horse, with artillery and pioneers, assembled at Chittagong towards the end of September 1824, under the command of Brigadier-general Morrison, of His Majesty's 44th; a flotilla of sloops and gun-brigs was attached to it, under Commodore Hayes,³ for the conveyance of troops and supplies along the shore, and to co-operate

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 93.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 96.

³ Vestal, Bombay cruiser; the Research and Investigator, surveying ships; five gun-brigs; ketch bomb-vessel, Pluto; steam gun-vessel; four gun pinnaces; and eighty gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder; transports; Mug and country boats; and a flotilla marine six hundred men.

with the force. The force moved from Chittagong early in January, 1825.¹ The approach to the town of Aracan² lay across a narrow valley, bounded by a range of hills about four hundred feet high, the summit of which was crowned by a series of stockades, and garrisoned by the whole Burma force, estimated at nine thousand men. An attack, made on the 29th March, failed. On the evening of the 31st, Brigadier Richards,³ with a detachment,⁴ ascended the range by a circuitous route, and had established himself on the summit, before his movement was detected by the enemy. Next morning (1st April), the division attacked the Burmese in flank, while the

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 106. His Majesty's 54th, 10th Madras native infantry, and left wing 16th native infantry, went by *sea*. The field-battery, his Majesty's 44th, 1st light infantry battalion, four companies 42nd Bengal native infantry, five companies 62nd native infantry, right wing Madras 16th native infantry, and two troops of Gardner's local horse went by *land*. The 26th and 49th Bengal, went by *boats* along the coast. There were one thousand five hundred Europeans, and eight thousand native troops; total, nine thousand five hundred men.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 108.

³ Lieutenant-General Sir W. Richards, K.C.B. Bengal.

⁴ Six Companies 44th foot, three of the 26th, three of the 49th, thirty seamen and thirty Gardner's dismounted horse.

main body again assailed them in front. The enemy were driven from each stockade, and abandoned Aracan to the British arms, retreating across the low lands between the city and the mountains, and crossing the latter by the passes of Talak and Aeng.

General Morrison, being very ill, left Aracan in October, and the command devolved upon Brigadier Richards. He, on the 31st October, 1825, when commanding the south-east division in Aracan, reported¹ "that at present there is no road by which troops, with their supplies on cattle, could travel from hence (Aracan) through the mountains. "There are three roads; the northernmost, the Limrao road; the next lower down, the Talak; and the third, the Aeng road. The Talak, ninety miles from the town of Aracan. From Talak to the opposite side of the Yeo Mandong range, is said to be seventy miles." The 18th Madras native infantry,² under Captain D. Ross, with elephants, marched first to Pakangyeh, on the Irawadi, eight marches from Yandabo, and thence, after crossing the river to Sembew Ghwen, quitted the low country in

¹ Extracts from his Journal.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 153.

three days; and in eight more, crossed the mountains by a practicable route to Aeng in Aracan. Captain Trant,¹ assistant quarter-master-general, observes, "We met with but little arduous difficulty, yet performed a march of one hundred and twenty-four miles, which had been supposed impracticable, in eleven days, and clearly pointed out that, had this road been examined, it would have been found that there was nothing to have prevented a portion of General Morrison's army from wintering in Ava, instead of perishing in the marshes of Aracan." The sickness of his surveyor, prevented the brigadier causing a minute investigation of the roads being made in time to have effected this object.

Sir A. Campbell,² owing to the want of conveyance and of supplies, early suggested doubts of the possibility of penetrating into the interior of Ava by the line of the Irawadi. Sir T. Munro, Governor of Madras, wrote to Lord Amherst,³ on the 23rd August, 1824, "I have al-

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 153, note 1. Two Years in Ava, p. 447.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 118.

³ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 119, note 1. Life, vol. ii. p. 131.

ready given my opinion on the main point, namely, that the plan of advancing by the Irrawadi was preferable to that of marching south, or re-embarking and landing at Aracan. I can see no object in his going to Martaban, because it would not facilitate his advance to the capital, as, according to his own account, even if the Siamese and Peguers were to take a part in the war, he would still require draught and carriage equipage from Bengal. With regard to the plan of re-embarking the Rangoon force, and landing it at Aracan, nothing could justify such a measure but the certainty of being furnished there with an equipment of draught and carriage-cattle. If they could not obtain it, they would be still more helpless than where they are now, and we should have lost reputation,—given confidence to the enemy.” But Brigadier-general Morrison’s force had not then left Chittagong.

After obtaining a supply of conveyance, Sir A. Campbell, leaving a garrison in Rangoon of native troops, with such Europeans as were unfit for field duty, formed the remainder of his force into three divisions; one, of the strength of two thousand four hundred, under his own

command;¹ one of twelve hundred under Brigadier-general Cotton;² and one of less than six hundred men under Major Sale.³ The latter was directed to proceed against Bassein, and after clearing that province, to cross the country, and join the main body at Henzada, on the Irawadi. The division under General Cotton was to proceed by water, with a flotilla of sixty-two gun boats, and all the boats of the men-of-war, under Captain Alexander of the Royal Navy, and on its way was to carry the enemy's entrenchments at Panlang and Donabew. The column under Sir Archibald Campbell was to proceed by land to Prome, on the Irawadi, where it was to be joined by the other divisions.

Major Sale⁴ proceeded by sea to Cape Negrais.

¹ The land column:—his Majesty's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three native battalions, the body guard, a troop of Bengal horse artillery, and part of the rocket troop.

² His Majesty's 89th, 1st Madras European regiment, two hundred and fifty of the 18th Madras native infantry, foot artillery and part of the rocket troop.

³ His Majesty's 13th and 12th Madras native infantry, with details of artillery.

⁴ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 119.

The fire of the ships drove the enemy from their batteries. The troops landed and destroyed the works. The squadron ascended the Bassein river, to the town of that name. The enemy had abandoned it, and set it on fire. The enemy fell back upon Donabew. The column under Sir A. Campbell marched on the 13th of February, 1825. General Cotton's column advanced to Yangan-Chena, where the Rangoon branch separates from the Irawadi, and arrived in sight of Donabew¹ on the 28th February, where Maha Bandoola had entrenched himself. There was some delay in the heavy boats crossing the shallows into the Irawadi. The column reached Panlang, on the Rangoon river, on the 19th February; both banks were defended by stockades. The shells and rockets drove out the enemy, and a division of the Madras 18th native infantry was left there. The whole were in the main stream by the 4th of March, and on the 6th took up a position on the right bank of the river, two miles below Donabew. The Burma general had been summoned to surrender, and had returned a courteous but resolute refusal. The works were of considerable strength along

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 122.

the right bank of the river, and commanding its whole breadth. The chief work, a parallelogram of one thousand by seven hundred yards, stood on a bank withdrawn from the bed of the river in the dry season, and rising above it. Two others, one a square of two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre, and the other, an irregular work, four hundred yards from it, stood lower down on the river, forming outworks to the principal stockade, commanded and supported by its batteries. All three were constructed of squared beams of timber, provided with platforms, and pierced for cannon; and each had an exterior ditch, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed bamboos, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. One hundred and forty guns of various calibre, and a greater number of ginjals, were mounted on the parapets, and the garrison consisted of twelve thousand men, commanded by the most celebrated general in the service of Ava. General Cotton had left his native regiment at Panlang, and part of his Europeans to guard the boats and stores. "His whole available force did not, therefore, exceed six hundred bayonets, a force manifestly inadequate to the storming of Donabew."

General Cotton considered the commander-in-chief's orders imperative, and prepared to attack. On the 7th he formed two columns, composing, altogether, five hundred men. They advanced against the smaller stockade, supported by the fire of two field-pieces, and of a rocket battery. It was captured. The second of the entrenchments was next attacked. It was stormed by two hundred men. The attack failed, and the party was recalled. General Cotton seeing it was evident that his force was too small, the guns and stores were re-embarked, and the flotilla dropped down to the position at Yung-yung, which it had occupied on the 6th of March, and there awaited instructions from the commander-in-chief.

It is evident that General Cotton's force was inadequate, and that Sir A. Campbell ought to have proceeded with his whole force to attack Donabew, which would only have amounted to three thousand six hundred men: instead of detaching twelve hundred men from his force, which was too weak to advance with into Prome. He could not advance till joined by other troops, and he had to return. On the 25th of March, Sir A. Campbell, having made a retrograde movement,

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 126.

came before Donabew. The army encamped above the works; the water column was some way below them. The flotilla on the 27th, with a fair breeze, joined the army; landed the heavy guns and mortars. Shells and rockets were diligently thrown into the entrenchments. The guns opened on the 3rd of April. They were unanswered. Shortly after, the Burmese were observed to be in full retreat. It was soon ascertained that Maha Bandoola had been killed on the previous night by the bursting of a shell. The loss of the British in the affairs before Donabew was thirty killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded. As soon as the post was taken possession of, Sir A. Campbell resumed his march. He was at Tharawa with his advance, on his way to Prome, on the 7th of April, and on the 8th, was there joined by reinforcements from Rangoon, under Brigadier M'Creagh, consisting of His Majesty's 1st or royal regiment, and the 28th Madras native infantry, with elephants and carriage cattle. The Burmans had been rallied by the Prince of Tharawadi. The army reached Prome on the 25th of April, without encountering an enemy.¹ The town had been evacuated by the Burmans, after burning the stockades.

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 128.

Sir A. Campbell¹ had now about five thousand men, of whom, two thousand three hundred were Europeans. Detachments left at Rangoon to the extent of about fifteen hundred more, were under orders to join him. An armistice had been agreed upon, to extend from the 17th of September, to the 17th of October, "during which, neither force should cross a line extending from Komma, on the west bank of the Irawadi, through Naibenzik, to Tongho. Towards the end of September, Sir James Brisbane² joined the army. The Kyi Wungyi engaged to meet the British general at Naibenzik on the 2nd of October, to determine the definitive conditions of peace. The meeting took place. Sir A. Campbell was accompanied by Sir James and his personal staff, and one thousand picked men, both Europeans and natives. A like number of Burmas formed the escort of the Kyi Wungyi. The parties met at Naibenzik, on a plain. The Kyi Wungyi was assisted by other officers of rank. It very soon appeared that they were entirely unprepared for the demands made upon their government by the British commanders.

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 133.

² Commander-in-chief of the British navy in the Indian seas.

“The court of Ava¹ was expected to desist from all interference with Assam and Kachar, and to recognise their dependence of Manipur, Arakan, with its dependencies, was to be given up to the British, and an indemnity of two crores of rupees (£2,000,000), was to be paid for the expenses of the war; until the discharge of which sum, Rangoon, Martaban, and the Tenasserim provinces, were to be held in pledge. A resident was to be received at Ava, and a commercial treaty to be concluded, by which the trade with Rangoon should be relieved from the exactions by which it had hitherto been repressed. These proposals were received by the Burma negotiators with manifest surprise, and were strenuously resisted.” They were unauthorised to accede to such conditions, and must refer them to the royal pleasure. They proposed, therefore, to extend the armistice to the beginning of November. Little doubt was entertained, that recourse must be again had to arms. At the end of October, a letter from the Burma chief announced, “that if the English made any demands for money for their expenses, or for any territory, friendship was at an end. Such was the custom of the

Burmas."¹ The court was indignant, and the war party rose in favour. The Burma army was ordered to move upon Prome. Their army drew towards the British lines, to circumscribe their limits, and harass and intercept their communications.

A considerable body of their troops was thrown forward to Watigaon, twenty miles from Prome, where they entrenched themselves. It was necessary to dislodge them.² On the evening of the 15th November, 1825, Brigadier M'Dowall, with four regiments Madras native infantry, moved in three columns. The ground did not admit of the employment of field artillery; and, "as the brigade was unprovided with battering guns, the entrenchments could not be breached." There was no co-operation. The commandant was killed, and the attack failed.³ The principal cause of the failure appears to have been mis-

¹ At the interview they said, the Chinese had formerly conquered a part of Ava, but at the peace had exacted no pecuniary compensation.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 138.

³ Ten other officers were wounded, one died; of the sepoys fifty-three were killed, one hundred and ten wounded, and forty-two missing. Total loss of two hundred and sixteen.

information as to the amount of the Burma force, which, instead of two thousand or three thousand as reported, whereas it consisted of eight thousand shans, two thousand Burmas, and six hundred horse.¹ The success of the Burmans confirmed them in their expectation of compelling the British army to retire from Prome. The Burmans advanced within a few miles of Prome. Sir A. Campbell, with his Majesty's 13th, 38th, 47th, and 87th regiments, and 38th Madras native infantry, in one column; and General Cotton, with his Majesty's 41st and 89th regiments, and 18th and 28th Madras native infantry, in another, attacked them. The flotilla, and a corps of native infantry, were to make a demonstration against the enemy's right; while Sir Archibald attacked their left.² General Cotton attacked them at noon on the 1st December; and the Burmans left three hundred dead in the entrenchments. The veteran general, Maha Nemyo, was among the slain. The division under Sir A. Campbell was delayed, but came up and completed the defeat. Our troops attacked and defeated the Burmans again on the 2nd, drove

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 139.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 141.

them from their entrenchments, and followed them from hill to hill till the whole position, two miles in extent, was in our possession. On the 5th of December, Brigadier-general Cotton crossed the Irawadi, and drove them from the other stockades. Our loss was twenty five killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded. Three officers killed, two wounded (one mortally). This broke up the Burma force.

The force reached Miaday¹ on the 19th of December, accompanied by the flotilla. The latter was met on the 26th by a flag of truce, bearing a message from the Burma commander, stating that full powers had been received from the court to conclude a treaty, and suggesting that deputies should be sent to discuss the conditions. Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., were again sent.² The army continued its march, and arrived at Patangoh, opposite to Melloon, on the 29th, where it encamped. The flotilla ascended the river without molestation. A suspension of arms was proposed, but not agreed to.³ On the 30th of De-

¹ Wilson, p. 143.

² Sent on the former occasion.

³ The proposed meeting was to be on the 24th January, 1826.

cember a conference was held in a boat which the Burma chiefs undertook to fit up for the meeting and anchor in the middle of the river.¹ Accordingly Sir A. Campbell, accompanied by Mr. T. C. Robertson,² the civil commissioner from Bengal, and by Sir James Brisbane, repaired on board, and were met by four of the principal members of the Burma Government. The stipulations were the same as those formerly proposed, and were encountered with the same objections.³ Those relating to territorial concession were not persisted in; but the unwillingness to pay money indemnification was so insuperable, and the plea of inability so tenaciously urged, that the British commissioners were induced to lower the demand to one crore of rupees (£1,000,000). With this alteration the Burma commissioners professed themselves contented, and a definitive treaty was executed by them on the 3rd of January (1826). An armistice was agreed upon until the 18th, by which period it was expected that the treaty

¹ Imitating the meeting of the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor Napoleon, in 1807, at Tilsit.

² Lastly, member of the Supreme Council in India.

³ Besides the money compensation objected to, they had said that the Chinese had, when the peace was re-established, restored the subjugated territory.

would be returned from Ava with the royal ratification, the prisoners at Ava would be sent down, and the payment of the first instalment would be commenced. These expectations were disappointed.

On the 17th of January¹ a deputation was sent to apologize for the non-arrival of the ratified treaty, and requesting prolongation of time. This was declined, and on the 18th a deputation from the British camp proceeded to Melloon to apprise the Wungis, that, unless the ratified treaty should arrive, or, unless they engaged to evacuate Melloon by sunrise, on the 20th, the post would be attacked. They refused to accede to the latter, and could not pledge themselves to the former. Hence the army advanced. Melloon was stormed and taken. On the 8th of February² the army approached within five miles of the ancient city of Pagahm, the capital of the Burma empire, at the season of its greatest power and prosperity. The force, with Sir A. Campbell, did not exceed 1,300 men, of whom 900 were Europeans; two regiments of the latter, the 47th and 87th, detached to Tondwyne,

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 145.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 148.

to collect cattle and grain, as well as disperse a body of Burmas, reported to be stationed there, to harass the British flanks, not having rejoined.

After halting five days at Pagahm, Sir Archibald, on the 16th of February, continued his march towards the capital, and had reached Yandabo, within sixty miles of Ava.¹ The treaty was at last concluded on the 24th of February, 1826. The payment of the first instalment of twenty-five lakhs of rupees (£250,000), was a proof of the sincerity of the court; "and, by the authority vested in the American deputies,² to accede to whatever terms the British commissioners should impose. No other conditions were stipulated than those already insisted upon; and a treaty was finally concluded upon the basis already described. The King of Ava renounced all claim to, and right of interference with, the country of Assam, and the principalities of Jyntia and Kachar, and recognised the independence of Manipur. He consented to cede in perpetuity the four divisions of Aracan, or Aracan Proper, Ramri, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and the three

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 152.

² Messrs. Price and Judson, Missionaries.

districts of Tenasserim, Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui, or the whole of the coast belonging to Ava, south of the Sanluen river ; to receive a resident at his capital, and sanction the conclusion of a commercial treaty ; and, finally, he agreed to pay a crore of rupees (or about £1,000,000) in four instalments, the first immediately, the second within one hundred days from the date of the treaty,¹ and the other two in the course of the two following years." The British engaged to retire at once to Rangoon, and to quit the Burma territory upon the payment of the second instalment. The discharge of the promised indemnity was tardily and reluctantly complied with.

On the receipt of the ratification of the treaty the army broke up from Yandabo. A brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, marched by land to Rangoon. The 18th Madras Native Infantry crossed the mountains by the Aeng Pass, in Aracan, in a march of 124 miles in eleven days. Sir A. Campbell and Mr. Robertson embarked in boats, and proceeded down the river to Rangoon, whence such of the troops as were not required to protect the cautionary towns and conquered provinces, were despatched to their

¹ Falling due on the 4th June, 1826.

several presidencies. Sir A. Campbell, after visiting Calcutta, returned to Rangoon, of which he held possession until the payment of the second instalment, at the end of the year 1826. He then removed the troops to Moalmain, an inconsiderable village opposite to Martaban, on the British side of the Sanluen river, but which afforded a convenient military frontier station. A sea-port, called Amherst, was established at the mouth of the river Sanluen, twenty-seven miles below Moalmain.

It appears, by the statement of the late Captain W. Roy,¹ in 1841, that when Lord Amherst heard of the fall of Bhurtpoor (captured on the 18th of January, 1826), he wrote to Mr. Robertson, the civil commissioner, to demand four crores of rupees (£4,000,000), and all the country up to Prome. The original treaty was signed on the 3rd of January, 1826. It was too late to make any further demands. The war, it is said, upon good authority, cost fourteen crores of rupees (£14,000,000).²

¹ Stated to the author in 1841, in Calcutta, by Captain W. Roy, who was a merchant at Rangoon, and prisoner on our landing at Rangoon, in 1824.

² Wilson (Narrative, 1852, p. 262,) thinks it cost about £5,000,000,

The Burmans obtained possession of Assam and Aracan in 1783.¹ The Tenasserim province originally belonged to the King of Siam. "In 1688 the Court of Directors of the East India Company ordered their servants to endeavour to obtain possession of it from the king, and to fortify it. In 1759 it was taken from the Siamese by Alompra, the Burman monarch, after feeble resistance. It was then large and populous, but is now almost a heap of ruins."²

Sickness in Aracan. "By the end of the rainy season, a fourth of the men had died, and more than half the survivors were in hospital."³ "In the course of August the deaths were, eight officers, seventy Europeans, four hundred and twenty sipahis, and two hundred camp followers, above seven hundred men. Between May and September two hundred and fifty-nine Europeans, out of one thousand five hundred, died; and of the rest, nearly four hundred were in hospital. Of eight thousand native troops, eight hundred and ninety-two had died, and three thousand six hundred and forty-eight of the sur-

¹ Hamilton's Gazetteer, and the authorities.

² Symes, Bruce, &c.

³ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 113.

vivors were in hospital. The peculiarities of the locality, combined with the effects of the climate, sufficiently accounted for the mortality."¹ His Majesty's 44th and 54th, amounting to one thousand and four men; five hundred and ninety-five died in the country in the course of eight months, and of those who quitted it not more than a half were alive at the end of twelve months.² In the expedition to Walchern (1809) there were one thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight officers, and thirty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty-one native company's officers, and privates embarked. There were :—

	OFFICERS.	RANK AND FILE.
Killed or died . . .	47 . . .	4,108
Reported sick . . .	217 . . .	11,296
	264	15,404*

So that the deaths and sickness were greatest in the Burma war.

In July, 1824, the King of Siam having died, Captain Burney⁴ was sent to congratulate the

¹ Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta, vol. ii. p. 201.

² Report by Major Tulloch, August, 1841.

³ Return adjutant-general officer, (Horse Guards) 1st Feb. 1810. Annual Register.

⁴ Narrative by Wilson, (1852) p. 230.

new king upon his accession, and reached Bangkok on the 4th of December, 1825. After the signing of the treaty, Mr. Crawford¹ was appointed envoy to the court of Ava, to discuss with the ministers a commercial treaty. The mission returned to Rangoon by the middle of January, 1827, having effected the object for which it had been sent. All personal intercourse was then suspended. The manner in which the mission of Mr. Crawford was received at Ava offered little encouragement for the appointment of a successor,² and he dissuaded, in his report to the government of India, the enforcement of the article which provided for the permanent presence of a British envoy at the Burman capital. It was not till the end of 1829, when some delay in the payment of the instalments of the contribution due,³ and some questions relating to the affairs of the two states, that Lieutenant-Colonel Burney, recently returned from Siam, was sent to Ava. The King of Ava becoming imbecile, if not insane, the administration was assumed by his favourite queen, with the support of her bro-

¹ Narrative by Wilson, p. 260. Bengal medical service.

² Narrative by Wilson, p. 265.

³ Due (in two years from the treaty) on 24th Feb. 1828.

ther, Menthagye, to the total exclusion of the heir-apparent, and the brothers of the king, from all offices of trust and emolument. Towards the end of 1837 the parties came to an open rupture. It was known that the Prince of Tharawadi,¹ the king's eldest brother, was collecting men and arms in the city. He declared his quarrel was with Menthagye alone, and that he had no intention or desire to injure his brother the king, or his nephew, the rightful heir to the throne.

Menthagye² and his colleagues had recourse to the British resident; he repaired to the headquarters of Tharawadi who refused to accede to any terms of accommodation; he gave orders to the commanders of his troops, that they should consider the resident and all persons connected with him as his friends, and should carefully respect the residency in the event of having to storm the town. At last Tharawadi, after many acts of violence, assumed the title of king of Mouttshobo. He now determined to get rid of the residency altogether. He not only declared in council, but explicitly stated to the resident,

¹ He rallied the troops after Bandoola's death, and was desirous of negotiating.

² Narrative, p. 261.

that he did not consider himself bound by the acts of his predecessor, and that he did not acknowledge the treaties made by his brother with the government of India.¹ That the Burmese officers had been frightened into signing the treaty of Yandabo. The resident applied for permission to withdraw from Ava to Rangoon, on the plea of impaired health, and reported the state of affairs to the government of India. This was exactly what Tharawadi desired.² Colonel Burney quitted Ava on the 17th of June, 1837, accompanied by the European traders and American missionaries. Tharawadi removed his capital to Kyung-myung, having expressed his determination to make Ava a heap of ruins, and forbidding any Europeans or Americans to accompany him to his new capital. Colonel Burney reached Rangoon on the 6th of July, and experienced much incivility from the Burman functionaries.

The government of India, thinking it possible that amicable relations might be restored by a conciliatory course of conduct, resolved on Colonel Burney's departure for Europe to despatch Colonel Benson³ to Rangoon, having as his assistant

¹ Narrative, p. 272.

² Violence had been recommended by his adherents.

³ Of the Bengal army, formerly military secretary to

Captain M'Leod, who had been before in Ava ; was personally known to the king and his ministers, and was well acquainted with the Burman language and manners. The experiment was not successful. Colonel Benson was at first received with some show of civility at Rangoon, where he arrived in July, 1838. An intimation met him at Prome that he would do well to remain there. The notice was in some degree unofficial ; he resumed his route, and in October arrived at Amerapura where the court then was. The mission was not permitted to enter the city ; and the envoy and suite were at times in peril of starvation. Tharawadi steadily refused to receive a British officer under the conditions of the treaty of Yandabo. He was admitted to an interview with the ministers, but an audience of the king was denied.

At last Colonel Benson finding his situation to be incompatible with the character and credit of his government, he quitted his irksome position in the beginning of 1839, and returned to Cal-

Lord W. Bentinck, Governor-general of India. Colonel Burney of the same army. Captain McLeod of the Madras army. Before Colonel Benson's arrival Tharawadi had put to death the heir apparent with his wives, and a number of his followers.

cutta. Captain M'Leod, whom he left behind, was for a time rather better treated; he was admitted to an interview with Tharawadi; but this was in his own private character, and arose on the occurrence of a severe earthquake, from his desire to know how Europeans accounted for such phenomena. Captain M'Leod was at last compelled to retire to Rangoon, where he spent the remainder of the year: when continued neglect and insolence compelled the government of India to recal the mission.

In the middle of 1840, formidable disturbances arose in the north-west, chiefly among the Shan tribes. Tharawadi took occasion to get rid of some obnoxious persons, and the queen, her brother Menthagyee, and his daughter, with a number of their followers were publicly executed. Considerable apprehension was excited in the adjacent British dependencies towards the end of 1841, by the visit of Tharawadi to Rangoon, with a numerous and warlike train, which it was anticipated would be directed against Aracan or Tenasserim. Prudential measures were adopted against such a design. After laying the foundation of a new town in the vicinity of Rangoon, and paying a visit to Pegu, Tharawadi quitted

Rangoon in January, 1842, and returned to Amerapura. Although averse to the British alliance, and anxious to vindicate the honour of the Burman arms and recover the lost provinces of his country, it does not appear that he ever seriously meditated a renewal of hostilities; he was aware of his inability to cope with the Indian government; and eventually fell a victim to the spirit of insubordination of which he had set the example.¹ Towards the end of 1845, Tharawadi resolved to announce his legitimate son as his successor; and to strengthen his claim by his marriage with the daughter of the old king, his brother. The measure was opposed by his eldest son, the prince of Prome; the prince was defeated, and put to death soon after. Tharawadi, addicted to intemperate habits, became so ferocious that his ministers treated him as insane, and raised the young prince to the chief authority, with the title of regent. Tharawadi died in confinement a few months after his deposal; but the regent refrained from assuming the royal title until after the death of the old king, which did not occur until the beginning of 1847. His nephew then became sovereign.

¹ Narrative, p. 279.

Hopes were entertained of renewing the intercourse with Ava on the terms of the treaty, as some disposition was shown to relax the restrictions to which the trade, and the resort to Rangoon, had been subjected. The new king subsided into sensual indulgence, and experienced the fate of his father; having been deposed by one of the ministers, who placed himself upon the throne.

The revenues of the Tenasserim provinces are stated by Wilson¹ to be £55,000, in 1848-49. The revenue of Aracan in 1850-51, at £88,000. The value of the imports and exports of Moulmain in 1850-51, at nearly £600,000. The trade of Akyab in 1850-51, at £360,000. So that the trade is about £960,000. The revenue, £143,000. The population of Moulmain, fifty thousand; of Aracan, three hundred and forty-four thousand, nine hundred and fourteen, or three hundred and ninety-four thousand, nine hundred and fourteen souls, being an increase of about two hundred and fifty thousand since the year 1828. In the four years ending 1839-40, the revenue of the territory ceded by the Burmese, on the average

¹ Narrative p. 289, Note 15.

revenue was only about £56,000.¹ The advantages gained by the war are not only to be regarded in a commercial point of view.² Admiral Suffrein, when he returned to France in 1784, told Louis XVI. that India could be best invaded by obtaining possession of Aracan.

State of British India.—1824. The tranquilization of Hindostan had been insured after the Mahrattah and Pindaree war of 1817-18, and had “thrown back upon the Company’s territories a multitude of military adventurers,³ who were natives of India;” and who could no longer “procure service in the mercenary bands of the Mahrattahs or Puthans.⁴ The defects in the administration of civil justice, the ineffective police, and the deferred settlement of the revenue in the upper provinces,⁵ produced general discontent; and in 1824, there was scarcely a district, in the

¹ Remarks on Indian Revenue, 1832-33 to 1839-40, p. 9, by the author.

² Narrative, p. 290, (note) says Aracan has become the granary of the countries along the Bay of Bengal.

³ Notes on Indian affairs, by Hon. F. J. Shore, Bengal civil service, vol. i. p. 159.

⁴ It was a wise resolution after the Punjab war 1848-49, to enlist Sikh soldiers in our regiments.

⁵ The system of leases for thirty years works well.

upper provinces in particular, in which a spirit of disaffection was not more or less manifest. To the north-west, disturbances broke out towards the end of 1824 in Cutch; which threatened to assume political importance, from the secret encouragement which the authors of them received from the ameers of Sindh.”¹

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 177. A considerable force was sent to Cutch in 1815. (Wilson, vol. viii. p. 102):—The ruler of that country became our ally.

CHAPTER IV,

SIEGE OF BHURTPOOR.

SIEGE of Bhurtpoor.—1825-26. “The triumphs of the Marquis of Hastings had confirmed the disposition of the Jaut principality to look to the British government for protection.¹ The treaty with the Raja Runjet Sing (of Bhurtpoor, 1805) was faithfully observed by his successors, Ranadhir Sing, and Baldeo Sing; and the latter relied upon the government of India to defend the interests of his son, Bulwunt Sing, in the event of his death, while the latter was in his minority. At his earnest solicitation, the political agent at Delhi, Sir D. Ochterlony, consented to invest the boy with a khelat, or honorary dress, as a pledge of the recognition of his succession.” The raja’s infirm state of health, and his apprehension of the ambitious designs of his nephew, Durjan Sal,

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 183.

induced him to make the request. The investiture was performed at Bhurtpoor early in 1824. A year afterwards, the raja died. The young raja, who was about five or six years old, succeeded, under the guardianship of his maternal uncle, Ram Ratan Sing. A month after Baldeo Sing's death, Durjan Sal, the son of a younger brother of the late raja, seduced the soldiery to join his party, broke into the citadel, and killed the guardian, and seized the person of the young raja, and assumed the direction of affairs. Sir David addressed a proclamation to the Jauts, requiring them to withhold obedience from the usurper, and assured them of the support of a British force, which he at once assembled at Mathura, on the confines of the Bhurtpoor territory. Durjun Sal declined an invitation to visit the British cantonments, and place the young raja in the hands of the British agent. A respectable force was speedily assembled, and was about to move against the fortress, when the execution of the project was arrested by the supreme government.

This was in the month of July, 1825, while our extensive military operations in the war with Ava were undecided, and attended with great

difficulties and very heavy expense.¹ Lord Amherst, Governor-general, did not admit of the existence of any obligation to uphold the claims of the minor raja. It was affirmed that the grant of the honorary dress had been made without the sanction of the supreme authority. It was observed that Durjun Sal only claimed the exercise of the regency. The majority of the supreme council "considered interference might become indispensable for the preservation of tranquillity in Hindustan." The sentiments of the Governor-general so far prevailed, that it was resolved to countermand the military preparations, and to recal the hostile declarations which had been published. Upon this decision being made known, Sir D. Ochterlony immediately resigned. He died at Meerut on the 15th July, 1825, aged sixty-eight years. "It is not unlikely that the mortification which he had experienced on this occasion, and the disappointment of the proud hope he had cherished of seeing Bhurtpoor fall before him, accelerated his decease."²

Wilson says that the force assembled by Sir

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 185.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 187.

David, "however formidable, was confessedly inadequate to overcome a prolonged and national resistance. At the East India House, on the 19th December, 1826, on a vote of thanks to the army of Bhurtpoor, Sir J. Malcolm said that "if the siege had failed, it would in all human probability have added to the embarrassments of the Burmese war,¹ that of hostilities with almost every state of India."² The late Lord Metcalfe,³ when a member of the supreme council of India, recorded his opinion that "the Burmese war produced an extraordinary sensation all over India, amounting to an expectation of our immediate downfall."⁴ The operations against Bhurtpoor commenced on the 10th December, 1825. The Burmese signed the first treaty on the 3rd January, 1826. The employment of twenty-eight thousand men on a new enterprise,

¹ Bhurtpoor fell on 18th January, and the treaty with the Burmese was signed at Yandabo, on 24th February, 1826; the former may have partly influenced the latter event.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 180, note 1.

³ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 181, note 1.

⁴ At the beginning of the Mahrattah War, 1803-4, Company's paper was, at one time, at a discount of thirty-six per cent, but never since that period.

against a fort before which we had failed after one hundred and nine days' continuance, may have caused the Burmese to make delays in regard to the treaty.

Sir C. Metcalfe¹ was recalled from Hyderabad, and succeeded the late Sir David as resident in Malwa and Rajputana. The opinion he gave in Calcutta was decidedly in favour of an effective support of the minor raja; that he should be acknowledged, and Durjan Sal removed upon a suitable provision.² His recommendations (first

¹ Wilson, vol. ix. p. 191.

² He obtained five hundred rupees a month. By the 7th article of the treaty of 17th April, 1805, (Marquis Wellesley's Despatches, vol. iv. p. 636, Appendix,) we guaranteed the raja's country "against external enemies; the Maha raja hereby agrees, that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and the sircar (which means government) of any other chieftain, the Maha raja will in the first instance submit the case of dispute to the Honourable Company's government," &c. The clear object of this article was (as we always insert in treaties,) to prevent warlike operations between neighbouring chiefs. There were two parties within Bhurtpoor, and warlike operations between them, would have been calculated to cause many military vagabonds to join each party (had we not interfered) and have caused a disturbed state of the country. We always employed our troops in Oude to put down insurrections. In arguing that Durjan Sal only claimed the "exercise of the regency," they lost

to try negotiations) were adopted. At length, war was determined upon, and Lord Combermere, the new commander-in-chief,¹ who was in Calcutta, went up the country dâk, and established his head-quarters at Muttra, on the 5th December, 1805. The army consisted of²—

	MEN.
Cavalry:—his Majesty's 11th and 16th light dragoons	1,212
3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, native levy	3,151
Foot:—his Majesty's 14th, 59th, and Hon. Company's European regiment	1,959
Native infantry:—6th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 41st, 58th, 60th and 63rd.	15,511
Gorkhas, (Nusseree)	200
Artillery:—Horse	816
Foot:—European, 576, native, 310	886
Gun Lascars	640
Sappers and miners	920
	25,295

sight of the fact, that he had destroyed the regent, and had no authority to make himself regent; which must have originated with the state or government, and not by the act of any individual, or by his own nomination of himself.

¹ Arrived in Calcutta, 2nd October, 1825.

² Narrative by Captain J. N. Creighton, his Majesty's 11th light dragoons, (1830) pp. 61—79.

But, including irregular cavalry, &c., there were above twenty-seven thousand men.¹

The siege-train:²—

- 16 twenty-four pounders.
- 20 eighteen-pounders.
- 4 twelve-pounders.
- 12 eight-inch howitzers.
- 46 eight-inch mortars.
- 12 ten-inch mortars.
- 2 thirteen-inch mortars.

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Abundance of material; five hundred rounds to each mortar; one thousand rounds for each gun.

Horse artillery, and light field guns:—

- 14 twelve-pounders.
- 10 five and a-half inch howitzers.
- 26 six-pounders.

Total 162 guns and mortars.

The commander-in-chief, Lord Combermere.

The division from Muttra was commanded by Major-general Thomas Reynell, C.B. That from Agra was under Major-general Jasper Nicolls, C.B. The force of the enemy's garrison was estimated at twenty thousand men,³ chiefly Rajputs and Jauts, with some Affghans. The greatest

¹ Journal of Lieut. (Colonel) W. N. Forbes, Engineers.

² Creighton, p. 9.

³ Wilson, vol. ix: p. 193.

security of the fortress was in the thickness and toughness of its walls, constructed of clay hardened in the sun.

The army assembled before Bhurtpoor on the 10th of December, 1825. In a northerly direction, some distance from the fort, and screened from it by an interjacent forest, towards the north-west, was the Moti Jhil; an extensive piece of water, capable of filling the ditches of the fortress, by sluices cut through the embankment within which the waters were confined. To prevent the enemy from opening channels through the bank, a party, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, of cavalry and infantry, with two companies of sappers and miners, were sent in advance; and drove away a small party of the enemy, and filled up sluices which had been recently opened. The object was to prevent the enemy filling the ditch with water, as was the case in the time of Lord Lake in 1805.¹ The post at the Jhil was maintained during the siege. Ex-

¹ Some officers on the staff in Lord Lake's army thought it were practicable to drain the water out of the ditch; but unless the country at a distance from the fort was much lower than the ground near the fort, it is difficult to understand how the drainage could be effected.

cept in a few places of little depth or extent, the ditch continued dry.

From the extent of the fortress the complete investment could not take place, but posts were established at certain intervals. The batteries were opened on the 24th of December. Although the fire of the breaching batteries produced sensible damage, yet the nature of the materials of which the walls were constructed, prevented their being breached. The earth *crumbled* down, but did not *fall* down in masses as is effected by breaching a brick wall.¹ Hence, recourse was had to mining. Lieutenant (now Colonel) W. N. Forbes, of the engineers, had prepared a plan before Lord Combermere left Calcutta.²

¹ Many shot were embedded. A party tried one night to get up one of the breaches, but found it steep and inaccessible. They sunk in the pulverised earth at every attempt to ascend.

² Wilson (p. 197, note 1,) alludes to the claim of the late Major-General Sir A. Galloway, who was at the siege in 1805, and in 1825—but his memoir was given to Lord Combermere when before the fort,—Lieutenant (Colonel) Forbes, when in Calcutta, gave his plan to Lord C. and the credit is due to him. The latter was wounded and disabled near the Jhil. He had been instructed in mining under Sir C. Palsey, before he went to India. Sir A. Galloway published a pamphlet on the attack on mud forts; and was wounded in the pioneers at the first siege.

There were several mines. On the 17th of January, 1826, the largest mine, containing ten thousand pounds of gunpowder, was loaded and exploded. Both breaches were formed by mines. The storm took place on the 18th of January, 1826. The column for the right breach was commanded by Major-general Reynell. That for the left breach, by Major-general Nicolls. A column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Delamaine (twelve hundred), stormed the Jangina gate, to the right of the right breach. An intermediate column (five hundred), under Lieutenant-Colonel T. Wilson.¹ The two main columns amounted to seven thousand men. The reserve column was under Brigadier-general J. W. Adams. Altogether, nearly eleven thousand men were employed in the storming columns and reserves.

All the storming columns succeeded. The citadel was surrendered. The enemy generally fought with resolution,² and the artillery-men mostly fell by their guns. Of the enemy seven thousand³ were slain. The killed and wounded

¹ Lieutenant-General T. Wilson, C. B.

² Wilson, vol. ix. p. 202.

³ "Not a chief of any consequence escaping. The enemy lost about seven thousand men." We had near six hundred killed and wounded. Extract Letter, date 26th January, 1826, from Bhurtpoor, from an officer of high rank to the author.

were estimated at many more. Our loss was one hundred and three killed, and four hundred and sixty-six wounded (total, five hundred and sixty-nine). Brigadier-general Edwards, Captain Armstrong, his Majesty's 14th, Captain Pitman, his Majesty's 59th, and Captain Brown, 31st native infantry, were killed. The day after the storm Lord Combermere and Sir C. Metcalfe entered the citadel, and on the 20th placed the young raja on the throne of his ancestors. The care of his person was confided to the principal widow of the late raja, as nominal regent. A resident was appointed. Thus, under the prompt and decided measures adopted by Lord Combermere, was Bhurtpoor captured in forty days, which had, in 1805, cost us the loss of three thousand men killed and wounded; the result of four unsuccessful attacks, and the detention of the army, under Lord Lake, for one hundred and nine days. Lord Lake, after his unvaried successes, thought he might hazard an attack on this fort with a very small and inefficient train of artillery. It enabled the natives to say that Bhurtpoor could not be taken,¹ and the failure

¹ A native said it was written in their books that Bhurtpoor could not be taken.

encouraged the killedars of other forts to hold out.

It is said that they had weakened some part of the fort since 1805, by adding more bastions. Sir D. Ochterlony considered that, as there were two parties within the walled town, he had every chance of success. It was supposed that the party opposed to Durjan Sal would have admitted our troops into the fort. A well known staff-officer, who was at the siege in 1805, even in 1825 considered the blowing open of the gates would have insured success at the time Sir David proposed the attack. The state of the Burma war in July, 1825, and in December of the same year, was very different. At the former period we had not advanced from Rangoon; in the latter period overtures for peace had taken place early in October, 1825, so that, independent of the inconvenience of operations in the rainy season, and as to the state of the war in Burma, the period selected for the attack was the best. A failure in 1825-26 would have been of very great importance, and would have created a great sensation in India.

Lord Combermere acted upon the principle of carrying the fortress in a style which should con-

vince the natives of India of the invincibility of the English power. His lordship, who had seen much service, particularly in the Peninsular war, and who was known to be energetic in all his military operations, exhibited that decision of action, which so eminently appertains to his character. In the command of the British cavalry in the Peninsular war, under the Duke of Wellington (with whom he had served in India in 1799), he was trusted with the principal cavalry arrangements of the army before the enemy; hence, and from his general knowledge of warfare, he exhibited to India the resources of the British government in the operations against Bhurtpoor, in a manner that ensured success. His lordship was made a viscount on the fall of Bhurtpoor; where the prize money amounted to forty-eight lakhs of rupees (£480,000); and his lordship obtained for the deposit of the prize money, from the government, five per cent.,¹ by which the shares of all were increased.

¹ Mr. Wilson (vol. ix p. 204, note 2) alludes to communications in a Calcutta newspaper, the *Englishman*, 1847, forming part of a series of papers on the operations of the Bengal army in India, to which it were very desirable to have access in a more commodious form." The present author published those articles from, April 1844, to April

The expenditure of shot and shells at Bhurt-poor was, from 24th December, 1825, to 18th January, 1826, on twenty-six days,—

Shot	42,215
Shells	17,060
Shrapnells . .	1,096
Grape	693
Case	404
Carcasses . .	4
	<hr/>
Grand total . .	61,472

Sometimes one hundred rounds each gun per day. Rendered unserviceable :—

9 out of 16 .	24-pounders
16 „ 26 .	18-pounders
1 10-inch mortar, out of 10	
7 8-inch mortars „	44
6 8-inch howitzers „	12

1848, "Operations of the Bengal Army in India and on Foreign Service," from the years 1756 to 1840. They extended to at least two thousand five hundred pages octavo. They might be much curtailed. He would contribute papers, if duly noticed, towards any proposed work on military operations in India.

CHAPTER V.

EXPEDITION TO AFFGHANISTAN.

THE expedition to Affghanistan.—1838. Sir J. M'Neill, the British envoy in Persia, had announced the advance of a large Persian army against Herat in 1837, under the King of Persia (Mahomed Shah), to Lord Palmerston. It consisted of forty-five thousand men, and eighty guns. It was accompanied by a Russian regiment. There were Russian staff-officers also, and the Russian envoy was present. The Persian army drove in the garrison out-posts at Herat on the 22nd of November, 1837. It was, therefore, considered that there was a design to invade India. Lord Broughton has proclaimed himself as the author of the expedition,¹ which it was resolved to send from India. At all events, his lordship proved that the war against Dost Mahomed, of Cabool,

¹ Speech in the year 1851. He was President of the Board of Control, and Lord Palmerston Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

did not originate with the East India Company. Though the measure did not originate with them, they had to pay the cost of the war.

The expedition was determined on in June, 1838. Lieutenant-colonel Sir A. Burnes had been deputed on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Cabool; and had returned from Cabool in June, 1838. The proclamation,¹ dated the 1st of October, 1838, stated that the mission to Cabool was purely of a commercial nature, and alluded to the treaties with the ameers of Sindh, the nawab of Bahawulpore, and Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, for opening the navigation of the Indus. The object² of Sir Alexander Burnes' mission was, "to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Affghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties." That³ Dost Mahomed gave "his undisguised support to the Persian design on Affghanistan." That the chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool,⁴) had "avowed

¹ Hough's Narrative of the March and Operations of the Army of the Indus." 1841, London. Appendix, No. 1.

² Hough, par. 3.

³ Hough, par. 6.

⁴ Hough, par. 9.

their adherence to the Persian policy," in opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India. The possession of Herat would, no doubt, have facilitated any ulterior views of Persia on Affghanistan, by the possession of Candahar and of Cabool : which would be the gaining of so many advanced positions towards India ; opening the road to the frontier of India. Last, the proclamation¹ stated that " his Majesty, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk (whom it was resolved to restore to his throne) will enter Affghanistan, surrounded by his own troops." And concluding with the intention, that "when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn." The treaty included Shah Shoojah, the Sikh ruler, and the British.

The Army of the Indus.

Cavalry brigade of the Bengal column :—

His Majesty's 16th lancers, 2nd regiment light cavalry, 3rd regiment light cavalry ; Brigadier Arnold.

4th local horse, and detachment of Skinner's
1st local horse, not attached to the brigade.

¹ Hough par. 14.

Major-general J. Thackwell, 3rd light dragoons, commanding the cavalry of the army.

Artillery :—

2nd troop 2nd brigade horse artillery ; 4th company 2nd battalion artillery ; 2nd company 6th battalion artillery.

Camel battery.

Two companies sappers and miners.

Infantry division, Bengal column, Major-general Sir W. Cotton, K.C.B. and K.C.H. :—

1st brigade—His Majesty's 13th light infantry, 16th native infantry, and 48th native infantry. Colonel Sale, C.B., 13th light infantry, brigadier.

2nd brigade—31st, 42nd, and 43rd native infantry. Major-general Nott, brigadier.

4th brigade¹—1st European regiment, 35th and 37th native infantry. Lieut.-Colonel Roberts, brigadier.

Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk's contingent :—

Horse artillery, two troops ; cavalry, two regiments ; infantry, five regiments. Major-general Simpson, commanding.

¹ Lots were drawn by the 3rd, 4th, and 5th brigades : and they fell to the 4th brigade, on a reduction of the amount of force to be sent.

Bombay column, Major-general Willshire, C.B.:—

Cavalry—Wing of his Majesty's 4th light dragoons, 1st light cavalry, Poona local horse (unattached). Lieut.-colonel J. Scott, brigadier.

Artillery—3rd and 4th troop horse field battery. Brigadier Stevenson.

Infantry—His Majesty's 2nd and 17th foot, 19th native infantry.

Sappers and miners.

Chief Bengal staff:

Major P. Craigie, deputy adjutant-general.

Major W. Garden, dep. quarter-master-general.

Captain George Thompson, chief engineer.

Major Parsons, deputy commissary-general.

J. Atkinson, Esq., superintending surgeon.

Chief Bombay staff:—

Major Keith, deputy adjutant-general.

Major N. Campbell dep. quarter-master-general.

Captain A. C. Peat, chief engineer.

Captain D. Davidson, assistant comm^r.-general.

R. H. Kennedy, Esq., superintending surgeon.

His Excellency General Sir H. Fane, G.C.B., commander-in-chief in India was to have commanded the expedition; but on the 22nd of October, 1838, it was known that the king of Persia had raised the siege of Herat on the

9th September, and marched from Herat towards his capital; in consequence, the force was reduced, and the 2nd Bengal division was left at Ferozpoor. His Excellency Lieutenant-general Sir J. Keane, commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, was appointed to command the army,¹ and Major-general Sir W. Cotton held the command till Sir J. Keane joined.

A force, with Shahzada Timoor, under Lieut.-colonel C. M. Wade, amounting to about ten thousand, including the Sikh contingent, was to proceed through the Punjab, *via* the Khyber Pass, to Cabool.

Major-general Duncan, with the 2nd division or reserve force, at Ferozpoor, of five thousand men, was to advance, if required. The Bengal column, under Major-general Sir W. Cotton, was to march *via* Sindh, through the Bolan Pass, to Candahar; thence to Ghuznee and Cabool. The Bengal column (nine thousand five hundred men), including followers, amounted to thirty-eight thousand men. A Bombay force had arrived in

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel R. Macdonald, K.H., Deputy Adjutant-general, Q. T., Military Secretary.

Sindh, and was increased; so that when Sir J. Keane marched to join us at Quetta, he left about three thousand men, as a reserve, in Sindh. Nearly twenty thousand men entered Afghanistan by the month of July, 1839. The shah marched with his contingent in advance of the Bengal troops, till we got into the country near the Bolan Pass.

The Bengal column marched from Ferozpoor on the 10th of December, 1838. The headquarters were established at Rohree, in Sindh, on the 24th January, 1839. As the ameers had not signed the treaty granting us a passage through their country, and permitting us to hold certain military positions during the operations in Afghanistan, part of our force marched¹ to join Sir J. Keane; but returned, after making seven marches towards Hyderabad, to Sukkur, and crossed the Indus over an excellent bridge of boats. The ameers having signed the treaty, it was a great object to get through the pass.² Marched through the pass in six days. Arrived at Quetta on the 26th March, 1839. Lieut.-

¹ Having got the fort of Buckkur in our possession.

² Narrative, (Hough) p. 61, about fifty-eight miles long.

general Sir J. Keane,¹ with the 1st Bombay cavalry, arrived at Quetta on the 6th of April. Having got through the Kojuk Pass, the head-quarters marched on the 18th April, and on the 26th April arrived at Candahar, which the chiefs had deserted.²

The Bombay column arrived at Candahar³ on the 4th of May, 1839. On the 8th of May, the installation of the king took place, when all the troops were paraded; and on ascending his throne was saluted by one hundred and one guns. On the 21st June,⁴ Major Todd marched with a mission to Shah Kamran, at Herat. Two lakhs of rupees were sent, to be employed, partly, in the improvement of the fortifications of that fortress, which had been so gallantly defended by the late Major Pottinger, of the Bombay artillery. The army, having obtained a supply of provisions,⁵ horses and cattle, and leaving a garrison in Candahar, marched on the 27th of June, 1839, from that city⁶ for Ghuznee.

The army arrived before Ghuznee on the 21st

¹ Narrative, p. 69.

² Narrative, p. 99.

³ Narrative, p. 103.

⁴ Narrative, p. 125.

⁵ The king allowed the standing crops to be cut for the troops

⁶ Narrative, p. 129.

July, 1829.¹ Changed ground during the evening to the Cabool side. A reconnoissance was made on the 21st, and on the 22nd; when it was resolved to attack the fort by blowing open the gate. The storm took place on the 23rd of July.² Three hundred pounds of powder, in twelve sand-bags, were employed in blowing open the gate, which proved successful. Our loss was seventeen men killed; eighteen officers and one hundred and forty-seven men wounded (total one hundred and eighty-two). About five hundred of the enemy were killed in the fort and town, and one hundred outside by the cavalry; one thousand six hundred prisoners; the number of wounded not ascertained. Leaving a garrison in Ghuznee, the army marched on the 30th July, 1809, for Cabool.³ The Dost having fled from Cabool with about two thousand men, and left his guns behind, the latter were captured. On the 3rd of August, a party was sent to endeavour to capture the Dost, under Captain Outram,⁴ and eleven other officers, consisting of

¹ Narrative, p. 163.

² Narrative, p. 174.

³ Narrative, p. 239.

⁴ Lieutenant-colonel Outram, C.B.

eight hundred horsemen, including five hundred and fifty Affghan horse. The party returned unsuccessful to Cabool on the 18th of August, the Dost having pushed on beyond Bameean and the mountain range. Hajjee Khan Kakur, who accompanied the party (and had been Governor of Bameean under the Dost, and now taken into favour by the king), proved himself to be a traitor. He delayed the advance of the party, so as to allow of the escape of Dost Mahomed. Arrived at Cabool on the 6th of August, 1839, and the king¹ made his entry into Cabool in state the next day.

On the 3rd of September, the Shahzada,² Timoor (the king's eldest son), and Lieut.-colonel Wade, with the troops, arrived. Having forced the Khyber Pass and taken the fort of Ali Musjid,³ with the loss of one hundred and eighty killed and wounded, on the 27th of July, 1839, they left a garrison in the fort, and marched to Cabool. This force was to move on Cabool *via* Peshawur, while Sir J. Keane marched *via* Ghuznee, so as to reach Cabool from the east, while

¹ Narrative, p. 247.

² Narrative, p. 257.

³ Narrative, pp. 219-28. The Khyber Pass, twenty-eight miles long.

Sir J. Keane did from the west; and so to arrange the operation, as to get through the pass by the time Ghuznee should be taken. Ghuznee having fallen, some time was employed in arranging with the chiefs for a free passage for our troops and convoys, by securing certain annual payments of money to the chiefs.

On the 17th of September, the king held a durbar, for the purpose of conferring the Order of the Dooranee Empire on his Excellency Lieut.-general Sir J. Keane, on the envoy, on Major-general Sir W. Cotton, Lieut.-colonel Sir A. Burnes, Lieut.-colonel Wade, and on other officers. The order was composed of three classes.¹ The Bombay column marched on the 18th of September, 1839, from Cabool, *en route* for Quetta and Khelat.²

On the 2nd of October it was decided what troops were to be left in Afghanistan. Major-general Sir W. Cotton was left in command. A troop of horse artillery, his Majesty's lancers, 3rd light cavalry, 4th local horse, and some companies of infantry, returned to India with his

¹ Narrative, p. 262. The king proposed medals for the troops, which were issued, and leave given by her Majesty to wear the order.

² Narrative, p. 266.

Excellency Lieutenant-general Sir J. Keane, who marched from Cabool on the 15th of October, 1839,¹ *via* the Khoord Cabool, and Khyber passes, and the Punjab. On the 20th of December, we heard of the capture of Khelat² on the 13th of November, 1839, by the Bombay column under Major-general Willshire, with a loss of one hundred and thirty-eight killed and wounded. On the 1st of January, 1840, his Excellency Sir J. Keane³ was invited to visit Lahore; being unwell, he sent a deputation of officers. Before leaving Lahore the British officers were shown a large portion of the Sikh army, consisting of thirty-two battalions of infantry of eight hundred men each; six thousand cavalry; ninety-six horse artillery, and sixty-four field-pieces; and a large body of irregular troops: a total of about thirty-one thousand six hundred men and one hundred and sixty guns. On the 2nd of January, 1840, the order was issued for breaking up the army of the Indus, and the return of the troops with the Commander-in-chief to their respective stations.

Dost Mahomed Khan, after his flight from

¹ Narrative, p. 293.

² Narrative, Appendix, p. 24.

³ Narrative, p. 361.

Cabool as we advanced to it in August, 1839, went to Khoolum, &c., and eventually arrived at Bokhara, where he and his second son Akbar Khan¹ were detained as prisoners; whence they escaped. The Dost had collected troops on the 17th of September, 1840.² Brigadier Dennie defeated the Dost near Bameean; the Dost and his son Mahomed Afzul Khan effected their escape from the field of battle. The brigadier had only five hundred infantry, the Dost had about six thousand, chiefly Oosbeks. On the 2nd of November, 1840, Major-general Sale³ encountered the Dost who had taken possession of some forts in the direction of Purwan, whence he was proceeding to effect a junction with his son Mahomed Afzul Khan. The general's advanced column consisted of four companies of her Majesty's 13th light infantry, and three companies of native infantry, two squadrons of the 2nd Bengal light cavalry, and two hundred of Anderson's horse. The enemy were computed at five hundred horse and three thousand five hundred foot. Owing to the mis-

¹ Hyder Khan, the son, who was governor of Ghuznee, was taken to Bombay by Sir John Keane, as well as Hajjee Khan Kakur.

² "Annual Register," p. 564, Despatches.

³ "Annual Register," p. 565.

conduct of the 2nd cavalry the Dost escaped. The ex-Cabool chief finding he had no hope of recovering his position at Cabool, surrendered himself¹ to Sir W. Macnaghten, the envoy, on the 2nd of December, 1840. Dost Mahomed was escorted to India, and was located in Calcutta.

Russian expedition to Khiva in 1840.²—Russia had declared war in December, 1839, against Khiva. Khiva is on the borders of the Caspian Sea. A large Russian force, under General Brelowsky, reached Khiva in the latter end of March, 1840. The troops halted on the borders of the Steppes for some weeks, in consequence of the heavy snow that had fallen; and afterwards came down the sea of Aral to Khiva. Their numbers were estimated at nearly thirty thousand men, with twelve batteries of artillery. In various encounters which they had with the soldiers of the khan, the latter were invariably worsted; but the Russians were much annoyed and galled by the species of *Guerilla* warfare kept up by their opponents. Captain Abbott was at this time the British envoy at the court of the khan of Khiva, and the latter wished to make use of his services

¹ "Annual Register," p. 567.

² "Annual Register," 1840, pp. 230—232.

as a mediator between himself and the Russians ; professing his willingness to give up slavery and surrender the Russian slaves within his power ; but declaring that he had no means of paying the demands made upon him by way of compensation by that government.¹

Major Pottinger,² who had arrived from Calcutta in May 1841, was appointed political agent in Kohistan. The turbulent chiefs had maintained their independence against Dost Mahomed, and yielded an unwilling obedience to the king. The major prognosticated the coming storm. About the end of September he came to Cabool, to impress upon the envoy that, unless strong measures of prevention were speedily adopted, he considered a rise in Kohistan in the highest degree probable. The Giljye tribes between Ghuznee and Candahar had never been properly subdued. To the west of Candahar, a notorious freebooter had collected seven thousand followers.

¹ See a very interesting account of Major James Abbott's effort to release the Russian prisoners at Khiva. He nearly fell a sacrifice to his humane exertions. His subsequent admirable political and military exertions have not been adequately rewarded. His narrative is very interesting.

² Eyre's "Military Operations at Cabool," 2nd Edition, 1842, pp. 1—5.

But there was danger nearer Cabool.¹ Early in October, three Giljye chiefs of note suddenly quitted Cabool, after plundering a rich cafila at Tezeen,² and took up a strong position in the difficult defile of Khoord-Cabool, about ten miles from the capital: thus blocking up the pass, and cutting off our communication with Hindostan. Certain allowances made to these chiefs had been reduced; and to this has been partly imputed the hostility of these chiefs.

More troops. The late Brigadier Shelton marched from India in the beginning of 1841 in command of a brigade, consisting of his Majesty's 44th regiment, and two native corps, the 5th and 54th native infantry. On reaching Jellalabad, he was detached to the valley of Nazian, to compel the chiefs to pay obedience to the king's authority. After he had effected his object, he proceeded to Cabool. Major-general Sir W. Cotton had quitted the command in Affghanistan, and was succeeded by Major-general Elphinstone, who assumed the command in April 1841.³ The state of the pass

¹ Eyre's "Military Operations," p. 8.

² In the retreat the Cabool force here escaped the effects of the snow.

³ Eyre, p. 1.

caused troops to be detached on the 9th October under Colonel Monteath, C.B.¹ He was attacked at the entrance of the pass. On the 11th, General Sale marched with her Majesty's 13th light infantry. The pass remained in such a disturbed state, and was so occupied by the Giljyes, that the return of General Sale's brigade was deemed impracticable. He retreated to Jellalabad, where he remained during the whole period, till relieved by General Pollock in April 1842.

The outbreak of the rebellion at Cabool² took place on the morning of the 2nd November, 1841, when Sir A. Burnes, the political agent residing in the city, was murdered, as well as his brother, and Lieutenant Broadfoot. The treasury of Captain Johnson, the commissariat officer of the shah's contingent, was plundered and set on fire. Brigadier Shelton was in camp with a force between the cantonments³ and the Balla Hissar, and city of Cabool; and was ordered to proceed to the Balla Hissar with a detachment.⁴ But

¹ Eyre, p. 7.

² Eyre, p. 19.

³ Not built when the author left Cabool, in October 1839, with Lord Keane.

⁴ Eyre, p. 20. One company his Majesty's 44th foot, a wing 54th native infantry, 6th regiment Shah's infantry, and four horse artillery guns.

it was not till the next afternoon, that two companies, and two horse artillery guns, were sent from cantonments, with a view to aid Brigadier Shelton in an attack upon the city. The latter detachment never reached its destination. The shah detached about three hundred of his own men, with two guns, into the city; but they failed in putting down the insurrection. No other attempt was made. On the morning of the 9th November, Brigadier Shelton was ordered into cantonment, with part of his force.¹ On the 10th of November, the brigadier made an attack upon the Rika-bashee fort, and succeeded in capturing it, and obtaining a quantity of grain; but with a loss of about two hundred men, killed and wounded. The enemy appeared, on the 13th, on the heights near the cantonments. Our operations against them were not effective.² On the 15th November, Major Pottinger, and Lieutenant Houghton, adjutant of the Gorkha regiment stationed at Charekar, in Kohistan, came into cantonments, both wounded; the corps having been cut up: the rebellion having extended to that quarter soon after the 2nd of November.³ A small affair took place on the 22nd November,

¹ Eyre, p. 53.

² Eyre, p. 62.

³ Eyre, p. 68.

near the village of Beymaroo, near the cantonments. It was resolved to make a more decided attack on the 23rd of November.

For the attack on the heights of Beymaroo, on the 23rd of November, 1841, there were about one thousand three hundred and fifty men, but of infantry only nine hundred men¹ and one gun. Brigadier Shelton commanded. Another gun and reinforcements had been solicited. They were not sent. It is the opinion of an officer who was in the cantonment, that five hundred men might have been sent with safety to the cantonments; and that such a reinforcement would have driven the enemy from the heights near the cantonments. Instead of which the enemy were pouring in armed men in great numbers from the city. A good opportunity was lost for making a vigorous attack on the enemy. This was the last attack made by the British, though the Affghans often crowned the Beymaroo hills, and brought up guns, but usually retired in the evening. Akbar Khan arrived at Cabool on the night of the 22nd of November, 1841, from Bameean (ninety-six miles from Cabool), where he had been since the beginning of October.

¹ Eyre, p. 101. Seventeen weak companies.

They lost the grain depot near the city, on the 2nd of November ; and on the 4th of November¹ that close to the cantonment, was allowed to be captured by the enemy. It was supposed that there was much grain in the Bala Hissar. This is a point much disputed, and is very doubtful. It was, as early as the 16th of November,² proposed to leave the cantonment and retire into the Bala Hissar, in the belief that plenty of provisions would be found there, or be obtained from the city. As a place of security there was no doubt as to the advantage of its position, and as affording rest to the troops. The objectors to the measure were of opinion of its being too late, after the enemy had gained confidence in their attacks, and could command the road by which the movement must be made. Early in December the forts near cantonment had been occupied by the enemy. Brigadier Shelton considered that the Bala Hissar should have been occupied immediately on the outbreak taking place.

Negotiations. The propositions for negotiations³ occurred as early as the 8th of December, 1841. The troops did not retreat till the 6th of

¹ Eyre, p. 43.

² Eyre, p. 89.

³ Eyre, p. 132.

January, 1842. On the 11th of December, 1841,¹ we agreed to evacuate the country. On the 13th of December² we evacuated the Bala Hissar, by withdrawing the 54th Native Infantry from it. On the 16th, the magazine and forts near the cantonment were given up. On the 19th of December³ orders were sent to Ghuznee to evacuate that fortress. On the 23rd of December Sir⁴ W. Macnaghten held the fatal interview with Mahomed Akbar Khan and other chiefs, at which he was murdered. Major Pottinger, at the request of Major-general Elphinstone, assumed the office of political agent and adviser.⁵ Letters were received on the 26th of December from Captain Mackeson, political agent at Peshawur, announcing the march of strong reinforcements from India. But this was a distant prospect of relief. The late envoy had promised fourteen lakhs of rupees to the chiefs. The general convened a council of war, at which it was unanimously determined to renew the negotiations that had been commenced by Sir W. Macnaghten, and that the sums promised to the chiefs by that functionary, previous to his mur-

¹ Eyre, p. 136. ² Eyre, p. 145. ³ Eyre, p. 151.

⁴ Eyre, p. 155. ⁵ Eyre, p. 182.

der, should be paid.¹ On the 29th of December, several officers, as hostages, were given up to the chiefs. Guns and the greater part of our treasure were made over, and on the 30th the remainder of the sick were sent into the city under medical charge of Drs. Campbell and Berwick; Lieutenant Evans, her Majesty's 44th, being placed in command. Preparations were made for the retreat from Cabool. The chiefs had promised, three weeks before the retreat, two thousand camels and four hundred yaboos — some were sent, but when required they were not all forthcoming. The state of the snow in the direction of Ghuznee, prevented the brigade from Candahar reaching Cabool, as had been directed.

Retreat from Cabool. 6th of January, 1842. The retreat took place on the 6th of January, 1842, at 9 A.M. The amount of the British force was² four thousand five hundred fighting men. The camp-followers were about twelve thousand men, besides women and children.

¹ These bills were drawn, but the Indian government refused to pay them. The chiefs broke their word, and were entitled to nothing.

² Eyre, p. 196.

The advance moved off at nine A.M. The great loss in the retreat was in consequence of the delay in marching; on the 6th they marched only five miles;¹ on the 7th they halted at Bootkhak, only ten miles from the cantonments. On the 8th they got through the Khoord-Cabool Pass, having marched nineteen miles from Cabool: they had snow. On the 9th Akbar Khan caused the force to halt. On the 10th (fifth day) they reached the Tezeen valley at four p. m., having lost,² including followers, twelve thousand men. They had marched above twelve miles; in the evening they marched the same distance, or total, nearly twenty-six miles. Now, had they marched thirty-two miles by the evening of the 6th of January, they would have reached the Teezen valley that day; and have saved the suffering from the effects of the snow and cold for three days. If they could march twenty-six miles in one day, after so much suffering, they could have marched thirty-two miles the first day, when they had more strength and supplies of food. They were not attacked till the afternoon of the 7th, so that, by a quick advance, they would have had four thousand fighting men

¹ Eyre, p. 200.

² Eyre, p. 221.

in the Tezeen valley,¹ without suffering from the snow and cold; and, under any circumstances, have reached Jellalabad with three thousand men: where, then, there would have been a total force of five thousand men. In the spring of 1842 they could have aided the advance of Sir George Pollock, by commanding one end of the pass, while he moved up by the other from Peshawur. There were one hundred and two officers killed at Cabool, and during the retreat; and one hundred and two officers, soldiers, ladies, women, and children, who were released in September, 1842, after Sir G. Pollock's arrival at Cabool. Dr. Brydon was the only officer who reached Jellalabad in safety. It was resolved² by the Governor-general in council, on the 4th of February, 1842, to add a 10th company to every regiment of native infantry of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

¹ The author published a review of the operations during the outbreak in November 1841, and during the retreat from Cabool in January 1842. Calcutta Englishman's office, 1849. He marched that route with Lord Keane in October 1839, on his return to India; and therefore knows the route.

² "Blue Book," Afghanistan, 1843, p. 118.

This was preparatory to an advance again into Affghanistan.

Brigadier Wilde's force. — Brigadier Wilde, with the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th native infantry, about three thousand five hundred men, crossed the Punjab about the 20th November, and reached the left bank of the Indus on the 20th December, 1841. He reached Peshawur on the 27th. He advanced by Jumrood, near the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The brigadier, on the 15th of January, 1842,¹ detached two of his four regiments to Ali Musjid. The object had been to prevent the fort falling into the hands of the Khyberees. Three hundred and fifty bullock-loads of grain had been sent, but only about sixty loads arrived. Lieut.-colonel Tulloch was afterwards despatched with the two other corps (53rd and 64th), to facilitate the retreat of the two corps formerly sent. The troops could not hold out at Ali Musjid without an adequate supply of provisions; hence the operation was a failure. In the latter case, the heights were crowned. No guns were originally sent with the force, and the Sikh guns, lent to the force, broke down. Captain (Lieutenant-colonel)

¹ "Blue Book," p. 129.

Mackeson, political agent, wrote,¹ "Had this force been sent up in an efficient state as to ammunition and carriage, and with cavalry and artillery, it might, at the time of its arrival here, have advanced through the Khyber Pass to the support of Major-general Sale's force at Jellalabad. The Afreedee tribes had not, up to that time, heard of our troops having evacuated Cabool; and they would have allowed Brigadier Wilde's force to pass through the Khyber unmolested for a sum of money; neither had they at the time organized any opposition."

It was resolved to send General Pollock with a large force.

General Pollock's force.

Horse artillery—3rd troop, 1st brigade; 3rd troop, 2nd brigade.

Cavalry—His Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, 1st and 10th light cavalry, detachments of the 5th light cavalry, 3rd irregular cavalry, party of the 1st and 4th irregular cavalry.

Infantry—His Majesty's 9th, 13th, and 31st foot; 6th, 26th, 30th, 33rd, 35th, 63rd, 60th, and 64th native infantry.

¹ "Blue Book," p. 138, paragraph 2.

Foot artillery—2nd company 2nd battalion, 2nd and 4th companies of the 6th battalion.

Sappers and miners. Jezailchees.

Forcing the Khyber Pass, 5th of April, 1842.

—The troops, under Major-general Pollock,¹ marched off at half-past three A.M. on the 5th of April, 1842. The enemy had for some days appeared in great numbers at the mouth of the pass, which they had fortified with a strong breastwork of stones and bushes. The hills on the right and left were rocky and precipitous, presenting great natural obstacles to the ascent of troops. To gain the summit of these heights, defended as they were by a numerous body of the enemy, was an undertaking of considerable difficulty. The right and left columns moved off simultaneously with the main column, intended to assault the entrance; but were compelled to make a considerable detour to the right and left, to enable them to commence the ascent.

The right column² of twelve companies, under Lieut.-colonel A. B. Taylor, K.H., 9th foot, and Major Anderson, 64th native infantry. The

¹ "Blue Book," p. 201.

² Four companies 9th foot, four companies 26th, and four companies 64th native infantry.

left column of twelve companies,¹ under Lieut.-colonel Moseley, 64th, and Major Huish, 26th native infantry; led by Captain Ferris, 12th native infantry, and four hundred Jezailchees. Both columns, after considerable opposition, which they overcame in a most gallant style, succeeded in routing the enemy, and gaining possession of the crest of the hills on either side. While the flanking columns were in progress on the heights, Captain Alexander, horse artillery, was ordered to place the guns in position to throw shrapnell among the enemy when opportunity offered; which assisted much in their discomfiture. To assist the right column, Brigadier Wilde was detached with seven companies² to attack the heights in front, but they were unable to gain a footing on the summit, owing to the steepness of the ascent. When the heights on the right and left were gained possession of, the main column advanced to the mouth of the pass, and commenced destroying the barrier which the enemy had evacuated on perceiving their position was

¹ Four companies 9th foot, four companies 26th, and four companies 64th native infantry, four hundred Jezailchees.

² Grenadier company 9th foot, and six companies 53rd native infantry.

turned ; a portion of the right and left columns being left to keep the heights, under the command of Lieut.-colonel Moseley and Major Anderson respectively. Major Huish and Lieut.-colonel Taylor continued their advance to crown the hills in front and on each side, which were covered with the enemy, who appeared determined to contest every inch of ground ; but nothing could resist the gallantry of our troops who carried everything before them. The enemy's force was estimated at about ten thousand men. The baggage got through the pass without the loss of a single baggage animal. The rear-guard met with no opposition. The British loss was one officer killed, three wounded, and one hundred and thirty-five men killed, wounded, and missing. Thus was opened the road to Jellalabad. It is stated¹ that General Pollock got through the pass "by the help of bribes, as usual." Sir G. Pollock did not pay a single rupee.

Defeat of Akbar Khan at Jellalabad.²—Akbar Khan had caused a report to be circulated that

¹ Campbell's *Modern India*, 1852, p. 137. Sir G. Pollock authorizes the author to contradict the statement.

² Blue Book, p. 207.

General Pollock had been defeated in the Khyber Pass, and had retreated to Peshawur. On the 6th April, Akbar Khan fired a salute in honour of this event. General Sale, commanding the garrison at Jellalabad, with a view of facilitating the advance of General Pollock's force, of relieving the place from its state of blockade, as also of defeating the sirdar before he might obtain reinforcements or retreat into Lughinan, resolved to make a general attack on the Affghan camp. On the 7th of April, the troops, amounting to about one thousand six hundred men, of whom two hundred and forty were cavalry, were formed into three columns of infantry. The sirdar's force was computed at about six thousand men. The enemy were completely defeated, and the sirdar fled. Our loss was one officer killed, three wounded, and seventy-seven men killed or wounded. The enemy's loss was very great. Major-general Pollock reached Jellalabad¹ on the 16th April, 1842.

General Pollock urges an advance on Cabool.² General Pollock on the 13th May, 1842, wrote to Mr. Maddock, secretary to government from

¹ "Blue Book," p. 236.

² Kaye's "War in Afghanistan," 1851, vol. ii. p. 465.

Jellalabad, in answer to his letter of the 28th April, "which adverts to the present aspect of affairs in Affghanistan, and the probability of my having advanced towards Cabool; stating also, that in such an event, the views of the Governor-general as to the withdrawal of the troops will not be altered; and further, that whatever measures I may adopt, I must have especial regard to the health of the troops. I trust that I am not wrong in considering this letter as leaving to me discretionary powers, and, coming as it does from the supreme power in India, I venture to delay, for some days, acting up to the instructions communicated in his Excellency the commander-in-chief's letter,¹ dated 29th ultimo. I regret much that a want of carriage-cattle has detained me here; if it had not been so, I should now be several marches in advance, and I am quite certain that such a movement would have been highly beneficial. Affairs at Cabool are, at the present moment, in a very unsettled state; but a few days must decide in favour of one of the parties." "With regard to our withdrawal at the

¹ "Blue Book," p. 242, directing his withdrawing from Jellalabad to Peshawur, and intimating similar orders for retirement having been sent to General Nott.

present moment, I fear that it would have the very worst effect;—it would be construed into a defeat, and our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of the world.” But the advance on Cabool would require that General Nott should act in concert, and advance also. I, therefore, cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire; which, without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty in doing.”¹ The letters of Lord Ellenborough of the 4th July, 1842,² to Generals Nott and Pollock, gave a discretionary authority to the former to retire, *viâ* Ghuznee and Cabool; and to the latter, “to combine your movements, as far as you can, with those of the major-general (Nott), should he decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghuznee and Cabool.” Thus, General Pollock urged on the Governor-general the march on Cabool. General Nott had, also, pointed out to the Governor-general the feasibility of the march on Cabool. General Pollock³ also, in his letter of the 28th April, 1842, says, “when we

¹ This letter was not in the “Blue Book.” A copy was at last sent from India. Kaye, p. 407, note.

² “Blue Book,” p. 239.

³ “Blue Book,” pp. 327, 329.

advance, the 3rd light dragoons may possibly have to play a conspicuous part ; though at present, I believe there is not a soul to oppose us between this (Jellalabad) and Cabool." So that he had, before his letter of the 13th May, 1842, indicated his expectation of an advance on Cabool.

General Pollock's march from Jellalabad. General Pollock¹ marched from Jellalabad on the 20th August, 1842. Lord Ellenborough,² on the 4th July, 1842, wrote to Major-general Nott, as well as to General Pollock, granting permission to the advance upon Cabool; General Pollock from Jellalabad, by the passes, up to the capital; and General Nott, proceeding from Candahar, *via* Ghuznee, to Cabool.

General Pollock reached Gundamuck³ on the 23rd August; and, hearing of the enemy being at Mammookhail, two miles distant, attacked them next morning. There were two columns of attack; the right, under Brigadier-general M'Cas-kill; the left, under Brigadier Tulloch. Lieutenant-colonel A. B. Taylor, 9th foot, occupied the heights in front of the village of Koocee

¹ "Blue Book," p. 372.

² "Blue Book," pp. 327, 329. Letters, 404, 405.

³ "Blue Book," p. 374.

Khail; while Captain Broadfoot cleared the hills to the left of Lieutenant-colonel Taylor's position. This village is two miles from Mammookhail, and was the most difficult portion of the operations of the day. Four officers were wounded, and forty-nine men killed or wounded. General Pollock¹ marched from Gundamuck on the 7th September; having halted there for fourteen days. It was necessary to make many arrangements at that place, and to establish a depôt for grain, required on the return of the troops from Cabool. The general on the 8th September² left Soork-ab, and moved through the Jugdulluck pass. A considerable number of the enemy covered the summits of the hills which command the road through the pass. Attacks were made by the troops, and the enemy driven off. The British loss was, one officer killed, one wounded, and sixty-four of all ranks killed and wounded.

On the 11th September,³ General Pollock arrived in the Tezeen valley, and halted on the 12th. In the afternoon of the 12th, the enemy attacked the picquets on the left flank. Lieu-

¹ "Blue Book," p. 383.

² "Blue Book," p. 385.

³ "Blue Book," p. 395.

tenant-colonel Taylor, 9th foot, by a well-planned and gallant attack, drove them back. The enemy's attack on the picquets, during the night, were all unsuccessful. On the 13th, it was observed that the Affghans had crowned the heights, to oppose the advance of the army, by the Tezeen Pass, into the high ground (Kotuls) which intervenes between the valley and the village of Khoord Cabool, near the entrance to that pass. The enemy were said to be, sixteen thousand men. Akbar Khan was present, and seemed resolved to make a last stand on this difficult ground. "The enemy being completely dispersed, we pursued our march," concludes the dispatch, "and encamped at Khoord Cabool without further opposition." Our loss was four officers wounded, and one hundred and sixty-two of all ranks killed or wounded. On the 16th September, General Pollock arrived at Cabool, without any further opposition.

General Nott's march from Candahar towards Cabool. On the 10th of August,¹ 1842, Major-general Nott marched from Candahar. The force consisted of,—

Horse artillery, two troops.

Two companies Bengal artillery.

¹ "Blue Book," p. 366.

Cavalry :—

3rd Bombay light cavalry, five Rissalahs, Christie's irregular horse, three Rissalahs, 1st Bengal irregular cavalry.

Infantry :—

His Majesty's 40th and 41st foot, 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, 43rd, 3rd or Captain Craigie's Bengal irregular infantry.

Shumsoodeen's advance with twelve thousand men.¹ On the 30th of August, 1842, Shumsoodeen, governor of Ghuznee, advanced near General Nott's camp at Gonine, thirty-eight miles southwest of Ghuznee. The general moved out with one-half of his force, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy; capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., and dispersing them in every direction. Shumsoodeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee. Our loss was one hundred and four officers and men, including two officers killed, and four wounded.²

General Nott's advance on Ghuznee. On the 5th of September, 1842, General Nott³ moved

¹ "Blue Book," p. 388.

² Two officers killed and two wounded, and twenty-three men belonged to the 3rd Bombay cavalry affair on the 28th August.

³ "Blue Book," p. 391.

on and arrived at Ghuznee. Preparations were made during the night to erect batteries. On the morning of the 6th it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress. General Nott recovered about three hundred and twenty-seven of the sepoy of the 27th Bengal native infantry, who had been sold into slavery, and dispersed in villages forty miles round Ghuznee. Orders had been given by Sir W. Macnaghten, in December, 1841, for the surrender of the fortress. Lieutenant-colonel Palmer, on the 1st of March, 1842, wrote¹ that he had capitulated by the orders of Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone on the arrival of Rohilla Khan from Cabool. That the snow was still deep. "The men had suffered greatly from cold; the thermometer having been fourteen degrees below zero." The garrison had been promised honourable treatment and safety on the march to Cabool. The sepoy were induced² to give up their arms on Shumsodeen swearing on the koran that he would give them a safe escort to Hindostan. General Nott,³ on his approach to

¹ "Blue Book," p. 183.

² "Blue Book," p. 263, Colonel Palmer's syce said so.

³ "Blue Book," p. 401.

Cabool, had his march upon Beenee Badam, and Mydan, intercepted by Shumsoodeen and other chiefs, who had occupied a succession of strong mountains, with twelve thousand men, on the 14th and 15th of September; whom he dislodged, and reached Cabool the day after General Pollock.

General Pollock (he had heard that the prisoners had made arrangements for their own liberation), detached Sir R. Shakespear with a body of¹ seven hundred kuzzulbash horse, with the concurrence of their chief, in the direction of Bameean; and on the 19th of September, detached two thousand men, under Major-general Sir. R. Sale. The prisoners were under charge of Saleh Mahomed Khan, who was proceeding with them, by order of Akbar Khan, to Turkistan. Saleh Mahomed was promised a sum of money and a pension for life, when he agreed to march them back to meet our parties. Sir R. Shakespear joined them on the 17th, and moved on to Sir R. Sale's force on the 20th; the prisoners reached Cabool on the 21st of September. There were :—

¹ "Blue Book," p. 404.

Ladies	7
Women	3
Children	11
Officers	31
Non-commissioned officers and privates	49
Clerks	2
Boys	2
	105

.. Including the officers from Ghuznee. Captain Bygrave was given up on the 27th of September.

Istalif in Kohistan.—Major-general McCaskill was detached with a force to Istalif (three or four marches distant), where a number of the people from Cabool had taken refuge. The force made itself master of the strong and populous town of Istalif on the 29th of September,¹ and set fire to it in several places. Istalif commands a defile, which leads to Toorkistan.

Destruction of Cabool.² Before leaving Cabool General Pollock destroyed the grand bazar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the time of Aurungzeb, by the celebrated Ali Murdan Khan, where the remains of the late envoy and minister had been exposed to public insult. A mosque at the end of the bazaar, and another

¹ "Blue Book," p. 412.

² "Blue Book," p. 421.

near the cantonment, ornamented with European materials, and designated as the Feringhee mosque, to commemorate the events of last year, were also destroyed.

Departure from Cabool. — General Pollock marched from Cabool on the 12th of October. He detached Sir R. Sale with the 1st and 2nd brigades, the mountain train, 1st light cavalry, 3rd irregular cavalry, and Christie's horse, over the Gospund Durrah Pass, for the purpose of turning that of the Khoord Cabool; in consequence of which movement they marched through the principal defile without a shot being fired. The other troops, including General Nott's division, marched to Bootkakh. The Gospund Pass is to the right of the main pass marching from Cabool. It commands the main pass.¹ The rear-guard of Major-general Nott was attacked on the 14th of October in the Huft Kotul Pass.² General Pollock³ considered these attacks were made by the brigands of the country. He

¹ There is a road for caravans to the left of the main pass, called the Luttabund pass. It enters the main pass at the third march from Bootkakh; but is not fit for the passage of an army.

² Between Khoord Cabool and Tezeen Valley.

³ Page 426, writing from Jellalabad.

says, "I have crowned the heights the whole distance, and have had a strong rear-guard." Some of the troops in the rear division did not attend to this precaution. "Most certainly," adds General Pollock, "there has not been any organized resistance." Brigadier Wilde's brigade was attacked near Ali Musjid on the 3rd of November. The fort of Ali Musjid was destroyed. The troops under Major-generals Pollock and Nott crossed the Sutlej on their return from Cabool on the 17th of December, 1842.

The army of reserve. Lord Ellenborough¹ writes to the Commander-in-chief on the 19th of April, 1842, regarding the forming an army of reserve. "With a view to secure the tranquillity of India, while so large a portion of our force is beyond the Indus, it appears to me that it would be advisable to form, at the earliest period, an army of reserve, of at least fifteen thousand men of all arms, perfectly equipped for immediate service, in such a position as may make it at once an apparent support to the corps in advance; and an object of apprehension to all who may entertain designs of hostility against the British

¹ "Blue Book," p. 225, par. 7. He arrived in Calcutta 28th February, 1842.

Government." The Governor-general wrote then from Benares. He writes from Allahabad¹ that Ferozpoor was fixed upon for the assembly of the army of reserve, and on the 15th of November writes, that it will "facilitate the operations of the armies in Affghanistan;" "while exhibiting our undiminished military strength to the states by which we are surrounded, it will induce the abandonment of any intentions they might entertain of hostility to our Government."² We had lost an army in January, 1842, at Cabool. We had two armies on the eve of marching on that city. The treaty with the ameers of Sindh was not yet signed; as well as to exhibit to all India the military resources of the Government: were all sufficient causes for the assembly of this army on the bank of the Sātlej. There was another reason. Owing to the confused state of the Government of Lahore, there was a possibility of the Sikhs attacking our armies returning from Cabool. It is now known that the chiefs *did* urge Maharajah Shere Sing to attack the forces under Generals Pollock and Nott. Instead of

¹ "Blue Book," p. 331, 6th August, 1842, pars. 5 & 6, to the Secret Committee.

² "Blue Book," p. 331, par. 9.

which¹ "the army of reserve, formed in one line, extending two miles and a half, received the major-general and the garrison of Jellalabad, in review order, with presented arms." It was evidently a very excellent plan to prove to the chiefs of India the power of the British Government.

¹ "Blue Book," p. 429.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR WITH CHINA,¹ 1840-1842.

“ THE opium war, as it has generally been misnamed, from the Chinese having taken their stand on that question; professing that to save the morals of the people the trade in that drug must be cut off.” In April, 1820,² Yuen issued a proclamation prohibiting the drug. In the year 1838, the restrictions on the opium trade became exceedingly troublesome;³ but on the 17th of September, a Chinese officer appeared at Whampoa, to search for, and seize opium. Captain Elliot, the superintendent, had on the 2nd of December, 1837, left Canton and went to Macao, in consequence of the governor having refused to correspond with him. On the 22nd of March, 1839, Captain Elliot issued a circular to the merchants, which was received the next day, and on the 24th

¹ Captain J. E. Bingham, R. N., second edition, 1843, vol. i., p. i. introduction.

² Captain Bingham, p. 5.

³ Page 23.

he re-appeared at Canton.¹ He and the merchants were confined to the factories as prisoners. At last on the 21st of May,² 1839, the surrender of all the prohibited drug (20,283 chests of opium) was completed. On the 4th of June,³ "the Chinese High Commissioner, the Governor, and all the officers, civil and military, proceeded to Chunhow, near the Bocca Tigris, and commenced operations for the destruction of £2,500,000 of *forcibly seized* British property. Large trenches were lined with stone, and the opium being decomposed in them by the use of quick lime, rock-salt, and water, was allowed to run into the sea." There had been interruptions to the trade in 1784, 1801, and in 1806. But on the present occasion there was an insult offered to Captain Elliot, R. N., the representative of our most gracious Queen.

Expedition to China.⁴—The troops from Calcutta sailed in April, 1840, the last transport leaving on the 17th. The expedition consisted of the following men of war :—

Wellesley 74, . Commodore Sir J. G. Bremer, K.C.B.
K. C. H. Commander-in-chief. Cap-
tain T. Maitland.

¹ Captain Bingham, p. 61.

² Page 85.

³ Page 87.

⁴ Page 171.

Conway 26, . . .	Captain C. D. B. Bethune.
Alligator 26, . . .	Captain A. L. Kuper.
Crusier 16, . . .	Commander H. W. Gifford.
Algerine 10, . . .	Lieutenant T. H. Mason.
Young Hebe.	

STEAM VESSELS.

Atalanta . . .	Captain Rogers, Indian Navy.
Queen . . .	Mr. Warden, H. E. I. C. Service.
Madagascar . . .	Mr. Dicey, ditto.
Twenty-one transports.	

Troops.—Her Majesty's 18th, 26th, and 49th regiments; a native corps of Bengal volunteers; detachments of artillery and sappers from the Madras presidency, Brigadier G. Burrell, (18th foot) commanding; they arrived in China in June, and proceeded on the 22nd and 23rd, to the northward, for the purpose of occupying the island of Chusan, as a *point d'appui* for our future operations. Sir Gordon Bremer on his arrival, issued a notice, that the blockade of the port and river of Canton would be established on the 28th instant. On the 28th of June,¹ the following ships arrived from the Cape and England:—

Melville 74, . . .	Rear Admiral Hon. G. Elliot, C.B., Com- mander-in-chief and Plenipotentiary.
	Captain Hon. R. S. Dundas.
Blonde 42, . . .	Captain T. Bouchier.

¹ Captain Bingham, p. 175.

Pylades 16, . . . Commander T. V. Anson.

Enterprise 18, (steam vessel) from Bengal.

Captain Elliot became joint-plenipotentiary with the admiral.

The island of Chusan¹ was captured on the 5th of July, 1840, without any loss on the part of the British. The Chinese had twenty-five men killed—the number of wounded not known. A truce² between the Chinese Imperial High Commissioner and Rear-admiral Elliot was announced on the 6th of November, 1840. Orders arrived from Canton for the evacuation of the island, and on the 23rd of February, 1841,³ the British colours were struck, and the troops and ships proceeded to the Canton river.

Sickness at Chusan.⁴—The troops arrived at Chusan on the 5th July, and on the 22nd of October, 1840, out of three thousand six hundred and fifty troops, only two thousand and thirty-six were fit for duty. Bingham says, "Between three hundred and four hundred had been interred, and about fifteen hundred were

¹ "Annual Register," 1840; Despatches, p. 573.

² Bingham, p. 353. The Madras 37th native infantry, arrived in the Canton river in October, 1840, p. 404.

³ Bingham, p. 378.

⁴ "Annual Register," 1841, Chron. p. 21.

in the hospitals. The gallant Cameronians were reduced to a perfect skeleton, and the brave 49th¹ were scarcely in a better condition. No doubt this was mainly to be attributed to the want of fresh and wholesome provisions, predisposing the constitution of the men to the agues and fevers epidemic in this place; for we find the sickness comparatively mild amongst the officers, who had means of living on a more generous diet;” and that much sickness, it was said, prevailed among the Chinese. The seamen and officers, on board the ships were not sickly.² Dr. D. McPherson³ says, “So great was the dread of exciting a bad feeling, and causing discontent among the natives, that our men were obliged to live in their tents when there were thousands of houses available for that purpose; and without regard to the health of the men, or consulting medical authorities on the subject, positions were laid out for the encampment of the troops. Parades and guard-mounting in full dress, with a thermometer ranging from ninety

¹ “Annual Register,” vol. i. p. 312, 47th, by mistake for 49th.

² The statement of a Bengal assistant-surgeon to the author.

³ Madras army. “Two Years in China,” 1842, p. 12.

degrees to one hundred degrees, made the scene resemble the route of garrison duty in India." "Men were placed in tents¹ pitched on low paddy fields, surrounded by stagnant water, putrid and stinking from quantities of dead animal and vegetable matter. Under a sun hotter than that ever experienced in India, the men on duty were buckled up to the throat in their full dress coatees; and in consequence of there being so few camp followers, fatigue parties of Europeans were daily detailed to carry provisions and stores from the ships to the tents, and to perform all menial employments, which experience has long taught us they cannot stand in a tropical climate. The poor men, working like slaves, began to sink under the exposure and fatigue. Bad provisions, low spirits, and despondency drove them to drink.² This increased their liability to disease, and in the month of November there were barely five hundred effective men in the force."³ "Medical men, as is often the case, were put down as

¹ "Two Years in China," p. 21.

² Shamshoo—no arrak to be had.

³ Out of three thousand six hundred and fifty men landed in July, 1840.

croakers; their recommendations were neither listened nor attended to."

"The 26th Cameronians¹ suffered most. This regiment, which sailed from Calcutta upwards of nine hundred strong, a pattern of all other corps for sobriety and good conduct, its average mortality during the previous ten years being barely twenty, was, in the short space of three months, reduced to two hundred and ninety-one. The entire amount of force on the island did not, on the 1st of January, 1841, exceed one thousand nine hundred men." It was proposed to keep all the officers and men on board the transports, except those required for duty on shore; but the authorities did not think they would be justified in incurring the expense.² Had the parties on duty on shore been relieved weekly, and the rest retained on board, a great number of lives would have been saved. The orders to prepare the salt provisions were received in Calcutta only in February 1840. Salted meat could not be prepared properly at the time the order arrived, and

¹ Mc Pherson, p. 55.

² Military officers paid two rupees a day to the captains of transports, and the government paid six rupees. Surely about £100 a day was dearly saved at such a sacrifice.

there was an objection to give the prices asked by the merchants, &c.¹ The Marquis Wellesley began early in the cold weather of 1800 to prepare for the expedition to Egypt, which sailed in April 1801, from Calcutta. The attempt to improve the Calcutta salted meat by fresh brine at Singapoer, did not answer. Good meat ought to be sent, at any price it may cost.

The Madras 37th native infantry² sailed for Madras in August 1840, mustering one thousand bayonets, in three transports; one (the Golconda) was lost in a typhoon in the China Sea. The admiral, being ill, on the 4th December returned to England in the Volage. The truce was at an end.

Battles of Cheumpee and Tycoctow.³—The period allotted to receive a reply from Keshen having expired, the troops disembarked on the 7th January, 1841, on the island of Cheumpee. The land force, commanded by Major Pratt, her

¹ The Calcutta suppliers of provisions could have furnished salted meat, but the price was thought too dear. Ships in the river often dispose of salted beef; the Americans chiefly it is said.

² McPherson, p. 31.

³ McPherson, p. 65. Force, one thousand four hundred and sixty-one men.

Majesty's 26th regiment, consisting of Royal artillery, and marines, and seamen, six hundred and seventy-four; 37th Madras native infantry, six hundred and seven; and Bengal volunteers, seventy-six. Also one hundred invalids, who had arrived from Chusan. Her Majesty's ships Calliope, Larne, and Hyacinth, under Captain Herbert, proceeded to bombard the lower fort, while the steamers Nemesis and Queen, threw shells into the hill forts and entrenchments on the inner side,—the Wellesley and other large ships moving up into mid-channel, in case they might be required. The Chinese kept up a fire for an hour. Had the enemy's guns been a little more depressed, much mischief would have been done. When their firing had slackened a little, the infantry advanced. All the enemy's positions were carried, and their loss was great. In the forts there were eighty-two guns, and as many in the war-junks. Their force was about two thousand men, of whom six hundred must have been killed, and as many wounded.¹ The fort of Ty-coctow was carried by the division under Captain Scott, consisting of the Druid, Samarang, Modeste, and Columbine. The next day the

¹ McPherson, p. 76.

signal of a flag of truce was exhibited on board the Wellesley. It was for three days. On the fourth day, Captain Elliot, by public proclamation, announced a cessation of hostilities, and a conclusion of preliminary arrangements between the imperial high commissioner and himself.¹

Forts in Canton River.—The Chinese, it appears, had no intention of fulfilling the engagements entered into, although orders were sent to Chusan² by Sir G. Bremer to provide for the immediate evacuation of that island, by the British troops; and Hong Kong island was formally taken possession of in her Majesty's name. On the morning of the 19th of February, 1841, a hostile shot was fired at the boat of the Nemesis steamer, from North Wantong, upon which the British squadron advanced up the river to attack the forts; and on the 26th February, Captain Sir H. F. Senhouse, her Majesty's ship Blenheim, with the Melville, the Queen steamer, and four rocket boats, opened a fire upon Anunghoy. The Wellesley, Calliope, Samarang, Druid, Herald,

¹ Cession of Hong-Kong; six million dollars indemnity; direct official intercourse; and re-opening the trade at Canton.

² "Annual Register," 1841, History, p. 279.

“Alligator,” and “Modeste,” were opposed to the batteries on the south-south-west and north-west of Wantong, and the forts on the western side of the channel. In less than an hour the batteries on Wantong were silenced, and the troops,¹ under the command of Major Pratt, of the 26th Cameronians, were landed, and having in a few minutes made themselves masters of the island, without the loss of a single man: one thousand three hundred Chinese surrendered.

The Anunghoy batteries were silenced by the “Blenheim,” “Melville,” and “Queen.” Seeing the enemy wavering, Sir H. F. Senhouse, at the head of the marines, landed on the south battery, and drove the enemy from the celebrated works. The Chinese suffered great loss, and their admiral (Kwan) was blown up. On the 27th the light squadron, under Captain Herbert (Calliope), proceeded up the river, and, arriving at the first bar, found the enemy strongly fortified on the left bank of the river, close to Whampoa Reach, with upwards of forty war junks; a number of vessels also were sunk, in order to bar the passage.

¹ Detachments of her Majesty's 26th and 49th, 37th Madras native infantry, and Bengal volunteers, and royal marines.

A heavy fire was opened upon the steamers "Madagascar" and "Nemesis;" but the ships opened their fire on the junks and batteries, which in an hour were nearly silenced, when the marines and small-arm men were landed and stormed the works, driving before them upwards of two thousand Chinese troops, and killing nearly three hundred. In about half an hour after landing, all the defences were carried. Next day Sir G. Bremer joined the advanced squadron, and several transports were pushed forward within gun shot of Howqua's fort, and thus, for the first time, were ships seen from the walls of Canton. At the end of March, 1841, Sir G. Bremer left Canton for Calcutta, to obtain reinforcements. In the meantime the trade was partially re-opened in virtue of the convention which had been entered into.

Attack on Canton.¹ The attack was made on the 24th May, 1841. The right column, to attack and hold the factories, in tow of the "Atalanta," consisting of 26th regiment (fifteen officers and two hundred and ninety-four men), Madras artillery (an officer, and twenty men),

¹ "Annual Register," 1841, p. 495, Despatch. Major-General Sir H. Gough joined on the 2nd May, 1841.

with an officer of engineers, under Major Pratt, his Majesty's 26th. Left column, towed by the "Nemesis," in four brigades, to move left in front, under Lieutenant-colonel Morris. His Majesty's 49th (Major Stephens), twenty-eight officers, and two hundred and seventy-three men; 37th Madras native infantry, Captain Duff, eleven officers, and two hundred and nineteen men; one company Bengal volunteers, Captain Mee, one officer, and one hundred and fourteen men; artillery (royal), under Captain Knowles, three officers, thirty-three men; Madras artillery, Captain Anstruther, ten officers, two hundred and thirty-one men; sappers and miners, Captain Cotton, four officers, one hundred and thirty-seven men.

Ordnance :—

- 4—12-pounder howitzers
- 4—9-pounder field pieces
- 2—6-pounders * „
- 3—5½-inch mortars
- 152—32-pounder rockets

Naval brigade, under Captain Bouchier, ("Blonde").—1st naval battalion, Captain Maitland ("Wellesley"), eleven officers, one hundred

and seventy-two men. 2nd naval battalion, Commander Barlow ("Nimrod,") sixteen officers, two hundred and thirty-one men.

Reserve, under Major-general Burrell. Royal marines, Captain Ellis, nine officers, three hundred and seventy-two men; 18th royal Irish, Lieutenant-colonel Adams, twenty-five officers, four hundred and ninety-five men.

The right column took possession of the factories before five o'clock, P.M. The left column reached near the village of Tsing-hae, the point of debarkation, about five miles, by the river line, above the factories. "The heights to the north of Canton, crowned by four strong forts, and the city walls, which run over the southern extremity of these heights, including one elevated point, appeared to be about three and a-half miles distant; the intermediate ground undulating much, and intersected by hollows under wet paddy cultivation, enabled me to take up successive positions, until we approached within range of the forts on the heights, and the northern face of the city walls. I had to wait here some time, placing the men under cover, to bring up the rocket battery and artillery."

A strongly entrenched camp of considerable

extent, occupied by about four thousand men, to the north-east of the city, was taken and burnt; and the forts on the heights were taken thus:— “The British troops looked down on Canton, within one hundred paces of its walls.” Sir H. Gough had decided upon storming the city of Canton; but “the following morning, the 26th May, at ten o'clock, a flag of truce was hoisted on the walls.” Sir Hugh says, “As the general (Chinese) did not make his appearance (at the expiration of the two hours), I hauled down the *white* flag.” The attack was not renewed. At last, Captain Elliot (superintendent) wrote to Sir H. Gough, requesting him to suspend hostilities, as he (Captain Elliot) was employed in a settlement of the difficulties upon the following conditions.”¹

The military force under Major-general Sir H. Gough,² was, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three, and one thousand seamen and marines. The British lost, killed, fourteen, and wounded, ninety-one. The navy, killed, six,

¹ Six million dollars, &c. “Five million dollars were paid, and security for one million more for the ransom of Canton.”

² “Annual Register,” 1841, p. 506.

wounded, forty-two. The Chinese had five hundred killed, and fifteen hundred wounded, on the 25th May, and many more after that date. There were said to have been forty-five thousand soldiers from other provinces. By the agreement made on the 27th May, 1840, the troops from other provinces were to leave in six days, and to proceed to a distance of upwards of sixty miles. The city of Canton,¹ the population nearly one million, and whose boasted army of fifty thousand, was now humbled. Our troops bivouacked on the heights near Canton for seven days. On the afternoon of the 29th May,² the Tartar troops, ten thousand in number, evacuated the city. On the 31st, eight thousand more Tartar troops left the city,³ and the remainder were preparing to follow, when carriage was provided.

It has been questioned whether the force we had at Canton, at the time, could have taken the city. It is supposed by an officer on the staff, who was there, that the British troops might have entered the city; and that the populace would have plundered the place; the force was too small

¹ McPherson, p. 137.

² McPherson, p. 149.

³ McPherson, p. 163, and Despatches par. 39.

to keep possession of it. A bombardment would have done much damage to private property; the navy could only act externally; the capture of Canton would not have brought peace; we obtained ransom. It was the last attack in the direction of the Grand Canal that insured peace; the Chinese were gaining strength, for as we went to the north we encountered the Tartar troops.

Hong Kong,¹ sickness in 1841.—From Canton the troops went to Hong Kong. The troops who were obliged to remain on shore continued to suffer much. Two-thirds of the latter were, during the months of June, July, and August, quite unfit for duty; nor was there a solitary-European at this time resident on the island who escaped the prevailing fever. Malaria is to be found on the island of Hong Kong where no vegetable matter is to be seen, and where no marsh exists. The natives sometimes, at one period of the day, may be seen in the thinnest and coolest habiliments, and in another, clad in furs and woollens; or put on a succession of garments as the cold increases, and again throw them aside as it becomes warm. In the 37th Madras native infantry, six hundred strong,

¹ McPherson, pp. 168, 169.

barely one hundred men were effective; two of the officers had died, and of the sixteen remaining, one only was fit for duty.

Commodore Sir G. Bremer, on the 22nd of June,¹ 1841, returned from Calcutta, invested with authority by her Majesty to co-operate with Captain Elliot as joint-plenipotentiary. Major-general Sir H. Pottinger, and Rear-admiral Sir W. Parker arrived in August. Captain Elliot and Commodore Sir G. Bremer went to England.

Proceed to Amoy.²—The expedition proceeded to the north on 21st of August, in the following order:—

Bentinck Surveying Ship.		
Queen (steamer), ³	Wellesley 74,	Sesostris (steamer).
Phlegethon (steamer),	Blenheim 74,	Nemesis (steamer).
Columbine 16,	Marion (staffship)	Modeste 16.
Seven Transports.	Six Transports.	Eight Transports.
Druid 44, Wing ship,		Blonde 44, Wing ship.
Pylades 18,	Cruiser 18,	Algerine 10.

The fleet rendezvoused off the harbour of Amoy, on the 25th of August; on the 26th, Sir

¹ McPherson, p. 167.

² Page 201.

³ Steamer.

H. Pottinger, Sir H. Gough, and Sir W. Parker, reconnoitred the defences in the "Phlegethon." These appeared to be of vast extent and of great strength: every spot from whence guns could bear upon the harbour was occupied and strongly armed. From the point of entrance into the inner harbour, the great sea line of defence extended in one continued battery of granite upwards of a mile. This battery was faced with turf and mud several feet in thickness, so that at a distance no appearance of a fortification could be traced. The embrasures were roofed, and the slabs thickly covered with turf, so as to protect the men while working their guns. This work mounted about one hundred guns, and it terminated in a high wall, which was connected with a range of rocky heights which run parallel to the beach. The entrance into the harbour is by a channel six hundred yards across, between the island of Koolangsoo and Amoy. On each side of this passage there were also strong fortifications.

About one P. M. a simultaneous attack was made upon these prominent defences. The line of battle ships and large steamers attacking the great sea batteries, the two frigates the island of Koolang-

soo, while the smaller vessels engaged the several flanking works. The capture of Amoy was chiefly a naval operation; and for four hours did the ships pepper at those enormous batteries without a moment's cessation. The stream of fire and smoke from the sides of the liners was terrific. The Wellesley and Blenheim alone each fired upwards of twelve thousand rounds, to say nothing of the frigates, steamers, and small craft; yet the works were as perfect when they left off as when they began, the utmost penetration of the shot being sixteen inches. From twenty to thirty people were all that were killed, by this enormous expenditure of powder and shot.

It was late before the first division of the troops landed. They escalated the wall which flanked the main line of batteries, covered by the "Queen" and "Phlegethon" steamers. The flank companies of her Majesty's 18th were the first to go over the wall, driving the enemy before them. They opened a gate, through which the rest of our men entered, and advancing along the battery, quickly cleared it, killing more men in ten minutes than the ships of war did the whole day. The enemy fled on all sides so soon as the troops landed. The island of Koolangsoo

was about the same time taken possession of by the troops with little opposition. During the whole day, the heights above the city were densely crowded with people, who had proceeded thither for safety. On the following day, the city was entered. It has an excellent harbour. The citadel is about a mile in circumference. It contains several extensive grannaries well filled, arsenals with enormous quantities of arms, and extensive magazines of powder, &c. Their magazines were blown up, the arsenals and their contents destroyed, the war-junks and dock-yards burnt, upwards of five hundred guns rendered unserviceable, and the fortifications were destroyed; after which, the fleet and force, on the 5th of September (1841), took their departure, leaving a garrison of five hundred and fifty men on the island of Koolangsoo, which completely commands the entrance into the harbour. Her Majesty's ships "Druid," "Pylades," and "Algerine," were left to protect the garrison and island.

Re-capture of Chusan.¹ On reconnoitring, it was found that the Chinese had built the fortifications on the same principles as those at Amoy.

¹ McPherson, p. 212.

“There was now a continual line of strong battery on the sea face.” “This battery was chiefly constructed of mud, and had two hundred and sixty-seven embrasures, though the majority were not yet supplied with guns.” There were other works on the several heights and valleys which commanded an approach to the harbour from the sea. The attack commenced on the 1st October, 1841. The men-of-war took up their position, and the landing took place in two columns. The first column, which Sir H. Gough accompanied, was fifteen hundred strong, and commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Craigie, her Majesty’s 55th regiment. The second column, one thousand and fifty strong, was under Lieutenant-colonel Morris, her Majesty’s 49th regiment.¹ The Chinese fought better than on the former occasion in July. The operations lasted two hours, and our loss was only thirty killed and wounded, including one officer killed. The enemy lost fifteen hundred, including nine or ten mandarins. A military government was formed, and four hundred men left as a garrison.

Capture of Chinhae.² The city is situated on

¹ Bingham, vol. ii. p. 261, says the Chinese force was five thousand men.

² McPherson, p. 219.

the left bank of the Tahae or Ningpo river. On the evening of the 9th of October, 1841, the whole of the squadron anchored off Chinhaë; the "Wellesley," "Blenheim," "Blonde," and "Modeste," took up their positions to cannonade the citadel and eastern part of the city walls; the steamers "Sesostris," and "Queen," so as to shell the citadel in flank, and enfilade any batteries their guns could bear upon. The flat-bottomed steamers landed the troops. Sir H. Gough formed a left, centre, and right column. He accompanied the two former; the latter was placed under Captain Sir T. Herbert, R.N. The iron steamers were of great use, as they at once ran their bows on the mud bank, and allowed the men to wade on shore in water barely knee deep. The left column was one thousand and seventy strong,¹ under Lieutenant-colonel Craigie. The centre column,² amounting to four hundred and sixty men, two twelve-pounder howitzers, and two six-pounder field guns, under Lieutenant-colonel Morris. This column landed a mile to

¹ Detachments of her Majesty's 18th and 55th, Madras artillery, sappers, and rifle company, four light howitzers, and two five and a-half inch mortars.

² Her Majesty's 49th, detachments royal and Madras artillery and sappers.

the right of the left column. These columns acted on the opposite bank of the canal, crossing over the bridges. On the left bank, the bombardment still continued. The city defences were reduced to almost a ruinous state. The right column was seven hundred strong. The seamen at once dashed up the precipitous rock, and planted the union-jack on the citadel walls. The rockets and musketry mowed the Chinese down by hundreds. In a few hours Chinhae, the key to the large and opulent city of Ningpo, was in our possession, with a loss to the Chinese of about two thousand; while our loss was only nineteen, killed and wounded. A garrison of about five hundred men was left at Chinhae.

Capture of Ningpo.¹ On the 13th October, 1841 (the admiral in the "Nemesis" having ascertained the depth of water), the remnant of the force proceeded up the river in steamers. The Chinese had placed the utmost confidence in the defences of Chinhae, and therefore had taken no precautions to protect the city of Ningpo. It was ascertained that the Tartar troops had refused to again face ours. The gates were barricaded;

¹ McPherson, p. 228.

the walls were escaladed, and the gates opened from within; the Chinese assisting in removing the obstructions. Our little force of soldiers, sailors, and marines, not amounting, in all, to one thousand men, marched quietly into the city. It is nearly five miles in circumference, and is surrounded by a high wall; fully two thirds the size of Canton, and said to contain six hundred thousand people.

Chinese attack on Ningpo and Chinhae.¹ On the 10th March, 1842, the Chinese made the attack on Ningpo. The signal was, the ignition of some fire-rafts, to be sent against the ships. At Ningpo, ten or twelve thousand men advanced upon the south and western gates, the guards retiring before them. The Chinese were repulsed, however, in the centre of the city. The attack at Chinhae was comparatively feeble. The fire-rafts at Chinhae and Ningpo were towed on shore, without causing any injury to the ships. It was reported that the enemy were near Tsekee, on the Segaoon hills² in two entrenched camps. On the 15th March, the forces consisting of,—

¹ Bingham, vol. ii. p. 292.

² Page 297.

	MEN.
18th Royal Irish	201
26th Cameronians	156
49th Regiment	305
36th Madras Native Infantry, (Rifles)	54
Madras Artillery	83
Madras Sappers	54
Marines and Seamen	350
Total . . .	1,203

Ordnance—four 8-pounder guns.

Embarked on board the steamers "Queen," "Nemesis," and "Phlegethon," and shortly after noon were landed within four miles of Tsekee. The "Phlegethon" and the armed launches proceeded up the river to intercept the retreat of the Chinese, and the troops pushed forward to the city. The naval brigade was ordered to move under the walls, and occupy two large buildings in front of the right encampment—the object being to make a simultaneous attack with the three columns. The movement was so rapid that only one gun could be brought up, which was effected by the exertions of Lieutenant-colonel Montgomerie. The columns rushed up the heights; the marine brigade was led by their gallant chief, Sir W. Parker. On reaching the summit of the hill, Sir H. Gough found that the enemy had retreated, taking with him his guns and the treasure. The troops re-

turned to Ningpo on 17th March, 1842. Our loss was three killed, and twenty-two wounded.¹

Evacuation of Ning-po.²—Early in May, 1842, it was decided to evacuate that city, and proceed with the expedition up the Yangtse-Kiang, leaving two hundred men on the Pagoda Hill, at Chinhae.

Attack on Chapoo.³—It is fifty or sixty miles, N. W., from Chinhae. It is nearly surrounded by a moat or canal, within which is a high wall encircling the city. It owes its importance to the Japanese trade. The heights commanded the city. On their extreme right, and commanding the anchorage, were two batteries; they were crowded with soldiers, about ten thousand, of whom one-third were Tartars. The attack was made the 18th of May. The troops were:—

Right column under Lieutenant-colonel Morris.

	OFFICERS.	MEN.
18th Royal Irish	22	470
49th Regiment	25	426
Sappers	1	25
Total	48	921

¹ Her Majesty's 49th, Capt. T. S. Reignolds, and Lieutenants J. M. Montgomerie, and F. W. Lane, and four rank and file wounded. The rest belonged to the navy.

² Bingham, p. 318.

³ Page 320.

210 TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE CHINESE.

Centre column under Lieutenant-colonel Montgomerie.

	OFFICERS.	MEN.
Royal Artillery	2	25
Madras Artillery	8	164
Sappers	2	74
36th Madras Nat. In. (Rifles)	3	100
Total	15	363

Left column under Colonel Schoedde.

26th Cameronians	27	521
55th Regiment	15	274
Sappers	1	25
Total	43	820

Ordnance, the whole light field-train

Were embarked in the steamers. The object was to turn the enemy's left; while the "Cornwallis," "Blonde," "Modeste," and "Sesostris" were to attack the forts. The troops were formed into three columns. The rout of the Chinese soon became total, the fugitives throwing away their arms. At this period three hundred Tartars, finding their retreat cut off by her Majesty's 26th regiment, threw themselves into a loop-holed Joss-house in one of the defiles, and defended themselves a considerable time with the most determined bravery. The artillery had no effect in dislodging them. This check to the whole force by a handful of men, could not be borne, and

several runs were made at the door, to burst it in and get amongst them, but without effect. The gallant Colonel Tomlinson,¹ of the 18th, was shot through the neck in leading one of these assaults, and several other officers and men fell at this spot. Ultimately, the place was fired by rockets, and breached by bags of powder, placed under the superintendence of Captain Pears, when about fifty of the dependants were taken prisoners, but nearly all of them wounded. The troops passed on to the walls; the bridge had been destroyed, but the canal was crossed in boats, the troops mounted the walls and carried the place,—the enemy fled. Our loss was nine killed and fifty-one wounded.

Killed—Lieutenant-colonel Tomlinson, 18th Royal Irish.

Wounded—Lieut.-colonel A. S. H. Mountain, (26th foot) staff.

„ Lieutenant A. E. Jodrell, . . . 18th foot.

„ Lieutenant A. Murray, . . . „

„ 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 27 rank and file, „

Killed—Two rank and file . . . 26th Cameronians.

Wounded—Three rank and file . . . „

Killed—Two rank and file . . . 49th regiment.

Wounded—Captain T. S. Reynolds . . . „

„ Lieut. and Adj. W P. R. Brown „

¹ The author was informed that the colonel was shot or cut down by entering the wicket, instead of waiting for the means of destroying the place; men could only enter singly.

Wounded—Eleven rank and file . . . 49th regiment.
 „ (since dead) Capt. Colin Campbell, 55th „
 „ Lieut. J. G. Johnstone, Madras sappers.
 „ One rank and file, 36th Madras Nat. In. (rifles).

The Chinese must have suffered severely—from twelve to fifteen hundred were buried by our people. The city had been fired in several places, and a large part destroyed before our troops left the place.

The “Queen” steamer was dispatched for Sir H. Pottinger. The force re-embarked, and on the 20th of May, 1842, took their departure for the Yang-tse-kiang. Commanders Kellet and Collinson, in their vessels, accompanied by the “Algerine” (Lieutenant W. Maitland), were busily employed in exploring a safe passage for the fleet.¹ This arduous duty was completed by the 4th of June, and on the following day the fleet moved to the northward. Owing to the necessity of anchoring at night, and the calm and foggy weather, it was the 8th before the force had assembled off Amherst rocks,—the point of rendezvous from whence the “Modeste,” “Phlegethon,” and “Nemesis” were dispatched to intercept any communication with Woosung, a village

¹ Bingham, p. 323.

at the junction of the Woosung river with the vast embouchure of the gigantic Yang-tse-kiang.

A steamer was appointed to each of the men-of-war¹ to the attack on Paoushan, near the village of Woosung. It was carried with little loss. It was decided to attack the city of Shanghai, a large commercial town, sixteen miles up the Woosung. On the 16th of June her Majesty's ship "Dido,"² accompanied by eight transports with troops, arrived.³ The destruction of the military materials at Woosung and Paoushan being completed, the troops were, on the morning of the 19th, embarked on board the steamers.

Attack on Shanghai.—The troops proceeded to the intended point of attack, the Commander-in-chief accompanying the force in the "Medusa;" while a column,⁴ under Lieutenant-colonel Montgomerie, approached it by a road that existed between Woosung and Changae. The enemy's batteries fired on the leading ship—hearing the firing, the troops having disembarked at the

¹ Bingham, p. 332. ² Page 335. ³ From India.

⁴ 18th royal Irish, 49th regiment, detachments Madras horse artillery, royal artillery, sappers and miners, and four light field guns, in all about one thousand men.

city, Colonel Montgomerie pushed on his advance, and, finding no opposition, entered the town. The mandarins had fled the preceding night. While the force were occupied in the work of destruction, Sir W. Parker, with the light steamers, proceeded up the river, which he ascended thirty-seven miles in a direct line, or forty-seven, including the sinuosities above Changae.¹ The troops were embarked on the 23rd, and dropped down to Woosung.

Yang-tse-Kiang.—The “Belleisle,” from England, and numerous transports from India having arrived with reinforcements,² the commanders-in-chief were enabled, on the 6th of July, to commence their operations up the Yang-tse-Kiang, with a force of seventy-three vessels of all arms.³ “On the 17th of July Captain Bouchier, in the ‘Blonde,’ was despatched with a squadron⁴ to blockade the entrance of the grand canal, and gained an admirable position for that object

¹ They were told that small steamers might reach Suchan-foo, twenty-five miles higher up.

² Her Majesty's 98th from England, and Lord Saltoun; and troops from Madras and Bengal.

³ Bingham, p. 340.

⁴ “Modeste,” “Dido,” “Calliope,” “Childers,” “Plover,” “Starling,” and “Queen” and “Nemesis” steamers.

above Kinsham. It was calculated that by this movement the passage of not less than seven hundred junks was interrupted, and consequently the whole trade with Peking was cut off. On the 19th the 'Cornwallis,' towed by the 'Vixen,' succeeded in taking up a berth off the city of Tchang-Kiang, at the entrance of the south grand canal, while her marines occupied the island of Kinshan."

Attack on Tchang-Kiang.¹—On the 21st of July, the reconnoissance being completed, and the ships being in position, the troops in three brigades commenced landing as early as possible :—

1st Brigade, under Major-general Lord Saltoun:²

26th Cameronians, Lieutenant-colonel Pratt.

Royal Volunteers, Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd.

Flank Companies, 41st Madras native infantry,
Major Campbell.

98th Regiment, Lieutenant-colonel Campbell.

2nd Brigade, under Major-general Schoedde :

Royal Artillery, Captain Greenwood.

¹ Bingham, p. 344.

² Served in Sicily, 1806-7; Corunna, 1808-9; Walcheren, 1809; Cadiz, 1811; Peninsula; Quatre Bras and Waterloo; China, Chin-Keang-Foo.

55th Regiment, Major Warren.

6th Madras native infantry, Lieutenant-colonel
Driver.

Rifles, 36th Madras, Captain Simpson.

2nd Madras native infantry, Lieutenant-colonel
Luard.

Detachment of sappers, Lieutenant Johnstone.

3rd Brigade, under Major-general Bartley :

18th Royal Irish, Major Cowper.

14th Madras native infantry, Major Young.

His Majesty's 49th Regiment, Lieut.-colonel
Stephens.

The 2nd Brigade landed under the bluff height, and occupied the hills above it. They were directed to turn this diversion into a real attack, if it could be done without much loss. The first brigade was landed under the hills, accompanied by Sir H. Gough; the artillery and the 3rd Brigade followed. The General now obtained a good view of the enemy's encampment, in which there were about one thousand five hundred men. Lord Saltoun was, therefore, directed to move forward with such portions of his brigade as had first landed, and cut off the communication with the city. Majors

Gough and Kent,¹ with three companies of Bengal volunteers, were directed to proceed by a path over some undulating ground, and fall on the enemy's right. These three companies were the first to come in contact with the enemy, by whom, probably, they were unobserved until they came close upon their flank. The whole encampment was quickly carried, and the fugitives followed up for some distance by the troops sent against them."

"The 26th, on landing, advanced to cover some guns which were being placed on a low hill to the west of the town, a strong position commanding the walls, which could thus be taken in reverse. The 3rd brigade having come up (and the canal being found to be fordable), it was decided to attack the western gate, and two guns, under Lieutenant Molesworth, Madras artillery, were placed to take the works in flank, while Captain Pears, under their cover, placed the powder bags and blew open the gates. This gave entrance to the troops into an out-work, and of which Captain Richards, of the "Cornwallis," with the marines, was already in posses-

¹ Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd and Major Kent commanded the 2nd Bengal volunteer battalions.

sion by scaling the walls. The 2nd brigade got possession of the Joss-house, near the point where they landed. Covered by the rifles, the grenadiers of the 55th, with two companies of the Madras native infantry, under Major Maclean, advanced against the north-east angle of the walls, and mounted the scaling ladders placed by the sappers, Lieutenant Cuddy gallantly setting the example. The Tartars disputed every inch of ground; each embrasure was carried at the point of the bayonet, while the brigade, having separated to the right and left as they escalated, fought their way along the walls.¹ It was about one hour and a half before this brigade made their way round to the western gate, where they arrived just as the 3rd brigade had carried the outer defences. "By these combined movements, a large body of Tartars were driven into a division of the western works, without a possibility of retreat, and, as they would not surrender, most of them were shot or buried under the ruins of the now burning houses."

¹ The author was informed that a very powerful Tartar, six feet and a-half high, advanced towards the head of her Majesty's 55th regiment, and seizing one of the men, threw him over the wall of the rampart.

“The 3rd brigade was directed to move round the west face and occupy the gates to the south and east.”¹ This brigade soon fell in with about one thousand Tartars under cover of some enclosures, who resisted, in many cases, with great desperation, but were quickly routed under the spirited attack of her Majesty’s 18th and 49th. Sir W. Parker, with the marines, was strongly opposed by bodies of Tartars. The troops were too much exhausted to undertake any fresh movements till the close of day; the gates were, therefore, occupied until six o’clock.

Lieutenant Crouch, R.N.,² in command of the boats of the “Blonde,” pushed up the canal close to the city wall. They were exposed to a severe fire. He received three wounds, and sixteen out of twenty seamen, two officers of artillery, and eight men were rendered *hors de combat*. He, with great presence of mind, saved the remainder of his boats. Captain Richards landed with two hundred marines, and, joined by three companies, 6th Madras native infantry, pushed through the suburbs to the walls. Ladders were raised against the parapet, thirty feet high. Commander Watson, with the marines of his ship, arrived.

¹ Bingham, p. 349.

² Page, 350.

Lieutenant Baker, Commander Watson, Captain Richards, and a marine of the "Modeste," were the first to ascend; the two former were wounded, and the latter killed by the enemy's fire from the battlements of the western gate. They thus established themselves in the works between the outer and inner defences, where they were found by the 3rd brigade, which almost simultaneously had carried the outer gate; at which time, too, the 2nd brigade coming along the ramparts had cleared the inner one.

At six o'clock, P.M. several parties were pushed into the heart of the city, where the scene was most appalling. Numerous houses were found burnt to the ground; and many were strewed with the dead bodies of Tartars, who had fallen by their own hands, after having murdered their wives and children, and thrown their bodies into wells and other places. Others were suspended by the necks in closets, and behind the doors." The Tartar force in the city was estimated at between three and four thousand men. But few, it is said, escaped to Nankin.

List of the British killed and wounded, 21st July, 1842:—

Killed—her Majesty's 49th regiment, Lieutenant T. P. Gibbons.

6th regiment Madras native infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Driver,¹ died from fatigue.

18th royal Irish, Captain Collinson.

Her Majesty's ship "Cornwallis," Brevet-major James Uniacke, royal marines, died from fatigue.

Four officers, two serjeants, twenty-nine rank and file, and two marines; total, thirty-seven.

Wounded—Royal artillery, Lieutenant J. N. A. Freere, slightly.

Madras artillery, Lieutenant C. D. Waddell, severely.

Assistant-surgeon C. Timmins, severely; Subadar Major Ramasawuy, slightly.

18th royal Irish, Lieutenant Bernard, slightly.

26th Cameronians, Ensign Duperier, slightly.

49th regiment, Lieutenant Baddely, dangerously; Lieutenant Grant, slightly.

55th regiment, Major Warren, severely; Lieutenant Cuddy, severely.

2nd Madras native infantry, Lieutenant Carr, Adjutant, slightly; Ensign Travers, slightly; Jemadar Mundah, slightly.

¹ He and several men fell victims to the sun.

36th native infantry, rifles, Captain Simpson, severely.

Her Majesty's ship "Cornwallis," Lieutenant James Fitzjames, severely.

"Blonde," Lieutenant E. Crouch, severely; Mr. H. T. Lyon, midshipman, slightly.

"Modeste," Commander R. L. Watson, slightly.

Wounded—Eighteen officers, one warrant officer, four serjeants, one drummer, thirty-six rank and file, fifteen seamen, and two marines; total, one hundred and twenty-seven.

Missing—One drummer, two rank and file.

The city was found to be about four miles in circumference, with a much larger suburb.¹ The arms and arsenals were destroyed, and the walls breached in many places. The cholera broke out among our troops,² and destroyed many men. The commanders-in-chief, to avert from Nankin the calamities that had befallen Tchang-Kiang, despatched the Tartar secretary with a summons and terms of capitulation to New-Kien, viceroy of the two Kiang provinces. Keeying and Elepoo again attempted to open communications, but

¹ Bingham, p. 354.

Most likely from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and probably drinking shamshoo.

not being accredited with full powers, were disregarded.

On the 4th of August,¹ the "Cornwallis," and the other men-of-war, anchored off the ancient capital of China; Sir H. Pottinger, Sir H. Gough, and Lord Saltoun's brigade arrived next day; and by the 9th, the whole force of four thousand five hundred fighting men had assembled without an accident, with a fleet of seventy sail, at two hundred miles from the ocean, in the heart of the Celestial empire.

On the 11th August, 1842, everything was ready to attack Nankin.² It contained about one million inhabitants. The Tartar troops amounted to six thousand, and the Chinese regulars to nine thousand, together with a large body of militia. From the immense extent of wall to be defended, it was very evident that the city must have fallen, had not the Chinese sued for terms. They begged for forty-eight hour's time, as mandarins of the highest rank, deputed by the emperor to treat for peace, were actually approaching.

On the 17th August,³ 1842, Sir H. Pottinger

¹ Bingham, p. 355.

² "The southern capital."

³ Bingham, p. 360.

communicated to the commanders-in-chiefs that the following treaty of peace had been signed by the imperial commissioner,¹ viz. :—

1. "Lasting peace and friendship between the two empires."

2. "China to pay twenty-one million dollars,² in the course of the present and three succeeding years."

3. "The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foo-chow-foo, Ningpo, and Shanghai, to be thrown open to British merchants; consular officers to be appointed, to reside at them; and regular and just tariff of impost and export (as well as inland transit) duties to be established and published."

4. "The island of Hong-Kong to be ceded in perpetuity to her Britannic Majesty, her heirs and successors."

5. "All subjects of her Britannic Majesty (whether natives of Europe or India), who may be confined in any part of the Chinese empire, to be unconditionally released."

6. "An act of full and entire amnesty to be published by the emperor, under his imperial

¹ Kee-ying, Eleepo, and Gnu.

² Four million two hundred thousand pounds, at two shillings.

sign manual and seal, to all Chinese subjects, on account of their having held service, or intercourse with, or resided under, the British government or its officers."

7. "Correspondence to be conducted on terms of perfect equality amongst the officers of both governments."

8. "On the emperor's assent being received to this treaty, and the payment of the first instalment, six million dollars, her Britannic Majesty's forces to retire from Nankin and the Grand Canal, and the military posts at Chinhae to be withdrawn; but the islands of Chusan and Ko-long-soo are to be held until the money payments, and the arrangements for opening the ports, be completed."

The emperor's assent having been intimated by an imperial edict on the 29th, vessels were despatched to the different Chinese ports, to remove the embargoes on their trade.¹ Bingham thinks² the "losses of the enemy, to say nothing of the wounded (vast numbers of whom probably

¹ Bingham, p. 362. There is a beautiful print of the reception of the Chinese commissioners and of Sir H. Pottinger, Sir H. Gough, Sir W. Parker, and their staff, &c.

² Bingham, p. 366.

died) cannot have fallen much short of twenty thousand, exclusive of such as perished by disease." That China maintains at least one million of men for military service. That we captured and destroyed more than three thousand pieces of cannon, besides jinjals, &c. The Chinese navy, such as it was, was nearly annihilated. That the Chinese loss in treasure was great.¹

	DOLLARS.
Found in the treasury at Ting-hai, on the 5th July, 1840	3
Paid for the ransom of Canton, and injury done to the British, May 1841 . . .	6,669,615
Treasury at Amoy, 26th August, 1841 . .	20,000
Taken at Ning-po, 13th October, 1841 . .	120,000
At Tchang-Kiang	50,000
Paid at Nankin, first instalment of indemnification for the war	6,000,000
To be paid before the expiration of three years	15,000,000
Total	<u>27,859,618</u>
	<u>*£5,571,923</u>

Then the value of two hundred tons of copper found at Chinhae, is to be added, worth about £20,000.

There was a grant to the officers who served

¹ Bingham, p. 368, including Sycee silver.

² Taking the dollar at four shillings.

in China of eighteen, twelve, and six month's batta, according to the time they served with the expedition.

Canton and China trade—1781. Colonel Henry Watson, chief engineer of Fort William, in his letter dated 29th March, 1781, writing to government,¹ expressed his surprise at the Company and British subjects going to Canton, and pointed out the disadvantages of the monopoly of the Cohong merchants there. Asked why they fixed “upon Canton, the most southern part of the Chinese empire, as a general emporium for vending the produce of their respective northern climates; and was still more surprised at the continuance of their trade to that port only, since it has been known that their commerce with the other provinces was neither prohibited nor obstructed by the emperor's order.” Alluded to the “attempts made by the English company in the years 1755, 1756, and 1757, to open a trade at the port of Limpo, in the province of Check-Yang.” That British subjects had lost seven million Spanish dollars lent on bond.

¹ Ninth Report, 1783, Appendix No. 80, East Indian affairs.

Chusan. "The island of Chusan,¹ or Chowsan, on which the British had a factory in 1700, is a miniature likeness of a vast chain of mountains, small streams flowing from its central heights, passing between the hills, which separate as they approach the sea, forming wide and extensive valleys, where boundary walls and embankments form large alluvial plains. That in which the city of Ting-hai is situated, has an embankment facing the sea, of full two miles in extent." The population of Chusan, he says, may be estimated at about two hundred and eighty thousand, at seven inhabitants per house, from reports in the public offices. "In 1700, there were three ports open for the reception of English vessels, viz., Limpo, Canton, and Amoy."² Chusan afterwards proved to be a very healthy island; and it is clear, that the great number of deaths in 1840 was caused by want of sanitary arrangements.

¹ Bingham, vol. i. p. 315. Fifty-one and a-half miles in circumference, twenty-one long, and ten and a-half miles broad.

² Hamilton's Gazetteer, p. 240, Canton. Bingham, vol. i. p. 295, says, the "Yang-tse-kiang" river (or "Child of the Ocean") is second only to the Mississippi and the Amazon; rises in Thibet, and, before reaching the sea, passes over two thousand seven hundred miles of country.

CHAPTER VII.

WAR IN SINDH.

AFFAIRS in Sindh. There had been treaties made with the ameers in Sindh on the 22nd August, 1809, and on the 9th November, 1820.¹ The East India Company had a factory at Tatta in 1751.² On the 20th April, 1832, a treaty was entered into between the East India Company and the government of Hyderabad in Sindh; and a supplementary treaty on the 22nd April, 1832, with Meer Roostum, of Khyrpoor,³ regarding the navigation of the river Indus, and the levying of tolls or duties on the transit of merchandise. On 23rd December, 1834, a commercial treaty with the government of Hyderabad⁴ was entered into, regulating the tolls on boats, instead of duties on goods, as the latter plan involved delay, and the examination of the goods. On the 20th April,

¹ Sindh "Blue Book," 1838-43, p. 1.

² Hamilton's Gazetteer and authorities.

³ "Blue Book," pp. 2 and 3.

⁴ "Blue Book," p. 4.

1838, a treaty was entered into with the ameers of Sindh, to use our good offices to adjust the differences subsisting between the ameers of Sindh and Runjeet Sing, the ruler of Lahore; and also, that an accredited British minister should reside at the court of Hyderabad.¹ In 1839, a treaty with the four ameers of Hyderabad was entered into;² by Article xi. of which, it was declared that no toll was to be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river Indus within the territories of the ameers of Hyderabad; thus rendering the navigation of that river *free* to every one. By Article ii., a British force was to be maintained in Sindh, and stationed at Tatta, "or such other place westward of the river Indus as the Governor-general may select. The Governor-general will decide upon the strength of this force, which it is not intended shall exceed five thousand fighting men."³ By Article x., the Company's rupee was to be the currency of Sindh, it being of equal value with the Bakkroo or Timooree rupee, the currency of Sindh.⁴

¹ "Blue Book," p. 5.

² Treaties with Sindh, p. 6, No. 8.

³ Three lakhs rupees were to be yearly paid by three of the ameers.

⁴ There was an intention to have a rupee of equal value all over India. It took place in 1835.

Before the expedition to Cabool marched from Ferozpoor in December 1838, it had been settled with the ameers of Sindh, that the British troops were to march through that country, and the possession of the fort of Bukkur was afterwards obtained from the ameer of Khyrpoor, by treaty, to be held by the British during the operations in Affghanistan.¹ It was required as a depôt. When Sir W. Cotton arrived at Rohree in January 1839, Sir J. Keane and the Bombay troops were moving up from Kurrachee, towards Hyderabad. The treaty of 1839 had not been signed by the ameers, and as large bodies of the Beloochees were assembled, and assembling at that capital, a brigade of the Bengal troops made seven marches towards Hyderabad; when, hearing of the treaty having been signed, we returned to Sukkur, to prepare to move on to the Bolan Pass *en route* to Candahar.

On the 4th November, 1842,² a year after the outbreak at Cabool (2nd November), "a draft of a treaty between the ameers of Hyderabad and the British government was prepared:—

By Article 2. The Company's rupee was to

¹ See Affghan war.

² "Blue Book," p. 441, No. 392.

become the only coin legally current in the dominions of the ameers, after the 1st January, 1845.¹

By Article 5. The ameers renounced the privilege of coining money.²

The 6th Article relates to the cutting of wood for the steamers navigating the Indus.

By Article 7. Kurrachee and Tatta were to be ceded to the British government, and a free passage between Kurrachee and Tatta.

By Article 8. Subsulkote,³ and the territory between the present frontier of Bhawalpoor and the town of Rohree, are ceded to his Highness of Bhawalpoor, "the ever faithful ally and friend of the British government."

Sir W. Napier says,⁴ the Sindhian princes "were again excited by Nott's advance from Candahar; they judged it a forced abandonment of that important city; and though he afterwards destroyed Ghuznee, and, in conjunction with Pollock, ruined Istalif and Cabool, the apparently hurried retreat from Affghanistan which followed, bore,

¹ The date of the coinage of the Company's rupee throughout our Indian possessions.

² The act of coining is the right of the sovereign of a country.

³ Which had been taken from the nawab by the ameers.

⁴ "Conquest of Sindh," part i. p. 111.

for the misjudging people, the character of a flight. It was viewed as a proof of weakness, and Belochis and Brahoos became more hopeful and more confident than before. The ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh consulted together, how best to league against the Feringhees; Seik vakeels were at Khyrpoor, ready to start for Lahore, loaded with presents for the Maharaja; and at the same time, letters came from the victorious Affghans, reminding the ameers that they were feudatories of the Doonaree empire, and exhorting them to act boldly in the common cause. These things led to the ameer's final destruction; they were the forerunners of the battle by which they fell; but their primary cause, it has been shown, was deeper seated. The Sindhian war was no isolated event. "*It was the tail of the Affghan storm.*"¹

¹ It is a mistake to suppose that the army going to Cabool, could have proceeded altogether through the Punjab. Sir C. M. Wade, and the Sikh Mahomedan troops, went by that route. But even, on our return from Cabool with Lord Keane (October 1839), four months after Runjeet Sing's death, the Sikh chiefs made great objections to our passage through their country. It was the subject of negotiation, as our convoys were often leaving our provinces for Cabool. Besides, the Sindh treaty had not been signed.

Our reverses had, no doubt, induced the ameers of Sindh to expect our defeat in other quarters. Meer Roostum, of Khyrpoor, wrote to Meer Nusseer Khan, of Hyderabad, on the 21st October, 1842 :—“ I have received your friendly letter,¹ together with the Koran,² in which was written the agreement, bearing your seal, relative to war or peace, as it might happen, with the British, Sikhs, and others ; they came safely to hand, by Mahomed Khan, Talpoor, and Moolla Buchal, your confidential messengers. The purport being, that I was to accept and approve of the Koran (containing the written compact), and to send one in return ;³ they also gave me your verbal message, and I was much pleased.” “ Not to place dependence upon them (our brothers), but to exert yourself in entertaining sepoy, and men of the Belooch tribe. Now is the time, whatever it may cost,” &c.

The Bombay troops must have gone by the Bolan Pass and Candahar. The danger of invasion is not *via* Cabool, but by the route *via* Herat, Candahar, and Sindh.

¹ “ Blue Book,” p. 430, Appendix, No. 382.

² Writing an agreement or treaty, &c. in the Mahomedan bible is held most sacred.

³ Such are sent, when writing letters is considered dangerous. The returned Koran is a proof of the acceptance of the agreement.

Proposed agreement between Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan.¹ "If Meer Nusseer Khan should be opposed by his brothers of Hyderabad, or any chiefs or rulers (but especially by the British Feringhees), I, Meer Roostum, will, without hesitation, come to his assistance with my brothers, sons, and the whole tribe." "I, Meer Roostum, will have no regard for life or death, prosperity or ruin, but will join Meer Nusseer with all my forces, without any dread of the consequences." Meer Roostum had formally and publicly resigned, and placed the turban on the head of Ali Moorad, his younger brother.² At last, Meer Roostum fled to Hyderabad.

Emaum Ghur in the desert.—In January, 1843, Sir C. Napier selected two hundred irregular cavalry, put three hundred and fifty of the 22nd Queen's regiment on camels, loaded ten more with provisions, eighty with water, and marched to take Emaum Ghur, having a garrison of four times his numbers, well provided.³ The skirts of the waste swarming with thousands of

¹ "Blue Book," p. 431, No. 383.

² "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. p. 475, December 1842.

³ "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. p. 237 to 241. "He forced Ali Morad and the native guide to go with him."

Belooch horsemen. He took the fortress and then blew it up. The Duke of Wellington said in the House of Lords,—“ Sir Charles Napier’s march upon Emaum Ghur, is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions.”

The treaty of the 4th of November, 1842, (before alluded to) was signed and sealed on the evening of the 14th of February, 1843;¹ but on the 15th, Major Outram,² was attacked at the residency near Hyderabad, by eight thousand men and six guns. Major Outram, after a gallant defence, went on board a steamer with his escort, and joined the army under Major-general Sir C. Napier.

Battle of Meeanee, 17th of February, 1843.—
Sir Charles Napier heard of the account of the

¹ “Blue Book,” p. 505.

² “Blue Book,” p. 509.

attack on Major Outram, at Hala. On the 16th of February,¹ Sir Charles marched to Muttare. "Having ascertained that the ameers were in position at Meeanee (ten miles distance) to the number of twenty-two thousand men; and well knowing that a delay for reinforcements, would both strengthen their confidence and add to their numbers, already seven times that which I commanded, I resolved to attack them, and we marched at four a. m., on the morning of the 17th. At eight o'clock the advanced guard discovered their camp; at nine we formed in order of battle, about two thousand eight hundred men of all arms and twelve pieces of artillery. We were now within range of the enemy's guns, and fifteen pieces of artillery opened upon us, and were answered by our cannon. The enemy were very strongly posted; woods were on their flanks, which I did not think could be turned. These two woods were joined by the dry bed of the river Fulaillee, which had a high bank. The bed of the river was nearly straight, and about twelve hundred yards in length. Behind this, and in both

* "Blue Book," p. 511, No. 473 Despatch. "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. p. 305.

woods were the enemy posted. In front of their extreme right, and on the edge of the wood, was a village. Having made the best examination of their position, which so short a time permitted, the artillery was posted on the right of the line, and some skirmishers of infantry with the Sindh irregular horse, were sent in front, to try and make the enemy show his force more distinctly, we then advanced from the right in *echelon* of battalions, refusing the left to save it from the fire of the village. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve in rear of the left wing; and the Poona horse, together with four companies of infantry, guarded the baggage. In this order of battle we advanced, as at a review, across a fine plain, swept by the cannon of the enemy. The artillery, and her Majesty's 22nd regiment in line, formed the leading *echelon*; the 25th native infantry, the 2nd; the 12th native infantry, the 3rd; and the 1st grenadier native infantry, the 4th.

“The enemy was one thousand yards from our line, which soon traversed the intervening space. Our fire of musketry opened at about one hundred yards from the bank, in reply to that of the enemy, and in a few minutes the engagement

became general along the bank of the river, on which the combatants fought, for about three hours or more with great fury, man to man. Then, my lord, was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword and shield, and matchlock. The brave Beloochees, first discharging their matchlocks and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution, but down went these bold and skilful swordsmen under the superior power of the musket and bayonet. At one time, my lord, the courage and numbers of the enemy against the 22nd, the 25th, and the 12th regiments, bore heavily in that part of the battle. There was no time to be lost, and I sent orders to the cavalry to force the right of the enemy's line. This order was very gallantly executed by the 9th Bengal cavalry¹ and the Sindh

¹ Before the order arrived, Captain (now major) A. Tucker, 9th light cavalry, had urged Colonel Pattle to move to turn the enemy's right flank, and charge their rear, with the view of checking their advance. Colonel Pattle did not, at first, like to take upon himself the responsibility, but at last did, and the corps was moving off when Sir Charles's aide-de-camp came up. The author has Colonel Pattle's own statement in his possession, and has seen an official letter from a brigade major regarding the case. The despatch had been sent off before the statement was communicated.

horse, the details of which shall be afterwards stated to your lordship, for the struggle on our right and centre was, at that moment, so fierce, that I could not go to the left. In this charge the 9th light cavalry took a standard and several pieces of artillery, and the Sindh horse took the enemy's camp, from which a vast body of their cavalry slowly retired, fighting. Lieutenant Fitzgerald gallantly pursued them for two miles, and, I understand, slew three of the enemy in single combat. The brilliant conduct of these two cavalry regiments, in my opinion, was the crisis of the action, for, from the moment the cavalry were seen in the rear of their right flank, the resistance of our opponents slackened; the 22nd regiment forced the bank, the 25th and 12th did the same, the latter regiment capturing several guns, and the victory was decided. The artillery made great havoc among the dense masses of the enemy, and dismounted several of their guns. The whole of the enemy's artillery, ammunition, standards, and camp, with considerable stores, and some treasure, were taken."

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED. 241

*List of killed and wounded.*¹

	OFFICERS.	MEN.	HORSES.
9th light cavalry, killed	1	3	9
" " wounded	5	29	35
Sindh horse, killed	0	0	23
" wounded	0	17	21
2nd company 2nd battalion camel battery, wounded	0	2	2
3rd company 3rd battalion Go- lundaze horse and mule bat- tery, killed	0	1	0
" " wounded	0	2	4
C. company Madras sappers and miners, wounded	0	1	0
Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, killed	1	23	0
" " wounded	5	49	0
1st grenadier regiment native infantry, killed	0	1	0
" " wounded	0	4	0
12th regiment native infantry, killed	3	12	0
" " wounded	2	45	0
25th regiment native infantry, killed	1	16	0
" " wounded	2	28	0
Staff, wounded	1	0	0
" killed	0	0	1
Total	21	233	95
Killed	6	56	33
Wounded	16	177	62
Grand total	22	233	95

¹ Blue Book, p. 514.

Officers Killed.

- Lieutenant-brevet Captain Adjutant Cookson,
9th Bengal light cavalry.
Captain Tew, his Majesty's 22nd.
Brevet-Major Jackson, 12th Bombay native
infantry.
Brevet-Captain Meade, 12th Bombay native
infantry.
Lieutenant Wood, 12th Bombay native infantry.
Major Teesdale, 25th Bengal native infantry.

Officers Wounded.

- Captain A. Tucker, 9th light cavalry.
Brevet-Captain S. Smith, 9th light cavalry.
Lieutenant H.G.C. Plowden, 9th light cavalry.
Ensign J. H. Firth, 39th native infantry.
Lieutenant-colonel J. L. Pennefather, her
Majesty's 22nd regiment.
Captain Conway, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
Lieutenant F. P. Harding, her Majesty's 22nd
regiment.
Ensign R. Pennefather, her Majesty's 22nd
regiment.
Ensign H. Bowden, her Majesty's 22nd regi-
ment.
Ensign Holbrow, 12th native infantry.

Lieutenant Quarter-master Phayre, 25th native infantry.

Lieutenant Bourdillon, 25th native infantry.

Major Wyllie, assistant-adjutant-general.

“Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Nusseer Khan, and Meer Wullee Mahomed, of Khyrpoor, Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Shadad Khan, and Meer Hoossein Khan, all of Hyderabad,” surrendered themselves as prisoners of war in Sir Charles’s camp.

The enemy’s force was said to be twenty-five thousand eight hundred and sixty-two.¹ The British force two thousand four hundred, deducting two hundred men with Major Outram. But only one thousand seven hundred and eighty were said to be engaged, as the Poona horse and four companies of infantry guarded the baggage. In extreme cases even a baggage guard may be called into action. It appears that on the 25th of December, 1842,² the late Shah Shoojah’s regiments, and 19th Bengal native infantry, under the command of Brigadier Wallace, left Rohree *en route* to Ferozpoor. The Governor-general, on the 24th of November, 1842, wrote to Sir Charles—“ If you should not have detained the

¹ “Conquest of Sindh,” part iii. p. 504, Appendix.

² “Blue Book,” p. 481.

brigade, under Lieutenant-colonel Wallace, it would be desirable to recal it, or at least to halt it, upon making your demands.¹ I am very desirous of effecting our purpose without bloodshed, and the presence of a preponderating force may enable us to do this." Sir W. Napier says,² "On the 14th of February the ameers sent messengers to Major Outram, commanding him to be gone; for they now perceived their hope to get the general into their hands was illusive, and they desired to push the troops at the residency into the confusion of embarkation, that they might attack them to advantage." Major Outram, whether he expected hostilities or not, "had sent orders to stop the 41st regiment, then on its way to Kurrachee, to embark for Bombay (they had not reached Tatta); thus taking upon himself to interfere with a positive order of the Governor-general, which directed that regiment to embark immediately."³ Major Clibborn

¹ "Blue Book," p. 458, par. 7. The new treaty had not been signed.—He had been allowed to retain them. "Conquest of Sindh," part i. p. 140.

² "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. p. 288.

³ It has been said that Sir Charles could not stop the 41st foot on their way down the Indus. He was only a few miles from the bank of the river, and a sum of money, in India, will always induce some one to take a letter anywhere.

writes,¹ on the 24th of November, 1842—"Futteh Mahomed Ghoree² goes occasionally to the servants of Colonel Pattle, 9th cavalry, to pump out the intentions of the English. He writes to Meer Roostum to be under no apprehension, as the Bengal regiments are certainly to leave for Ferozpoor in a few days hence." On the other hand, Mahomed Shah "writes daily for Meer Nusseer Khan's information, to warn them to be on their guard, as the English will certainly bear down on them at Khyrpoor, and that there is no intention of the troops moving on to Ferozpoor." Sir Charles also knew that by delay, even to the 18th of February, the ameers counted on having sixty thousand fighting men.³ Sir Charles had left troops under Colonel Roberts at Sukkur. Why then send away Lieutenant-colonel Wallace's force? The district granted to him might have been made over to the Khan of Bhawalpoor, after the treaty had been signed and affairs had been settled.

Shere Mahomed, of Meerpoor,⁴ was within six

¹ "Blue Book," p. 461. Intelligence from Sindh.

² Prime minister of Meer Roostum.

³ "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. pp. 298, 304.

⁴ "Conquest of Sindh," part ii. pp. 324, 326.

miles of the battle of Meeanee, intending to have joined on the 18th of February. Sir W. Napier says it was an error not to attack Shere Mahomed. "It produced another terrible battle, and went nigh to cause the destruction of the army." Sir Charles took possession of Hyderabad. That gave him a strong position.¹ He applied for reinforcements, and Lord Ellenborough sent more troops as soon as he heard a rumour of the battle of Meeanee from a native source. Of the battle of Meeanee the Duke of Wellington said,² "He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up a reinforcement, and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations in war." It has been said that Sir Charles acknow-

¹ Five hundred men reserved for a garrison. He then ordered down the troops from Sukkur.

² "Conquest of Sindh," p. 330. Speech; debate on the vote of thanks.

ledged he committed an error in sending away the Bengal troops.

Annexation of Sindh. Sir W. Napier says,¹ "It was perplexing at first to decide how the ameers were to be treated, and this perplexity impeded the measures necessary for the security of the army; were they prisoners of war, or deposed princes? The battle had altered the political relations between them, as sovereign princes and the Anglo-Indian government. It was no longer a question of enforcing a new treaty. They had appealed to the sword, and were, by defeat, placed at the mercy of their conquerors. How would the Governor-general treat them? This question was decided on the 12th of March, twenty-four days after the action of Meeanee. Lord Ellenborough, by proclamation, annexed Sindh to the British possessions in the east, and the ameers were to be sent captives to Bombay."

The battle of Dubba, four miles from Hyderabad, 24th of March, 1843.—Shere Mahomed, of Meerpoor, was at the head of about twenty-five thousand men.² He had threatened to

¹ "Conquest of Sindh," p. 334.

² "Conquest of Sindh," p. 339. Sir W. Napier says twenty-five thousand to forty thousand men. Page 354 gives twenty-six thousand men.

“Cabool the English.” At break of day, on the 24th of March, five thousand fighting men were under arms in front of the British camp;¹ of these, one thousand one hundred were cavalry, and there were nineteen guns, five being horse artillery. Two pieces were left to defend the camp, seventeen remained with the army. Dubba is eight miles north-west of Hyderabad. The enemy had twenty-five thousand men and fifteen guns, eleven of which were in battery. Two lines of infantry were entrenched, and behind them a heavy mass of cavalry in reserve. Their right rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which, though generally dry, had at that point a large pond of mud protecting the flank, and beyond the nullah was a thick shikargah, which prevented the position being turned. Another nullah there was to the rear of the former, forming an obtuse angle to the front line, and there the left of the enemy’s army was posted. Thus the true front of battle extended from the right, for one mile perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting, what may be termed, the right wing and centre to an attack; but the left wing, behind the second nullah, was refused. All the cavalry were behind the left in

¹ “Conquest of Sindh,” p. 375.

one great mass ; and behind the right wing stood the village of Dubba or Naraja. Between the first line of the right and centre and the village of Dubba was a second nullah. Both had ramps for advancing or retreating. The enemy's second line was placed near the second and largest nullah, behind which were the enemy's guns. He had cleared the low jungle in front of his line.

The British force marched from Hyderabad in column and formed line, but the left was too near the right of the enemy's line.¹ This was afterwards remedied by throwing the left back a little. The cavalry were on the flanks, and the artillery, in the intervals, between the regiments. Then, the right was a little refused ; for there was a wood towards that flank. Sir Charles expected an attack from that quarter, and threw forward the cavalry of that wing. He found that the enemy outflanked him on the right about half a mile, and still had their cavalry in reserve. But he could not see the double lines and nullahs containing their centre and right. Dubba appeared empty. Major Waddington, engineers, and Lieutenants Brown and Hill, rode close up

¹ " Conquest of Sindh," p. 379.

to the centre of the Beloochee position, and along the front to the junction of the centre with the left. They thus forced the enemy to show his first line for two-thirds of its extent. Several of the ramps for passing the nullah were discovered. Sir Charles¹ "put his troops in motion to attack; preserving here, as at Meeanee, the *echelon* order, and hoping by his promptness to gain, not only the nullah at its junction with the Fullaillee, but to pass it, and seize the village of Dubba also, before the Beloochs could arrive there in force." Sir Charles, in his despatch,² says, "The British line advanced in *echelons* from the left, her Majesty's 22nd regiment leading the attack. The enemy was now perceived to move from his centre, in considerable bodies, to the left, apparently retreating, unable to sustain the cross fire of the British artillery; on seeing which, Major Stack,³ at the head of the 3rd cavalry, under command of Captain Delamain, and the Sindh horse, under the command of Captain Jacob, made a charge upou the enemy's left

¹ "Conquest of Sindh," p. 382.

² "Annual Register," 1843, p. 353, History.

³ Sir W. Napier finds fault with this charge made without orders.

flank, crossing the nullah, and cutting down the retreating enemy for several miles.¹ While this was passing on the right, her Majesty's 22nd regiment, gallantly led by Major Poole, who commanded the brigade, and Captain George, who commanded the corps, attacked the nullah on the left with great gallantry." They "marched up till within forty paces of the entrenchment, and then stormed it like British soldiers." "Meanwhile, the Poona horse, under Captain Tait, and the 9th Bengal cavalry, under Major Story, turned the enemy's right flank, pursuing and cutting down the fugitives for several miles. Her Majesty's 22nd was well supported by the batteries commanded by Captains Willoughby and Hutt, which crossed their fire with that of Major Leslie. Then came the 2nd brigade, under command of Major Woodburn, bearing down into action with excellent coolness. It consisted of the 25th, 21st, and 12th regiments, under the command of Captains Jackson, Stevens, and Fisher, respectively. These regiments were

¹ Sir W. Napier says, "He thus exposed the flank of the line of battle, and exposed the whole army to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the selected division of Beloochs," &c., p. 385.

strongly sustained by the fire of Captain Witley's battery, on the right of which were the 8th and 1st regiments, under Majors Browne and Clibborne: these two corps advanced with the regularity of a review up to the entrenchments, their commanders, with considerable exertion, stopping their fire, on seeing that a portion of the Sindh horse and 3rd cavalry, in charging the enemy, had got in front of the brigade. The battle was decided by the troop of horse artillery and her Majesty's 22nd regiment."¹

The Duke of Wellington, said of Sir C. Napier, in the House of Lords on the 12th February, 1844, on the occasion of the vote of thanks to the army in Sindh,² "He manifested at all times entire discretion and prudence in the formation of his plans, great activity in making the preparations which were necessary to insure success;—and, finally, great zeal, gallantry, and science, in carrying his plans and preparations into full execution." His march upon Emaum Ghur was one of the most curious military feats which he

¹ At the battle of Dubba, Sir Charles "turned both the enemy's wings, and thus rendered their centre of less importance, and which their defeat weakened. At Meanee we could only turn the enemy's right flank.

² "Annual Register," 1843, p. 355, Extract.

had ever known to be performed, or had ever perused an account of in his life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary; and he cut off a retreat of the enemy, which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions." And "the advance and attack of which he had been speaking, resulted in another brilliant victory, in which he again showed all the qualities of an excellent general officer, and in which the army displayed all the best qualities of the bravest troops."

The British loss was,¹ two hundred and seventy officers and men, of which number, one hundred and forty-seven were of her Majesty's 22nd regiment. The enemy lost about eight thousand,² as allowed by themselves.

After this victory,³ Sir C. Napier marched southward, and took possession of Meerpoor; and on the 4th of April, the fortress of Omercote, to the east of Hyderabad, opened its gates to the British forces. Shere Mahomed, though a fugi-

¹ "Conquest of Sindh," p. 380.

² "Conquest of Sindh," p. 457.

³ "Annual Register," 1843, p. 356.

tive, was preparing for a fresh attack, when Sir Charles resolved, if possible, to surround and cut him off, by dividing his army into three detachments. On the 8th of June, Colonel Roberts engaged, and totally defeated, one of the hostile ameers, Shah Mahomed, at the head of two thousand men, taking their leader prisoner. And on the 14th, Captain Jacob was attacked by Shere Mahomed himself, and four thousand Beloochees, whom he completely routed; the ameer, with very few followers, escaping with difficulty into the desert. Shortly afterwards, Lord Ellenborough appointed Sir C. Napier governor of Sindh. Towards the close of the Sikh campaign, 1845-6, Sir C. Napier marched *via* Mooltan, with a portion of his force from Sindh. He went on a-head with an escort, and reached army head quarters after the battle of Sobraon. He was present at the review at Lahore.

CHAPTER VIII.

Gwalior.

AFFAIRS of Gwalior.¹ Under the treaty of Boorhanpoor (1804), contracted with the Maharaja Dowlut Rao Sindia, the British government engaged to maintain a force, to be at all times ready on the requisition of the maharaja, to protect the person of the maharaja, his heirs, and successors, &c. The Governor-general, on the 20th December, 1843, issued a proclamation, stating, that on the decease of the late Maharaja Jhunkajee Rao Sindia,² the British government

¹ "Annual Register," 1843, p. 362, History; Treaty 27th February, 1804. Wilson (Mill), vol. vi. p. 547.

² He succeeded Dowlut Rao on the 18th June, 1827.—Wilson, vol. ix. p. 212. It is stated that when Dowlut Rao was on his death bed, they sent for the late Major Stewart, resident at Gwalior, on the 21st March, 1827, who went to see him, and learn his wishes as to his successor. "I wish you to do whatever you think proper." ("Jo toom monasib jano so kuro.") Captain J. D. Dyke (of the Bengal cavalry, and assistant) was present; he retired in 1835. Dr. Pauton (late physician-general, Bengal) came in afterwards. Thus one of our bitterest enemies at last had confidence in the British government of India. Bazeo Bae was the maharanee alluded to.

promptly acknowledged as his successor, the Maharaja Jyajee Rao Sindia, who was nearest in blood to the late maharaja, and whose adoption by the maharanee, his highness's widow, was approved of by the chiefs. The maharanee and the chiefs concurred in conferring the dignity and power of regent during the minority of the maharaja, upon the Mama Saheb. The British government communicated to the durbar its entire approval of this measure; and the British resident, in the presence of the chiefs, explained to the regent, that he was recognised as the responsible head of the Gwalior state; and, as such, would receive the support of the British government. This declaration appeared to give general satisfaction. Nevertheless, after a short time, the Mama Saheb was violently compelled to quit the Gwalior state, in despite of the remonstrance of the British resident. The Dada Khasgee¹ Walla succeeded to the confidence of the maharanee,²

¹ Khasjee.

² The Poona Observer, 15th May, 1852, states, "From Gwalior we learn that her highness the Baeza Bhae, who has for some time past been residing at Oojein, the capital of Rajpootana, has deputed her minister, Govindrow Jeyram, to the durbar, with a present of the enormous sum of twelve lakhs of rupees (£120,000), on the occasion of her

without possessing generally that of the chiefs, and by his influence, various acts were committed, insulting and injurious to the British government." The dada had committed acts hostile to the British government, and had concealed from the knowledge of the maharanee, and of the dūrbar, a letter addressed to the maharanee, conveying the sentiment of government. This was regarded as an act of usurpation of the sovereign authority in the Gwalior state, and the government insisted on the person of the dada being given up, to prevent his pernicious influence; and then to establish a strong government. An army had been marched towards Gwalior, with a view to prove the determination of the British government to have their demand complied with. The army had halted at Hingona for five days, and the Mahrattah vakeels had an interview with the Governor-general. The crafty enemy had continued the negotiations with the view of gaining time to assemble, and concentrate his forces. The Governor-general determined upon active measures of hostility.

grand-daughter, who is married to his highness Jyajeerow Sindia, having attained the age of puberty." — *Allen's Indian Mail*, 29th June, 1852, p. 391.

Battle of Maharajpoor.¹ On the 29th December, 1843, the main division crossed the Koharee river early in the morning. They found the Mahrattah forces drawn up in front of the village of Maharajpoor, in a very strong position, which they had occupied during the previous night, and which they had carefully intrenched. The British troops were about fourteen thousand men, with forty pieces of artillery;² and the Mahrattahs mustered eighteen thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, with one hundred guns. The action commenced by the gallant advance of Major-general Littler's³ column upon the enemy, in front of the village of Maharajpoor; and the charge was successful, although the Mahrattah troops fought with desperate bravery. Sir Hugh Gough, in his despatch, states, "I must do justice to the gallantry of their opponents, who received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe execution as we advanced; but nothing could withstand the rush of British soldiers.

¹ "Annual Register," 1843, p. 366.

² General Sir H. Gough marched from Agra, and it had been decided to take fifty battering guns. Owing to the pacific appearance of the state of affairs, forty of the battering guns were left at Agra.

³ Lieut.-general Sir J. H. Littler, G.C.B.

Her Majesty's 39th foot, with their accustomed dash, ably supported by the 56th native infantry, drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayonetting the gunners at their posts. Here a most sanguinary conflict ensued; the Mahrattah troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand with the most determined courage. General Valiant's brigade, with equal enthusiasm, took Maharajpooor in reverse, and twenty-eight guns were captured by this combined movement; so desperate was the resistance, that very few of the defenders of this very strong position escaped. During these operations, Brigadier Scott was opposed by a body of the enemy's cavalry on the extreme left, and made some well-executed charges with the 10th light cavalry, most ably supported by Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery, and 4th lancers, capturing some guns, and taking two standards, thus threatening the right flank of the enemy."

"In conformity with the previous instructions, Major-general Valiant, supported by the 3rd cavalry brigade, moved on the right of the enemy's position at Chonda. During the advance Major-general Valiant had to take, in succession, three strong intrenched positions, where the

enemy defended their guns with frantic desperation; her Majesty's 40th regiments losing two successive commanding officers, Major Stopford and Captain Coddington, who fell wounded at the very muzzles of the guns, and capturing four regimental standards. This corps was ably and nobly supported by the 2nd grenadiers, who captured two regimental standards, and by the 2nd and 16th grenadiers, under Lieutenant-colonels Hamilton and M'Laren; too much praise cannot be given to these regiments. Major-general Littler, with Brigadier Wright's brigade, after dispersing the right of the enemy's position at Maharajpoor, steadily advancing to fulfil his instructions of attacking the main position at Chonda, in front, supported most ably by Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery, and the 1st regiment of light cavalry; this column had to advance under a very severe fire, over very difficult ground; but when within a short distance, again the rush of the 39th regiment,¹ as before, under Major Bray, gallantly supported by the 56th regiment, under Major Dick, carried every thing before them, and thus gained the intrenched main position of Chonda."²

¹ "Primus in Indis" at Plassey in 1757.

² Chounda.

The battle was now in effect won ; but the loss on both sides was severe. The British had one hundred and six killed, six hundred and eighty-four wounded, seven missing, total, seven hundred and ninety-seven. Seven officers were killed or died of their wounds.¹ The Mahrattah's are said to have lost between three thousand and four thousand men.

The corps present in the battle were :—

Governor-general's Body-guard.

Cavalry—1st light cavalry, 4th lancers, detachments, 5th and 8th, 10th light cavalry, 4th irregular cavalry.

Infantry—Her Majesty's 39th and 40th regiments, 2nd native infantry (grenadiers'), 14th, 16th (grenadiers'), 31st, 39th (6th company), 43rd (light infantry), 56th Kelat-i-Ghiljee regiment (flank companies).²

Battle of Punniar.³—Likewise, on the 29th of

¹ Among these, Major-general Churchill, quarter-master-general H. M. T.

² Lord Ellenborough, Lady Gough and other ladies, were with the army in advance, not expecting an attack, when the enemy opened a fire from their guns.

³ "Annual Register," 1843, p. 367.

December, 1843, another decided victory was gained over the enemy by Major-general Grey, The troops under his command were :—

Cavalry—Two squadrons, 2nd light cavalry ; two squadrons, 5th light cavalry ; 8th irregular cavalry.

Infantry—Her Majesty's 50th regiment ; 39th, 50th, 51st, and 58th native infantry.

The Mahrattah force was estimated at twelve thousand in number. General Grey, having advanced from Bundelcund, reached Punniar, about twelve miles from Gwalior, on the 28th of December. The enemy took up a strong position on the heights, near the fortified village of Mangore. They were immediately attacked, and driven from height to height by our troops, who were much fatigued by their long march. Our loss was two hundred and fifteen killed and wounded.

The consequence of these two victories was the submission of the Mahrattah Durbar to the demands of the British government. Lieutenant-colonel Stubbs was appointed by the Maharanee, Governor of the fort of Gwalior, which commands the city ; the Mahrattah troops were

disbanded, and a British contingent was formed, consisting of four companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and seven regiments of infantry; to be maintained at the cost of the Gwalior government, which was also to pay forthwith the expenses of the campaign.

The Governor-general issued the following proclamation on the occasion of these victories :—

“ CAMP, GWALIOR RESIDENCY,

“*4th January, 1844.*”

“ The Governor-general directs the publication of the annexed despatch from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, reporting the operations of the corps under his Excellency’s immediate command, and of that under the command of Major-general Grey, against the mutinous troops which overawed and controlled the government of his highness the Maharaja Jyajee Rao Scinda, and attacked the British forces on their advances to Gwalior to his highness’s support.

“ The Governor-general deeply laments the severe loss in killed and wounded which has been sustained in these operations; but it has been sustained in the execution of a great and necessary service, and the victories of Maharajpooor and

Punniar, while they have shed new glory upon the British army, have restored the authority of the Maharaja, and have given new security to the British empire in India. The Governor-general cordially congratulates his Excellency, the commander-in-chief, upon the success of his able combinations, by which two victories were obtained on the same day, and the two wings of the army, proceeding from different points, have now been united under the walls of Gwalior."

Before the battle of Maharajpoor a reconnoissance had taken place, and Maharajpoor was not occupied the evening before by the enemy. The plan of attack had been formed for the attack on Chonda where their infantry and guns were expected to be found. Brigadier Valliant's brigade was to have taken the lead, and Major-general Littler's brigade was in the rear of the proposed attack. When the enemy unexpectedly opened a fire from the village of Maharajpoor, the rear column became the attacking column on Maharajpoor, which was in rear of the Chonda entrenchment. There were ten eighteen-pounders with the army which might have been employed against Maharajpoor, and then against Chonda with good effect.

CHAPTER IX.

CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB.¹

“AURUNGZEB (‘the ornament of the throne,’) was the last of the race of Tymoor, who possessed a genius for command.” He died in 1707. At his death the Mohammedan government began to decline, and its weakness favoured the Sikh nation, as well as those chiefs, both Mohammedan and Hindoo, who desired to become independent princes. In 1763, the Sikhs defeated the Affghans near Sindh, and permanently became masters of the province. The Sikhs became masters of Lahore in 1764.² Tymoor Shah, who had succeeded Ahmed Shah in 1773, died in 1793, leaving the Sikhs masters of the Upper Punjab as far as Attok.³ Runjeet Sing was born about 1780, and succeeded his father Muha Sing in 1792,⁴ who had made himself pre-eminent among the Sikhs.

¹ “History of the Sikhs,” by Captain J. D. Cunningham, Bengal engineers, (1849,) p. 97.

² “History of the Sikhs,” p. 110.

³ “History of the Sikhs,” p. 123.

⁴ “History of the Sikhs,” p. 126.

In 1799, Runjeet obtained the cession of Lahore from the Affghan king. It is said that at the battle of Delhi (11th of September, 1803,) five thousand Sikhs swelled the army of our enemy.¹ In 1805, when Holkar marched into the Punjab, Runjeet Sing refused to give him aid in operations against the English.² We then entered into a treaty with the Sikhs. In 1809, we took under our protection the Sikh states on the south-side of the Sutlej at the request of the chiefs, and formed a treaty with Runjeet Sing upon that occasion.³ The mistake made on that occasion was in not endeavouring for a money equivalent, to obtain certain districts, on the south side, which belonged to Runjeet or to his chiefs. The British cantonment at Loodianah was then established.

In 1824, " Runjeet Sing had now brought under his sway the three Mohammedan provinces of Cashmeer, Mooltan, and Peshawur: he was supreme in the hills and plains of the Punjab Proper; the mass of his dominion had been acquired."⁴ When Appa Sahib, ex-*raja* of Nag-poor, escaped from the custody of the British

¹ "History of the Sikhs," p. 135.

² Page 136.

³ Page 149.

⁴ Page 173.

authorities, and repaired to Lahore, Runjeet Sing, learning that he was a violent enemy of his English allies, ordered him to quit his territories.¹ In 1825, when the English army marched to besiege Bhurtpoor, Runjeet Sing was pressed to aid the Jhat prince, but he declined.² These two cases alone prove that Runjeet Sing studiously avoided giving offence to the English, with whose power he could not cope; while the history of British India had indicated to his mind, what would be the result of a war with our government. There was a meeting at Roopur on the Sutlej in 1831, regarding the navigation of the Indus and other matters.³ In the same year,⁴ he gave up his views on Sindh, particularly as regarded Shikarpoor, on our remonstrances. In 1838, Runjeet Sing entered into the treaty with the English for the restoration of Shah Shoojah at Cabool.⁵ Finally, he died on the 27th of June, 1839.

¹ "History of the Sikhs," p. 175.

² Runjeet told this to Sir C. M. Wade, and asked what we should have done had he joined; the reply was, "We should have attacked you, and then have undertaken the siege." "No," said Runjeet, "I always resolved to be your friend."

³ Page 204.

⁴ Page 207.

⁵ Page 232.

“ Khurruk Sing, the imbecile son of Maharaja Runjeet Sing was acknowledged as the master of the Punjab ;¹ but Sher Sing, the reputed son of the deceased king, at once urged his superior claim or merits on the attention of the British viceroy ; and Nao Nihal Sing, the real offspring of the titular sovereign, hastened from Peshawur to take upon himself the duties of ruler.² Maharaja Khurruk Sing died on the 5th of November, 1840.³ While attending his father’s funeral, Nao Nihal Sing, now king *de jure*, was killed. Sher Sing was proclaimed king.”⁴ In 1841, “ Sher Sing had induced the troops of the state to make him king, but he was unable to command them as soldiers, or to sway them as men.”⁵ He was a “ good natured voluptuary.” The Sikh troops were uncontrollable. The British agent on the Sutlej proposed to march to the Sikh capital with twelve thousand men, to beat and disperse a rebel

¹ “ History of the Sikhs,” p. 237.

² He left the Sikh force at Peshawur, sent there to aid the expedition in favour of Shah Shoojah, *en route* to Cabool in 1839.

³ “ History of the Sikhs,” p. 244.

⁴ “ History of the Sikhs,” pp. 245, 248 ; latterly acknowledged as his son by Runjeet Sing.

⁵ “ History of the Sikhs,” p. 249.

army four times more numerous.¹ The Governor-general was not prepared for a virtual invasion, although he was ready to use force if a large majority of the Sikhs as well as the Maharaja himself desired such intervention.² The disorders in the Sikh army subsided; but the people became suspicious of the English.

No doubt, the chiefs took a dislike to Sher Sing on account of his aiding the English cause. It was currently spoken of, that the chiefs wished him to refuse a passage to our troops, and to attack General Pollock on his return from Cabool. Sher Sing was assassinated by Ajeet Sing, on the 15th September, 1843, when present at a review of his troops.³ Dhuleep Sing was proclaimed maharaja,⁴ and Heera Sing⁵ was raised to the high and fatal office of vizier.

The power of the army was increased by the new minister (Heera Sing) raising the pay of the soldiers, by adding two and a-half rupees, or five

¹ "History of the Sikhs," p. 251.

² This was talked of at the time in Calcutta.

³ "History of the Sikhs," p. 270.

⁴ Colonel Steinbach, p. 36, says, "a reputed son of the late Runjeet Sing," a boy of ten years of age.

⁵ Son of Raja Dhian Sing, and nephew of Golab Sing of Cashmeer.

shillings, a month. The army felt that it had become the master of the state. Heera Sing professed suspicions of the English,¹ and was guided by Pundit Julla; and both were put to death.² The Sikh army moved against Jummoo; Golab Sing submitted, and repaired to Lahore. The Sikh army became all powerful.³ Lall Sing (the favourite of the maharanee) was made vizier, and Tej Sing, commander-in-chief, in expectation of our English war. The English government had long expected that it would be forced into a war. The Sikh army was so little under control, that the Lahore government "considered that the only chance of retaining power was to have the army removed, by inducing it to engage in a contest, which, they believed, would end in its dispersion."⁴ "War with the English was virtually declared on the 17th November; a few days afterwards, the troops began to move in detachments from Lahore; they commenced crossing the Sutlej, between Hurreekee and Kus-

¹ "History of the Sikhs," p. 276.

² "History of the Sikhs," p. 281.

³ "History of the Sikhs," p. 288.

⁴ "History of the Sikhs," p. 299. The army called upon Lall Sing, the minister, to join the army in December, 1845.

soor, on the 11th December; and on the 14th of that month, a portion of the army took up a position within a few miles of Ferozpoor." It must be remarked, that the Sikhs held some territory on the English side of the Sutlej, and hence they might cross over to their own portion of the territory so situated, where, indeed, they were allowed to have some troops for police purposes. How the Sikhs could have crossed over all at once, without observation, a great number of guns, is inconceivable; and some suppose that guns had been, from time to time, sent across, and buried within the territory on the English side, which they still retained.

In writing to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,¹ Sir Henry Hardinge wrote that he, in common with the most experienced officers of the Indian government, was "not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutle with its infantry and artillery." That "the Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river from Lahore, and, after remaining encamped a few weeks, had returned to the capital." That, "on the 9th,² at night, Captain

¹ "Annual Register," 1845, pp. 332, 333.

² December, 1845.

Nicolson, the assistant political agent at Ferozpoor, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the other hand, the information received by Major Broadfoot on that day from Lahore was not of a character to make it probable that any Sikh movement on a large scale was meditated. On the 10th, no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicolson's report, and the usual opinion continued to prevail, that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutlej." Lastly, "on the 13th,¹ I first received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river."

Sikhs threaten Ferozpoor. "The Sikh leaders² threatened Ferozpoor, but no attack was made upon its seven thousand defenders, which, with a proper spirit, were led out by their commander, Sir John Littler, and showed a bold front to the overwhelming force of the enemy. The object, indeed, of Lall Sing and Tej Sing, was not to compromise themselves with the English, by destroying an isolated division, but to get their own

¹ December, 1845.

² Cunningham, 304.

troops dispersed by the converging forces of their opponents." They "thus deprecated an attack on Ferozpoor, and assured the local British authorities of their secret and efficient good-will."¹

Battle of Moodkee, 18th December, 1845. On the 18th of December, 1845, the troops had reached the village of Moodkee. "Soon after mid-day,² the division under Major-general Sir H. Smith, a brigade of that, under Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that, under Major-general Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery, and two light field batteries, under Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, of the horse artillery (brigadier in command of the artillery force), and the cavalry division, consisting of her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, the body-guard, 4th and 5th

¹ "It was sufficiently certain and notorious" (says Captain C.), "at the time that Lall Sing was in communication with Captain Nicolson, the British agent at Ferozpoor, but, owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known. Compare Dr. Macgregor's 'History of the Sikhs,' ii., 80." But we know, on good authority, that the late Captain P. Nicolson "was fully informed of every march made by Lall Sing."

² "Annual Register," 1845. Despatch of Sir H. Gough, p. 335. After a march of twenty-one miles. Moodkee is twenty miles from Ferozpoor.

light cavalry, and 9th irregular cavalry, took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee."

"The troops were in a state of great exhaustion, principally from the want of water, which was not procurable on the road, when about three P. M.,¹ information was received that the Sikh army was advancing; and the troops had scarcely time to get under arms and move to their positions, when the fact was ascertained."

"I immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up this position, or were advancing in order of battle against us."

¹ The officer to be brigadier for the next day (19th) was warned for duty, and was told by the staff from head-quarters, that the enemy were ten miles off, and were to be attacked next morning. About an hour afterwards the troops were ordered to fall in. Major Broadfoot rode a-head to see if it were true, and returned and told the fact of his having seen them. The question has been asked—"Why not have formed the army in front of your own camp?"

“ To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery, under Brigadier Brooke who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his left flanks.”

“ The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but, in some places, thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded ; and, whilst our twelve battalions formed from *echelon* of brigade into a line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy ; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions, without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, to make a flank movement on the enemy’s left, with a view of threat-

ening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd light dragoons, with the 2nd brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body-guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right. This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, those brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect."

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir J. M'Caskill, attacked in *echelon* of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have

been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. The ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.”¹

The army returned to camp at midnight, and halted on the 19th and 20th of December, “to

¹ Major-general Sir R. Sale died of his wound. Sir J. M'Caskill was shot through the chest and killed. The number of killed were two hundred and fifteen, wounded six hundred and fifty-seven, total eight hundred and seventy-two. The enemy killed and wounded many officers by firing from trees.

refresh the men, to collect the wounded, and bring in the captured guns.”¹ On the 21st the commander-in-chief having left the baggage, the wounded, and the captured guns at Moodkee, protected by two regiments of native infantry, “marched at four o’clock in the morning by his left, keeping about three or four miles from the enemy’s intrenched position at Ferozshah, in which the enemy had placed one hundred and eight pieces of cannon, protected by breast works.”²

Sir John Littler, at Ferozpoor, had been directed to join “with such part of his force as would not compromise the safety of his troops and the post.”³

¹ Sir H. Hardinge’s narrative of events. “Annual Register,” p 340.

² It was found, after the capture of the entrenchment, that there were no guns in the rear face, but the fact did not appear to have been known at the time. There is required a regular intelligence department in the Bengal army! The sums paid for intelligence must be on a liberal scale. Those who get the most correct information pay high for it.

³ He left the 63rd native infantry to take care of the cantonments, and the 27th native infantry, with some sappers, half a field battery, and a company of artillery in the town.

“ At half-past one o'clock the Umballah force, having marched across the country disencumbered of every description of baggage, except the reserve ammunition, formed its junction with Sir John Littler's force, who had moved out of Ferozpoor with five thousand men, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field guns.”

“ This combined operation having been effected, the commander-in-chief, with my entire concurrence, made his arrangements for the attack of the enemy's position at Ferozshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united.”

“ The British force consisted of sixteen thousand seven hundred men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse artillery.”¹

“ The Sikh forces varied from forty-eight thousand to sixty thousand men, with one hundred and eight pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries.”²

Battle of Ferozshah.—The united forces advanced about four o'clock on the afternoon of the

¹ The force at Moodkee was said to be thirteen thousand men.

² Every available soldier had been brought from Loodiana and Ferozpoor.

21st, to attack the intrenched camp of the Sikhs. Sir Henry Hardinge had offered his services to Sir Hugh Gough as second in command, and took an active part in the eventful scenes of this and the following day.¹

“ The camp of the enemy was in the form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozshah; the shorter sides looking towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Ferozpoor and the open country. The British troops moved against the last named place, and the ground in front of which was, like the Sikh position in Moodkee, covered with low jungle.”

Attack on the 21st of December, 1845.²—
“ The divisions of Major-general Sir J. Littler, Brigadier Wallace (who had succeeded Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill), and Major-general Gilbert, deployed into line, having in the centre our whole force of artillery, with the exception of three troops of horse artillery, one on either flank and one in support, to be moved as occa-

¹ “ Annual Register,” p. 338.

² Extract, Despatches Lords Hardinge and Gough, and Sir H. Smith, second Edition (1846), p. 51.

sion required. Major-general Sir H. Smith's division, and our small cavalry force, moved in a second line, having a brigade in reserve to cover each wing." Lieutenant-general Sir H. Hardinge directed the left wing, and Sir H. Gough the right wing of the army.

"A very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position upwards of one hundred guns; more than forty of which were of battering calibre; these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced and carried these formidable entrenchments; they threw themselves upon the guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy; but, when the batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiery had to face such a fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that, in spite of their most heroic efforts, a portion only of the entrenchment could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging."

Although I now brought up Major-general Sir H. Smith's division, and he captured and long

retained another point of the position, and her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and, finally, bivouacked upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In this state of things the long night wore away." "During the whole night, however, they continued to harass our troops by the fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered our position."

The 22nd of December.—“ But, with daylight of the 22nd came retribution. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse artillery, whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played with great effect upon this point, dismounting our pieces, and blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir H. Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. Our line advanced, and, unchecked by the

enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out of the village of Ferozshah and their encampment; then, changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along its front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field."

"In the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Sing, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozpoor fresh battalions and a large field of artillery, supported by thirty thousand Ghorechurras,¹ hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position at Ferozshah. This attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become manifest, when the Sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank;

¹ The Sikh cavalry did not enter into the rebellious and hostile view of the Sikh infantry.

and, when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village, as compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns, during this manœuvre, maintained an incessant fire, whilst, our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats, we were unable to answer him with a single shot."

"I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which, apparently, caused him suddenly to cease his fire, and to abandon the field."¹ The enemy's camp "is the scene of the most awful carnage, and they have abandoned large stores of grain, camp equipage, and ammunition."

List of Killed and Wounded.

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.
Officers, European	37	78
„ Native	17	18
Non-commissioned officers, drummers, rank and file . .	630	1610
Syces, drivers, &c. . . .	10	12
Warrant officers	0	3
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	694	1721

Grand total of all ranks, killed and wounded, 2415 : of these, 115 European and 35 native officers (150).

¹ By some order (assumed to be official) given to the brigadier of cavalry, that force went off to Ferozpoor. The

It has been stated that the Sikhs fired their guns much quicker than the English, or at the rate of three times to our twice, to which circumstance our great loss is imputed. On taking possession of the entrenchment, it was found that the enemy had no guns in the rear face. Their guns were said to have been strongly fixed in, so that they could not be removed during the action. The nature of the position was not known before the attack was made.¹ At Sobraon the guns were moveable, and were, it is said, moved by the Sikhs during the attack.

On the 5th of January, 1846, the enemy made a predatory incursion in the direction of Loodiana.² On the 12th of January Sir H. Gough determined to bring his whole force into a position from which he could more closely observe the movements of the enemy, posted near the greater enemy, it is said, thinking it was a manœuvre to attack them in the rear, went from the field. Golab Sing remarked that Tej Sing should not have attacked, but have gone off to Delhi.

¹ It is said that our troops marched past the rear of the entrenchment, and that they then marched round to its front and took up the position from which the attack was made. Some part of the entrenchment was not above eighteen inches high.

² Despatches, p. 81.

Sobraon, on the right bank of the Sutlej. The army executed an oblique movement to its right and front. Major-general Sir H. Smith, supported by a cavalry brigade, under Brigadier Cureton, was in this new alignment, still on the right, opposite to Hurreekie Puttun; Major-general Gilbert in the centre; and Major-general Sir R. Dick on the left, covered again by cavalry. Major-general Sir J. Grey, posted at Attaree, watched the Nuggur ford. The troops of Major-general Sir J. Littler occupied the cantonment and entrenchment of Ferozpoor. There seemed no doubt that Sirdar Runjoor Sing Mujethea had crossed from Philour, and, not only threatened the safety of the rich and populous town of Loodiana, but would have turned the right flank, and have intersected the line of our communications at Busseean and Raekote, and have endangered the junction of our convoys from Delhi. Brigadier Godby commanded three battalions of native infantry at Loodiana.

Major-general Sir H. Smith, with his brigade at Dhurmkothe, and Brigadier Cureton's cavalry, were directed to advance by Jugraon towards Loodiana; and his second brigade under Brigadier Wheeler, moved on to support him. The

general was reinforced by Brigadier Godby, "but his manœuvres had thrown him out of communication with Brigadier Wheeler, and a portion of his baggage¹ had fallen into the hands of the enemy." The Sikh sirdar² took an entrenched position at Budhowal—fifteen miles below Ludiana.

The battle of Aliwal on the 28th of January, 1846.—The cavalry under the command of Brigadier Cureton,³ and horse artillery under Major Lawrenson, formed two brigades under Brigadier MacDowell, 16th lancers, C. B., and the other under Brigadier Stedman, 7th light cavalry. The first division as it stood consisted of two brigades: her Majesty's 53rd and 30th native infantry, under Brigadier Wilson, of the latter corps; the 36th native infantry and Nusseree batallion, under Brigadier Godby (36th native infantry); and the Shekawatte brigade under Major Foster. The Sirmoor battalion was attached to Brigadier Wheeler's brigade of the first division, the 42nd native infantry had been left at head quarters. "The regiments of cavalry which headed the

¹ A great deal of the baggage was lost! It by some mistake got between our troops and the enemy.

² Despatches, p. 83.

³ Despatches, p. 86.

advance, opened their glittering ranks to the right and left, and made apparent the serried battalions of infantry and the frowning batteries of cannon.

The scene was magnificent and yet overawing.¹ “The lines of battle were not truly parallel. The Sikh line inclined towards and extended beyond the British right, while the other flanks were, for a time, comparatively distant.” “It was perceived by Sir H. Smith that the capture of the village of Aliwal was of the first importance, and the right of the infantry was led against it. A deadly struggle seemed impending; for the Sikh ranks were steady and the play of their guns incessant; but the holders of the post were battalions of hill men, raised because their demeanour was sober and their hearts indifferent to the Khâlsa, and after firing a struggling volley, they fled in confusion headed by Runjor Sing, their immediate leader, and leaving the brave Sikh artillerymen to be slaughtered by the conquerors. The British cavalry of the right made at the same time a sweeping and successful charge, and one half of the opposing army was fairly broken and

¹ Cunningham, p. 317. Sir H. Smith's force is stated to be 11,000 men: the Sikhs 15,000 men, pp. 317, 316.

dispersed; but the Sikhs on their own right seemed to be outflanking their opponents in spite of the exertions of the English infantry and artillery; for there the more regular battalions were in line, and the true Sikh was not easily cowed. A prompt and powerful effort was necessary, and a regiment of European lancers, supported by one of Indian cavalry, was launched against the even ranks of the Lahore infantry. The Sikhs knelt to receive the orderly, but impetuous charge of the English warriors;" but at the critical moment, the unaccustomed discipline of many of Govind's champions failed them. They rose, yet they reserved their fire, and delivered it together at the distance of a spear's throw; nor was it until the mass had been three times¹ ridden through, that the Sikhs dispersed. The charge was wisely planned and bravely made; but the ground was more thickly strewn with the bodies of victorious horsemen than of beaten infantry. An attempt was made to rally behind Boondree; but all resistance was unavailing, the Sikhs were driven across the Sutlej; more than fifty pieces of

¹ Major Bere, 16th lancers, succeeded, but many others failed. The late Colonel Cureton said that lancers should never be employed in less numbers than a squadron.

cannon were taken.”¹ Our loss was, grand total killed, wounded and missing, five hundred and eighty-nine men; three hundred and fifty-three horses, (officers—four European and two native killed — twenty-five European and six natives wounded.²

“Raja Golab Sing³ of Jummo, first reproached the vanquished Sikhs for rashly engaging in hostilities with their colossal neighbour, and then entering into negotiations with the English leaders.” The English intimated their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty in Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the raja declared his inability to deal with the troops, which still overawed him and other well-wishers to the family of Runjeet Sing.

Operations against Sobraon, (10th of February, 1846.)⁴ “The Sikhs had gradually brought the

¹ The troops at first suffered much from the Sikh guns, and Major Lawrenson, not having time to send for orders, at once galloped, with his horse artillery, up to within a certain distance of the enemy's guns, unlimbered, and his fire drove the enemy's gunners from their guns. This promptitude of the major saved the loss of many lives.

² This loss includes those killed and wounded at Buddiwal, said to have been about one hundred men.

³ Cunningham, p. 319.

⁴ Cunningham, p. 321.

greater part of their force into the intrenchment on the left bank of the Sutlej, which had been enlarged as impulse prompted or as opportunity seemed to offer.¹ They placed sixty-seven pieces of artillery in battery, and their strength was estimated at thirty-five thousand fighting men; but it is probable that twenty thousand would exceed the truth.² Captain Cunningham says,³ "Hurbon the brave Spaniard, and Mouton the Frenchman, who were at Sobraon, doubtless exerted themselves where they could, but their authority or their influence did not extend beyond a regiment or a brigade, and the lines showed no trace whatever of scientific skill or of unity of design." "Tej Sing commanded in this entrenchment, and Lall Sing lay with his horse in loose order higher up the stream, watched by a body of British cavalry." Early in February, a formidable siege train and ample stores of am-

¹ From the 22nd of December, 1845, to the 10th of February, 1846, or for fifty days, we did not disturb their operations. We were waiting for guns, ammunition, stores, &c.

² The commander-in-chief wrote, "not fewer than thirty-five thousand men, the best of the Khalsa troops." Despatches, p. 116.

³ Cunningham, p. 322, *note* *

munition arrived from Delhi.¹ It was determined that the Sikh position should be attacked on the 10th of February. "It was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be planted in masses opposite the particular points of the enemy's entrenchment, and that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous storm of shot and shell, the right or weakest part of the position should be assaulted in line by the strongest of the three investing divisions, which together mustered nearly fifteen thousand men. A large body of British cavalry was likewise placed to watch the movements of Lall Sing, and the two divisions which lay near Ferozpoor were held ready to push across the Sutlej as soon as victory should declare itself.²

On the 10th of February,³ "The British divisions advanced in silence, amid the darkness of night and the additional gloom of a thick haze. The coveted post was found unoccupied;⁴ the

¹ A force was sent to escort it to camp, to prevent its capture by the Sikhs.

² Sir H. Smith joined on the evening of the 8th, and part of the siege train had arrived.

³ Cunningham, p. 324.

⁴ Roodee Walla, the post of observation, which had fallen into the hands of the Sikhs some time before.

Sikhs seemed everywhere taken by surprise, and they beat clamorously to arms when they saw themselves about to be assailed. The English batteries opened at sunrise, and for upwards of three hours an incessant play of artillery was kept up upon the general mass of the enemy. The round shot exploded tumbrils, or dashed heaps of sand into the air; the hollow shells cast their fatal contents fully before them, and the devious rockets sprang aloft with fury to fall hissing amid a flood of men; but all was in vain, the Sikhs stood unappalled, and "flash for flash returned, and fire for fire." The fire of the guns ceased for a time. "The left division of the British army advanced in even order and with a light step to the attack, but the original error of forming the regiments in *line* instead of in *column*,¹ rendered the contest more unequal than such assaults need necessarily be. Every shot from the enemy's lines told upon the expance of men, and the greater part of the division was driven back by the deadly fire of muskets and swivels, and enfilading artillery. On the extreme left, the

¹ His argument was that, by the attack in *line*, you expose *all* the troops to the fire from the *whole front of the entrenchment*.

regiments effected an entrance¹ amid the advanced banks and trenches of petty outworks, where possession could be of little avail; but their comrades on the right were animated by the partial success; they chafed under the disgrace of repulse, and forming themselves instinctively into wedges and masses, and headed by an old and fearless leader,² they rushed forward in wrath. With a shout they leaped the ditch, and up swarming, they mounted the rampart, and stood victorious amid captured cannon. But the effort was great; the Sikhs fought with steadiness and resolution; guns in the interior were turned³ upon the exhausted assailants, and the line of the trench alone was gained. Nor was this achievement the work of a moment. The repulse of the first assailants required that the central division should be brought forward, and these supporting regiments also moved in *line* against ramparts higher and more continuous than the barriers which had foiled the first efforts of their comrades. They, too, recoiled in confusion before

¹ Brigadier Stacy.

² Sir R. Dick mortally wounded close to the trenches.

³ They could not do so at Ferozshah; the guns were, there, fixed.

the fire of the exulting Sikhs. But at the distance of a furlong they showed both their innate valour and habitual discipline by rallying and returning to the charge. Their second assault was aided on the left by the presence in the trenches of that flank, of the victorious first division;¹ and thus the regiments of the centre likewise became, after a fierce struggle, on their own right possessed of as many of the enemy's batteries as lay to their immediate front. The unlooked-for repulse of the second division,² and the arduous contest in which the first was engaged, might have led a casual witness of the strife to ponder on the multitude of varying circumstances which determine success in war; but the leaders were collected and prompt, and the battalions on the right, the victors of Aliwal, were impelled against the opposite flank of the Sikhs; but there, as on all other points attacked, destruction awaited brave men. They fell in heaps, and the first line was thrown back upon the second, which, nothing daunted, moved rapidly to the assault. "The two lines mingled their ranks and rushed

¹ Brigadier Stacy's brigade.

² Caused by a large mound which could not be passed in line, but by the troops *wedging in*.

forward in masses just as the second division had retrieved its fame, and as a body of cavalry¹ had been poured into the camp from the left, to form that line of advance, which surpassed the strength of the exhausted infantry."

"Openings were thus everywhere effected in the Sikh intrenchments, but single batteries still held out; the interior was filled with courageous men, who took advantage of every obstacle, and fought fiercely for every spot of ground." Gradually "each defensible position was captured, and the enemy was pressed towards the scarcely fordable river;² yet, although assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh offered to submit, and no disciple of Govind asked for quarter. They everywhere showed a front to the victors, and stalked slowly and sullenly away, while many rushed singly forth to meet assured death by contending with a multitude. The victors looked with stolid wonderment upon the indomitable courage of the

¹ 3rd dragoons. This was much in the style of the Duke of Marlborough.

² It was Sham Sing, and not Tej Sing, who caused the bridge of boats to be broken, to prevent any flying across the river: thus hoping to induce the troops to remain in the intrenchment to the last.

vanquished, and forbore to strike when the helpless and the dying frowned unavailing hatred."

Sir H. Gough states in his despatch.¹ "The fire of the Sikhs first slackened, and then nearly ceased; and the victors then pressing them on every side, precipitated them in masses over their bridge, and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they suffered from our horse artillery a terrible carnage. Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of the action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mangling every wounded soldier whom in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war left at their mercy."² I must pause in this narrative especially to notice the determined

¹ Despatches, 2nd Edition (1846), p. 119—13th of February, 1846, par. 6.

² This is a complete answer to those who found fault with Lord Gough. See Beatson's and other accounts as to Seringapatam in 1799.

hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Gorkhas, the Sirmoor, and Nusseree, met the Sikhs, wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of small stature, but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation, and armed with the short weapon¹ of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat."

List of Killed and Wounded.

Total killed	320
„ wounded	2,063
	2,383

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.
European officers	13	101
Native „	3	39

Total, European and native officers killed and wounded, one hundred and fifty-six.

The Sikhs acknowledged that they had thirty-seven thousand men engaged in this battle, exclusive of the large force, particularly cavalry, at this side the river, and that their loss on this

¹ The kookree. When Captain J. Fisher (23rd native infantry), commanding the Sirmoor battalion, fell, his men revenged his death by attacking the Sikhs with their kookrees. The Gorkhas behaved well at Bhurtpoor in 1825-26.

occasion was from thirteen thousand¹ to fourteen thousand men.²

Major-general Sir R. H. Dick, K.C.B. and K.C.H., died of his wounds. Major-general Gilbert was slightly wounded, and twelve field and commanding officers were killed or wounded.

Brigadier E. J. Smith, engineers, formed the plan of attack. The dispatch³ states that Brigadier A. Irvine arrived on the evening of the 9th, and declined to assume the command,⁴ not wishing to take to himself the credit due to another.

¹ With regard to French, &c., officers, Runjeet did not wish them to *command*, or do more than *instruct* his Sikh officers. He knew that in 1803 the European officers left Sindia's service, when our proclamation was issued. *English* officers were *obliged* to resign his service, and obtained pensions from the Indian government. Most of the foreign officers also left his troops. Hence, in a war with the English, Runjeet knew he could not reckon on the services of his European officers. General Cortland left the Sikh army in 1845, before the first battle. The foreign officers (Allard, Ventura, Avitabili, M. Court, &c., were, it is believed, in Europe). Another thing, Runjeet knew that M. Perron, the principal European officer in Sindia's service, was gaining too much influence. He made a large fortune.

² Despatches, p. 129, *note*.

³ Despatches, par. 27, p. 125.

⁴ All the train from Delhi had not arrived (Governor general to the secret committee, 19th of February, 1846,

On the night of the victory, Major-general Sir J. Littler (as had been before arranged), crossed the Sutlej with his division. "No enemy was visible, and on the 12th of February,¹ the fort of Kussoor was occupied without opposition. On the following day, the army encamped under the walls of that ancient town, and it was ascertained that the Sikhs still held together to the number of twenty thousand men in the direction of Amritsir. But the power of the armed representatives of the Khalsa was gone; the holders of treasure and food, and all the munitions of war, had first passively helped to defeat them, and then openly joined the enemy; and the soldiery readily assented to the requisition of the court that Golab Sing, their chosen minister, should have full powers to treat with the English on the already admitted basis of recognising a Sikh government in Lahore. On the 15th, the raja and several other chiefs were received by the Governor-general at Kussoor, and they were told that Dhuleep Sing would continue to be re-

par. 3, p. 99, Despatch). It is said that Brigadier Irvine thought it would have been better to wait for the whole of the mortars and guns, shot and shells; the shot and shells were all expended before the assault.

¹ Cunningham, p. 329.

garded as a friendly sovereign, but that the country between the Beas and Sutlej would be retained by the conquerors, and that £1,500,000 must be paid as some indemnity for the expenses of the war. After a long discussion, the terms were reluctantly agreed to; the young maharaja came and tendered his submission in person, and on the 20th of February the British army arrived at the Sikh capital. Two days afterwards, a portion of the citadel was garrisoned by English regiments."

It was too late in the season for further operations (if the conquest of the Punjab had been the object at the time). There must have been distant operations, extending to Peshawur and Mooltan, besides against the capital. At a review in March 1846, the Sikhs had an army of twenty thousand men collected near the city.¹ "The raja of Jummoo coveted more than his own native mountains." "As two-thirds of the pecuniary indemnity required from Lahore could not be made good, territory was taken instead of money, and Cashmeer and the hill states from

¹ Lord Hardinge remarked to a field officer the reduced state of our European force. Sir C. Napier's force was at hand; but the season was too far advanced.

the Beas to the Indus were cut off from the Punjab Proper, and transferred to Golab Sing, as a separate sovereign, for £1,000,000.”¹ On the 15th March, 1846, Golab Sing was invested with the title of maharaja. “It was agreed² that a British force should remain at the capital until the last day of December 1846, to enable the chiefs to feel secure while they reorganised the army, and introduced order and efficiency into the administration. The end of the year came, but the chiefs were still helpless; they clung to their foreign support, and gladly assented to an arrangement which leaves the English in immediate possession of the reduced dominions of Runjeet Sing, until his reputed son and feeble successor shall attain the age of manhood.”³ Major-general Sir J. H. Littler, G.C.B., was selected to command the troops at Lahore.

On the 5th April, 1847, Viscount Hardinge⁴ wrote to the secret committee of the East India

¹ By Article 3. Treaty, 16th of March, 1846, with Golab Sing, seventy-five lakhs of rupees (£750,000), for Cashmere, was the amount.

² Cunningham, p. 333.

³ Cunningham, p. 417. 2nd Treaty, 1846. Understood to be till he should be eighteen years of age (or till 1854).

⁴ Punjab “Blue Book,” 1847-49, p. 1.

Company, that the Sikh authorities composing the durbar, appeared to be carrying on the government of the country under the British resident (Lieut.-colonel H. M. Lawrence), with a sincere desire to insure a successful result. In his letter of the 27th May, 1847, the Governor-general wrote to the committee that "The resident observes that, as usual, all sorts of reports are raised of evil intentions on the part of the Sikhs, and even of the chiefs, against us, which he declares to be greatly exaggerated, and many obviously false. Measures were taken to secure to Golab Sing the possession of Cashmeer.

On the 21st of November, 1847, Moolraj, the dewan of Mooltan tendered his resignation.¹ Mr. V. Agnew of the civil service, and Lieut. Anderson, Bombay army, had been sent to Mooltan with Sir-dar Khan Sing who was to become the new dewan. A small corps of five hundred and thirty men of irregulars was sent with them. They were attacked by Moolraj's people, were both wounded and died.² It was proposed to send a force to punish these acts of murder and rebellion. In

¹ "Blue Book," p. 90. Mooltan, is about two hundred and twenty miles from Lahore and Ferozpoor.

² "Blue Book," p. 131.

July, 1848, Major-general Sir J. H. Littler¹ wrote "I entirely concur with his Excellency the Commander-in-chief as to the inexpediency of immediate operations against the fort of Mooltan, with a British force. That fort is now surrounded, and closely invested, by the troops of the nawab of Bahawulpore and Lieutenant Edwardes, and they are, no doubt, strong enough to maintain their ground against any attack, than can be made by Dewan Moolraj's party." On the 13th of July, 1840, Lieutenant Edwardes wrote to the resident at Lahore,² as to Raja Sher Sing (son of Chuttur Sing) that his force was against us to a man. At last, on the 22nd of July, 1848, a proclamation was issued against Moolraj³ regarding his rebellion, treacherous murder of the British officers, and his schemes and plots for the subversion of the Khalsa government.

Major-general Whish marched and encamped in the vicinity of the fortress of Mooltan, on the 18th of August, 1848,⁴ with about seven thousand

¹ "Blue Book," p. 252.

² "Blue Book," p. 254. Shere Sing's troops at Mooltan.

³ "Blue Book," p. 260.

⁴ "Blue Book," p. 291—299.

men. He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants.¹ On the 6th of September, 1848, a council of war was held as to the mode of attack.² The place was bombarded on the 12th of September, and other operations undertaken. Sher Sing marched from Mooltan with his troops on the 14th. General Whish held a council of war, at which it was determined to withdraw from the siege, and taking up a position, wait for reinforcements.³

On the 1st of September, 1848, the resident at Lahore,⁴ wrote to the government of India, alluding to the rebellion of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, that he had ordered the Jallunder⁵ moveable column to be held in readiness. It was not to move unless Chuttur Sing marched towards the capital. On the 18th of November, 1848, the resident issued a proclamation stating, that "the British army under the right honourable Commander-in-chief, has entered the Punjab districts. The army will not return to its canton-

¹ "Blue Book," p. 327.

² "Blue Book," p. 330.

³ "Blue Book," p. 358.

⁴ Sir F. Currie, Bart., in room of Sir H. Lawrence in England.

⁵ The country ceded to us.

ments, until the full punishment of all insurgents has been effected, all armed opposition to constituted authority put down, and obedience and order have been re-established."

It appeared also that Moolraj distrusted Sher Sing.¹ The operations against Mooltan had been discontinued for three and a half months. The Bombay column, under Brigadier the Hon. D. Dundas, having arrived, the force attacked the enemy's entrenchments on the 27th of December, 1848,² Mooltan was taken on the 2nd of January, 1849, with a loss of one thousand one hundred and ninety-eight killed and wounded, in all the operations before the place. On the 27th December, 1848, by a shell from one of the mortars, the enemy's principal magazine in the citadel was blown up, and the grand musjid, and many houses destroyed.³ This termination of the siege enabled General Whish to march with a considerable portion of his force to join the Commander-in-chief. It was by some thought at the time, that General Whish might have carried on the

¹ "Blue Book," p. 387.

² "Blue Book," p. 515.

³ Somewhat similar to the case at the siege of Hattrass on the 1st of March, 1817.

siege without waiting for reinforcement : but the present opinion is that he acted with great prudence in not risking a failure.

The affair at Ramnuggur.—The Commander-in-chief,¹ deeming it necessary to drive the rebel force, at this side the river, across, and capture any guns they might have had on the left bank, “ directed Brigadier General Campbell, with an infantry brigade, accompanied by the cavalry division, and three troops of horse artillery, under Brigadier-general Cureton, to proceed during the night of the 21st of November, 1848, from Saharun, four miles in front of the Commander-in-chief’s camp at Nonwulla, to effect that object.” They proceeded next morning, and got into difficult ground near the river, and found themselves exposed to the fire of twenty-eight of the enemy’s guns. This was an unfortunate cavalry affair. It teaches the lesson of the necessity of examining ground near the bank of a river where the enemy are known, or supposed to be. It cost the lives of Brigadier-general Cureton and Lieut.-colonel Havelock, eighty-seven men killed, and one hundred and forty wounded.

Action of Sadoolapoor, 3rd of December, 1848.

¹ “ Blue Book,” p. 445.

—Major-general Thackwell had three troops of horse artillery, two light field-batteries,¹ her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, two regiments of light cavalry, one irregular cavalry, her Majesty's 24th and 61st regiments of infantry, five regiments of native infantry, and two companies of pioneers. The two 18-pounders and the Pontoon train were sent back. The major-general crossed the Chenab, and attacked the enemy under Sher Sing, at Sadoolapoor. He wrote, "After a cannonade of about two hours, the fire of the enemy slackened, and I sent Lieut. Patton to desire the cavalry on the right to charge, and take the enemy's guns if possible, intending to support them by moving the brigades in *echelon*, from the right at intervals, according to circumstances; but as no opportunity offered for the cavalry to charge, and so little of daylight remained, I deemed it safer to remain in my position, than attempt to drive back an enemy so strongly posted on their right and centre, with the prospect of having to attack their entrenched position afterwards. From this position, the Sikhs began to retire at about twelve o'clock at night, as was afterwards ascertained, and as was conjectured

¹ "Blue Book," p. 451, 452. Thirty guns sent, two were sent away, leaving only twenty-eight guns.

by the barking of dogs in their rear. I have every reason to believe that Sher Sing attacked with twenty guns; and nearly the whole of the Sikh army were employed against my position, which was by no means what I could have wished it; but the fire of our artillery was so effective that he did not dare to bring his masses to the front; and my brave, steady, and ardent infantry, whom I had caused to lie down to avoid the heavy fire, had no chance of firing a shot, except a few companies on the left of the line. 'The enemy's loss has been severe; ours, comparatively, very small.¹ I regret not being able to capture the enemy's guns, but with the small force of cavalry, two regiments on the right only, it would have been a matter of difficulty to tired cavalry to overtake horse artillery, fresh, and well mounted.'" He praised the patient endurance of all the troops "under privations of no ordinary nature."

The battle of Chillianwalla,² 13th of January, 1849. On the 10th of January Lord Gough heard of the fall of Attock, and of the advance of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in order to concentrate

¹ Seventy-three men and forty-eight horses killed and wounded.

² "Blue Book," p. 538.

his force with the army under Sher Sing (amounting to from thirty thousand to forty thousand men, and sixty-two guns), then in his lordship's front. Lord Gough moved on the 12th to Dingee, about twelve miles. Sher Sing, it was understood, held, with his right, the villages of Lukhneewalla and Futteh Shah-Ke-Chuck, having the great body of his force at the village of Lollianwalla, with his left at Russool, on the Jhelum, strongly occupying the southern extremity of a low range of difficult hills, intersected by ravines, which extend nearly to that village. On the morning of the 13th the force advanced. A considerable detour was made to the right, principally "to get as clear as I could, of the jungle, on which it would appear that the enemy mainly relied." The army approached the village of Chillianwalla about noon, and found a strong picquet of the Sikhs on a mound close to it, which was dispersed. From this mound a very extended view of the country was obtained, and of the enemy drawn out in battle array. The ground in front was, though not a dense, still, a difficult jungle—the Sikh right in advance of Futteh-Shah-Ke-Chuck, and his left on the furrowed hills before described. "The day

being far advanced, Lord Gough determined upon taking up a position in rear of the village, in order to reconnoitre his front, finding he could not turn the enemy's flanks (which rested upon a dense jungle, extending nearly to Heileh, which he had previously occupied for some time, and the neighbourhood of which he knew, and upon the raviney hills near Russool), without detaching a force to a distance: this he considered both inexpedient and dangerous."¹

"The engineer department" (his lordship says), "had been ordered to examine the country before us; and the quarter-master-general was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse artillery and opened a fire on the skirmishes in front of the village.² I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the village. Their fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the enemy's field artillery, thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle had hitherto concealed."

¹ A battle may be won by turning *one* flank.

² The original intention was not to attack that day.

“ It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, and would, probably, advance his guns so as to reach this encampment during the night. I, therefore, drew up in order of battle, Sir Walter Gilbert’s division on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope’s brigade of cavalry, which I strengthened by the 14th light dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong in cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse artillery, under Lieut.-colonel Grant. The heavy guns were in the centre. Brigadier-general Campbell’s division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White’s brigade of cavalry, and three troops of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-colonel Brind. The field batteries were with the infantry division. Thus formed, the troops were ordered to lie down, whilst the heavy guns, under Major Horsford, ably seconded by Brevet-majors Ludlow and Sir R. Shakespear, opened a well-directed and powerful fire upon the enemy’s centre, where his guns appeared principally to be placed; and this fire was ably supported on the flanks by the field batteries of the infantry divisions. After about an hour’s fire, that of the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to justify an

advance upon his position and guns. I then ordered my left division to advance, which had to move over a greater extent of ground, and, in front of which, the enemy seemed not to have many guns. Soon after I directed Sir Walter Gilbert to advance, and sent orders to Brigadier Pope to protect the flank and support the movement. Brigadier Penny's brigade was held in reserve, while the irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Harsey, with the 20th native infantry, was ordered to protect the enormous amount of provisions and baggage that so harasses the movements of an Indian army.¹

The attack on the enemy's guns, under Brigadier Pennycuick and Lieutenant-colonel Brookes, was a failure, because the order to charge was given (as is too often the case in India), when the troops were at too great a distance, as the Despatch states—"This unhappy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the native corps, which could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a belt of thicker jungle, where

¹ We never in India form the baggage into a square or other form, so as to require few troops to protect it. The Lohance merchants form a square with the grain bags and saddles, and a few men, inside the square; and protect everything.

they got into some confusion, and Lieut.-colonel Brookes, leading the 24th (foot), was killed between the enemy's guns. At this moment a large body of infantry, which supported their guns, opened upon them so destructive a fire that the brigade was forced to retire, having lost their gallant and lamented leader, Brigadier Pennycuick, and the three other field officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way; the native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely. In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed to state, that they behaved heroically, and, but for their too hasty, and consequently disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct of their left brigade, which, left unsupported for a time, had to charge to their front and right, wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of horse artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-colonel Brind, judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire."

"Major-general Sir J. Thackwell, on the extreme left and rear, charged the enemy's cavalry wherever they showed themselves. The right attack of infantry, under that able officer, Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert, was successful. This division nobly maintained the character of the

Indian army, taking and spiking the whole of the enemy's guns in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever they were seen."

The affair of the right cavalry brigade was an unfortunate occurrence. It does not clearly appear that so many corps were required. They were crowded up together; and the formation of cavalry in front of horse artillery¹ was a case for which, perhaps, there is no parallel in military history. If another regiment were required, it should have been formed on the extreme right of the cavalry line.

The action lasted till near eight o'clock at night. We did not bring off all the guns which had been captured, as only twelve remained in our possession. The despatch concludes—"The victory was complete as to the total overthrow of the enemy; and his sense of utter discomfiture and defeat will, I trust, soon be made apparent, unless, indeed, the rumours, prevalent this day, of his having been joined by Chuttur Sing, prove correct. I am informed that the loss of the Sikhs has been very great, and chiefly among their old and tried soldiers. In no action do I remember seeing so many of an enemy's

¹ Four of the guns upset by the cavalry retreating.

slain upon the same space; Sobraon; perhaps, only excepted."

Our loss was two thousand three hundred and fifty-seven men, and one hundred and seventy-six horses killed and wounded.

The battle of Goojerat, 21st of February, 1849.¹ The fall of Mooltan had permitted Major-general Whish, C.B., to march to join Lord Gough. He reached Ramnuggur² on the 13th, and joined army head-quarters on the 16th of February. On the 15th his Excellency had moved in the direction of Wuzeerabad, the enemy having left their entrenchments, and taken up a position between Goojerat and the Chenab. The governor-general says, "want of supplies led to this movement, on the part of the enemy, who were allowed to effect it without being molested by our troops." Their intention appears to have been to have crossed the Chenab, and, after ravaging the Rechna Doab, to proceed to Lahore; but the intention was frustrated by Major-general Whish's having detached a brigade, to guard the fords above and below Wu-

¹ "Blue Book," p. 597.

² "Blue Book," p. 584. Governor-general to Secret Committee.

zeerabad. The rear brigade, or Bombay column, of the Mooltan reinforcements, under Brigadier-general the Hon. H. Dundas, C.B., reached his Excellency's head quarters on the evening of the 19th, thus completing the army at the disposal of his Excellency.

Full Despatch, 26th of February, 1849.¹ Victory over the Sikhs.—The Sikh army was calculated, from all reports, at sixty thousand men of all arms, and fifty-nine pieces of artillery, under the command of Sirdar Chuttur Sing and Raja Sher Sing, with a body of one thousand five hundred Affghan horse, led by Akram Khan, son of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan;² a result, my lord, glorious indeed, for the ever-victorious army of India; their position carried, their guns, ammunition, the ranks of the enemy broken, camp equipage and baggage captured, their flying masses driven before their victorious pursuers, from mid-day to dusk, receiving most severe punishment in their flight; and, my lord, with gratitude to a merciful Providence, I have the satisfaction of adding that, notwithstanding

¹ "Blue Book," p. 597. Having written a short account on the field of battle to the governor-general.

² In all his misfortunes the Dost had not learnt the political wisdom of never joining a falling party.

the obstinate resistance of the enemy, this triumphant success, this brilliant victory, has been achieved with comparatively little loss on our side." The number of guns taken in the action and captured in the line of pursuit, "I now find to be fifty-three."¹

"By a reconnoissance, it was found that the enemy's camp nearly encircled the town of Goojerat, their regular troops being placed immediately fronting us, between the town and a deep water-course, the dry bed of the river Dwara; this nullah, which is very tortuous, passing round nearly two sides of the town of Goojerat, diverging to a considerable distance on the north and west faces, and then taking a southerly direction, running through the centre of the ground I occupied at Shadewal. Thus, the enemy's position on the right was greatly strengthened, the nullah giving cover to his infantry, in front of his guns, whilst another deep, though narrow, wet nullah, running from the east of the town, and falling into the Chenab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad, covered his left. The ground between these nullahs, for a space of nearly three miles, being well calculated for the operations of

¹ Including those lost at Ramnuggur and Chillianwalla,—now recovered, p. 503.

all arms, and presenting no obstacle to the movement of my heavy guns, I determined to make my principal attack in that direction, and disposed my force accordingly."

"On the extreme left, I placed the Bombay column, commanded by the Hon. H. Dundas, supported by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and the Sindh horse, under Sir J. Thackwell, to protect the left, and to prevent large bodies of Sikh and Affghan cavalry from turning that flank; with this cavalry, I placed Captain Duncan's and Whish's troops of horse-artillery, whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse artillery, under Major Blood."

"On the right of the Bombay column, and with the right resting on the nullah, I placed Brigadier-general Campbell's division of infantry, covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, having Brigadier Hoggan's brigade of infantry in reserve."

"Upon the right of the nullah, I placed the infantry division of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert; the heavy guns, eighteen in number under Majors Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakspear, and Brevet-major Sir R. Shakspear, commanding batteries, being disposed, in two divisions, upon the flanks of his left brigade."

“The line was prolonged by Major-general Whish’s division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry, under Brigadier Markham, in support, in second line ; and the whole covered by three troops of horse artillery, Major Fordyce’s, Captains Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s, and No. 17 light field battery, under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-colonel Lane’s, and Captain Kinleside’s, troops of horse artillery, in a second line, in reserve, under Lieutenant-colonel Brind.”

“My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Harsey’s and Lockwood’s brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner’s troop of horse artillery.”

“The 5th and 6th light cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 45th and 69th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Mercer, most effectually protected my rear and baggage.”

“With my right wing, I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy’s line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss ; and, in co-operation with the right, to double upon the centre, the wing of the enemy’s force opposed to them.”

“At half-past seven o’clock, the army advanced, in the order described, with the precision of a

parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery, covered by skirmishers."

"The cannonade, now opened upon the enemy, was the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effects."¹

"The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity;² and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position; but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement by my artillery, as before."

"The village of Burra Kalra, the left one of those of that name, in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert's advance, and was carried, in the most brilliant style, by a spirited attack of the third brigade, under Brigadier Penny, consisting of the

¹ Brigadier-general Tennant, commandant of artillery, it is said, proposed a cannonade for three hours. The plan was followed out.

² Said to be three times to our twice at Ferozshah.

2nd Europeans, 31st and 70th regiments of native infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with great slaughter."

"A very spirited and successful movement was also made, about the same time, against a heavy body of the enemy's troops in and about the second, or Chota, Kalra, by part of Brigadier Hervey's brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-colonel Franks, of her Majesty's 10th foot."

"The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance, and beautiful fire of the horse artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened, by bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-colonel Brind, Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse artillery, broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it. The nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position carried, the camp captured, and the enemy routed in every direction; the right wing, and Brigadier-general Campbell's division, passing in pursuit to the eastward, the Bombay column to the westward of the town."

“The retreat of the Sikh army, thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight; all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles, their track strewed with their wounded, their arms, and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers.”

“Throughout the operations thus detailed, the cavalry brigades on the flanks were threatened, and occasionally attacked, by vast masses of the enemy’s cavalry, which were, in every instance, put to flight by the steady movements and spirited manœuvres of our cavalry, most zealously and judiciously supported by the troops of horse artillery attached to them, from whom the enemy received the severest punishment.”

“On the left, a most successful and gallant charge was made upon the Affghan cavalry, and a large body of Gorchurras, by the Sindh horse; and a party of the 9th lancers, when some standards were captured.”

“The determined front shown by the 14th light dragoons, and the other cavalry regiments, on the right, both regular and irregular, completely overawed the enemy, and contributed much to the success of the day. The conduct of all, in following up the fugitive enemy, was beyond all praise.”

“ A competent force under the command of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert, resumed the pursuit towards the Jhelum on the following morning, with a view of cutting off the enemy from the only practicable gun road to the Jhelum. Another division of infantry, under Brigadier-general Campbell, advanced on the road to Bimber, scouring the country in that direction, to prevent their carrying off the guns by that route ; and a body of cavalry, under Lieutenant-colonel Bradford, successfully pushed on several miles into the hills, and twenty-four from Goojerat, accompanied by that most energetic political officer, Captain Nicholson, for the same purpose ; whilst I remained in possession of the field, for the purpose of supporting these operations, covering the fords of the Chenab, and destroying the vast magazines of ammunition left scattered in all directions. I am happy to add, that these combinations have been entirely successful, the detached parties coming, at every step, on the wreck of the dispersed and flying foe.”

Calibre of 53 Sikh guns taken.

1—eighteen-pounder.

2—sixteen pounders.

1—twelve-pounder.

5—nine-pounders.

19—eight-pounders.
 2—seven and a half pounders.
 3—seven pounders.
 6—six-pounders.
 1—three-pounder.
 2—two-pounders.

42

8—howitzers.
 3—mortars.

53

The British artillery :¹—

Ten eighteen-pounders, and eight eight-inch howitzers, drawn by elephants; nine troops of horse artillery, and four batteries of foot artillery.

—Total, ninety-six guns and howitzers.²

“These batteries, engaged in action by those attached to the first and second divisions, advancing within about six hundred yards, and the heavy guns within eight hundred or one thousand yards, of the enemy’s artillery, on which they opened their fire about nine o’clock, A.M.”

Our artillery practice lasted for three hours. Major-general Whish,³ in his report on the 22nd

¹ “Blue Book,” p. 602. One troop and one battery of Bombay artillery, not at p. 602.

² The calibre of the British guns (three out of nine were native troops), would be about 864 pounds. The calibre of the Sikh guns a little more than half of the British.

³ “Blue Book,” p. 609.

February, 1849, says, "Both troops¹ began a spirited cannonade; and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun, per hour, until the enemy's guns in our front (like those, I believe, in front of every part of the line, through a similar treatment) were silenced." These guns were worked at one thousand, and five hundred, yards.

Troops employed.

Cavalry—Her Majesty's 3rd, 9th, and 14th light dragoons; Bengal 1st, 5th, 6th and 8th light cavalry; 3rd and 9th irregular cavalry; detachments of 11th and 14th irregular cavalry, Sindh horse.

Artillery—Nine troops horse artillery, and four light field batteries (one each of the Bombay army).

Infantry—Her Majesty's 10th, 29th, and 32nd foot; Bengal 2nd European regiment; 8th, 13th, 15th, 25th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 36th, 45th, 46th, 51st, 52nd, 56th, 69th, 70th, and 72nd.²

This force was about twenty-four thousand men.

¹ Fourth of the 1st brigade, and 4th of the 3rd brigade, *native* troops.

² The Bombay 1st Fusileers, under Honourable Colonel H. Dundas; the native corps not known to the author.

The Governor-general,¹ on the 24th March, 1849, reports to the secret Committee, that the British prisoners² had been delivered up to Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert, who had been sent in pursuit of the flying Sikhs. On the 10th March, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and Raja Sher Sing, and several other sirdars and officers of the Sikh army, arrived in his camp, and gave up their swords, and made over seventeen guns. On the 14th, at Rawal Pindee, he received the surrender of the whole body of the Sikh army, the sirdars surrendering their swords, in the presence of the commanding officers of divisions and brigades, and their staff. The total number of guns given up was forty-one, and sixteen thousand stand of arms were laid down. "I have since learnt, that the arms amount to more than twenty thousand." "We have now," writes his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, "in our possession fifty-six guns, taken at Goojerat, and abandoned by the enemy in his retreat on the 21st February; forty-one surrendered to Major-general Sir W. Gilbert, since that event, twelve captured at Chillianwalla, and fifty at Mooltan, making a total of one hundred

¹ "Blue Book," p. 625.

² Major and Mrs. Lawrence, her children, and several officers.

328 LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED.

and fifty-eight pieces of ordnance, which have fallen into our hands during the present campaign."

Killed, wounded, and missing in the Sikhs battles from the 18th of December, 1845, to the 21st of February, 1849.

1845.		OFFICERS AND MEN.	HORSES.
18th Dec.	Moodkee . . .	872	297
21, 22, Dec.	Ferozshah . . .	2,419	507
1846			
28th Jan.	Aliwal. . . .	589	353
10th Feb.	Sobraon . . .	2,383	148
		6,263	1,305
1848.			
23rd Nov.	Ramnuggur . . .	90	140
3rd Dec.	Sadoolapoor . . .	73	48
1849.			
13th Jan.	Chillianwalla . . .	2,357	176
1848 & 1849.	Mooltan . . .	1,198	0
21st Feb., 1849.	Goojerat . . .	807	230
		10,788	1,899
Grand totals . . .			

This brings to a conclusion the account of the principal political and military events in India, from the year 1756 to 1849; or, during a period of ninety-three years. The Punjab was annexed to British India.

FINIS.

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